



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.


About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

NYPL RESEARCH LIBRARIES



3 3433 07024671 9







ARCHBISHOP WHATELY'S WRITINGS,

PUBLISHED BY

JAMES MUNROE & CO.,

No. 134 Washington Street, Boston, and Lyceum Building, Cambridge.

I.

EASY LESSONS ON REASONING. New Edition.
12mo. p.p. 180. 63 cents.

"It is an admirably clear and simple introduction to Dr. Whately's Elements of Logic, being designed, apparently, to facilitate the use of that work in Academies and High Schools." — *North American Review*.

II.

ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. Comprising the substance of the Article in the Encyclopædia Metropolitana, with additions, &c. New Revised Edition, with Author's last additions. Large 12mo. p.p. 484. Cloth stamped, \$1.00.

"This work (Elements of Logic) has long been our text-book here. The style in which you have published this new edition of so valuable a work leaves nothing to be desired in regard of elegance and convenience. — PROFESSOR DUNN, *Brown University*.

III.

ELEMENTS OF RHETORIC. Comprising an Analysis of the Laws of Moral Evidence and of Persuasion, with Rules for Argumentative Composition and Elocution. New Edition, Revised by the Author. Large 12mo. p.p. 546. \$1.00.

"The Elements of Rhetoric has become so much a standard work, that it might seem superfluous to speak of it. In short, we should not dream of teaching a College class from any other book on Rhetoric. Communion with Whately's mind would improve any mind on earth." — *Presbyterian Quarterly Review*.

IV.

A SELECTION OF ENGLISH SYNONYMS. Second Edition Revised and Enlarged. 12mo. p.p. 180. 63 cents.

"It is marked by that strong common-sense and accurate learning which have rendered the author's educational treatises so indispensable to all professional teachers. We know of no work on Synonyms that is equal in value to this." — *New York Recorder*

V.

LESSONS ON MORALS AND CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES. Edited by Rev. F. D. Huntington, D.D. 12mo. p.p. 330. 75 cents.

VI.

INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON THE MIND, with Preface by the American Editor. 12mo. p.p. 240. 75 cents.

**VALUABLE LIST OF
SCHOOL AND COLLEGE TEXT-BOOKS
USED IN MOST OF THE NEW ENGLAND COLLEGES.**

PUBLISHED BY

JAMES MUNROE & CO.,

184 Washington St., Boston, and Lyceum Building, Cambridge, Mass.

The Subscribers would ask the attention of Teachers and the Friends of Education generally to their superior merits:

Demosthenes' Select Popular Orations, with English Notes, by Prof. Champlin, of Waterville College. Revised Edition. 12mo.	\$1 00
The Gorgias of Plato, with English Notes, by President Woolsey, of Yale College. Fifth Edition. 12mo.	1 00
The Agamemnon of Æschylus, with Notes, by Prof. Felton, of Harvard University. Third Edition. 12mo.	1 00
Demosthenes' Orations on the Crown, with Notes, by Prof. Champlin. Sixth Edition. 12mo.	1 00
Homer's Iliad, with Notes, by Prof. Felton. Twentieth Edition. 12mo.	1 50
Æschylus Tragedy Septem Contra Thebas, with Notes. 12mo.	67
Demosthenes' Three Philippics. Notes by Prof. Smead. Revised Edition. 12mo.	1 00
Follen's German Reader, with Additions by Mr. Schmitt, Teacher of German in Harvard University. 12mo.	1 25
Follen's German Grammar and Exercises. New Ed. 12mo.	1 25
Virgil, with English Notes, by Prof. Bowen, of Harvard University. Ninth Edition. 8vo.	2 25
Metres of the Greeks and Romans. Notes by Profs. Beck and Felton. 12mo.	1 50
Geometry and the Science of Form. Prepared from the most approved Prussian Text-Books by Mrs. Lowell. 12mo. Plates	84
Day's Outlines of Physical Geography. Cuts. 12mo.	63
Coleridge's Introduction to the Greek Classic Poets. 12mo.	75
Peirce's (Prof. B.) Elements of Algebra and Geometry. 12mo. Plates, each,	84
Peirce's (Prof. B.) Plain and Spherical Trigonometry. 8vo. Plates.	1 75
Peirce's (Prof. B.) Curves, Functions, and Forces. 2 vols. 12mo. Plates.	2 50
The Alcestis of Euripides. Notes by President Woolsey. Revised Edition. 12mo.	56
The Antigone of Sophocles. Notes by President Woolsey. Revised Edition. 12mo.	56
The Prometheus of Æschylus. Notes by President Woolsey. Revised Edition. 12mo.	56
The Electra of Sophocles. Notes by President Woolsey. Revised Edition. 12mo.	56
Stewart's Philosophy of the Human Mind. Edited by Prof. Bowen. 12mo.	1 25

*** Copies of any of our Publications sent, free of postage, on remittance of the advertised price.*

INTRODUCTORY LESSONS

ON

M I N D .

Whately

BY THE AUTHOR OF

"LESSONS ON REASONING," "LESSONS ON MORALS,"
ETC.



ELECTROTYPE EDITION.

BOSTON AND CAMBRIDGE:
JAMES MUNROE AND COMPANY.

MDCCLXII.

CAMBRIDGE:
THURSTON, MILES & FRITCHETT, PRINTERS AND ELECTROTYPEERS.

100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000

INTRODUCTION

TO THE

AMERICAN EDITION.

It was recently remarked by an English Reviewer, that the author of these "Introductory Lessons" is probably to-day exerting more influence upon the minds of those who speak and read the English language, than any other living man. As we read it, we thought the statement quite too strong and broad, and began to inquire whether it could possibly be true. And the more we thought and considered, the more reason did we find for assenting to the opinion of the writer. The writings of Archbishop WHATELY, the author of these "Lessons," are numerous, and on a large variety of subjects, varying from matters familiarly discussed in the School-room to those which occupy the earnest thoughts of statesmen and theologians; but it is not their number, nor yet their variety, that gives them their wide and peculiar influence. This is rather to be ascribed to the fact that so much of what he has written is elementary, and has reference to the education of the young. We are not sure that we could enumerate all the

works which he has prepared to aid in the training of the mind and in the early development of character, but we easily recollect his "Easy Lessons on Reasoning," his "Introductory Lessons on Morals," and on "Christian Evidences," his "Logic," "Rhetoric," and his "English Synonyms," to which we may now add these "Introductory Lessons on Mind."

The great excellence and power of these writings or treatises lie, as we apprehend, in their admirable adaptation as a means to introduce the young reader or student to the general subjects treated, and in the large practical views of each subject, which the author presents. As "introductory," each treatise is elementary, while in the filling up of his plan and in the illustration of the different topics, there are a variety of thought, a scope of argument, and a fulness of knowledge pertaining to the general subject, which show us the man of large and liberal learning, as well as of extensive and accurate observation.

The present little treatise on Mind, which is intended as a sequel to the Lessons on "Reasoning," and on "Morals," has all the characteristics of the author as seen in his other and more pretending works—clearness of thought, directness of statement, pertinence and fulness of illustration, ability to pursue each subject to the limits of human knowledge, and a willingness to stop when those limits are reached.

As a Text-Book to be put into the hands of a class in our academies and in our public schools of a higher grade, this little work will fill a vacant place, and, we doubt not, be found very useful,—while as a book to be read, and even studied, by the teacher or the professional man in hours snatched from systematic toil, it will also be highly valued:

N. M.

Boston, August, 1859.

P R E F A C E .

THESE Lessons are intended as a Sequel to those on "Reasoning," which appeared first in the *Saturday Magazine*; and also to those on "Morals," of which the greatest part appeared first in the *Leisure Hour*; both sets of Lessons having, however, afterwards been published separately.

These Lessons (a portion of which has also appeared in the *Leisure Hour*) are intended — like those former ones — for popular and educational use. They do not at all pretend to form a complete System of the Philosophy of Mind.

If any one could succeed (as doubtless no one ever will) in giving a really sound and satisfactory explanation of all that various Writers on this subject have *attempted* to explain, still he would probably find it impossible to bring this within the reach of ordinary Readers, who have neither the power, nor the desire, to become profound Metaphysicians.

Yet there is no one among the Educated Classes — indeed, hardly, even among the uneducated — who does not, in common conversation, daily hear and say many things pertaining to the mental faculties and operations. And in most books that we read, and sermons or other discourses that we hear, we meet with remarks and statements — true or false — relating to something in the Human Mind. And thus men are led, without any thought of systematic study

PREFACE.

of the subject, to form, or adopt, in a loose and irregular way, some opinions on various points connected with that subject.

Now what all men actually do, and must do, whether well or ill, it is desirable that they should learn to do *well*: at least sufficiently well to avoid gross errors, and hurtful confusion of thought.

The design, then, of this Work is to notice some well-established facts which few or none would deny, but which are not always sufficiently attended to; and to draw some conclusions from these, which, though very evident when stated, are often overlooked.

These Lessons are not brought into so regular and systematic a form as those on "Reasoning," and on "Morals." The subject would hardly admit of this. But it is hoped that the statements and remarks may serve as useful hints, to set the thoughts at work on the subject, and at the same time to guard the Student against being led away by groundless Theories, set forth in a tone of high pretension, and dressed out in fine-sounding language.

CONTENTS.



LESSON I.

	Page
§ 1. Life	1
Soul	1
2. Mind	3
Analogy	4
3. Utility of knowing what we do and do not understand	5

LESSON II.

§ 1. The bodily Senses	7
2. Sensation and Perception	8
3. Sensation distinct from Perception	9
4. Senses of the Brutes	10
5. Use of the Senses, acquired	11
6. Attention to the indications of the Senses	12

LESSON III.

§ 1. Instinct	14
Hunger and Thirst	14
2. Instincts of Brutes	15
3. Instincts, blind	16
4. Implanted Instincts	17
5. Man's Instinct inferior	18
6. Use of fire	19
Man, not left originally untaught	20
7. Reason of Brutes	21
8. Difference of Man and Brute	22

LESSON IV.

	PAGE.
§ 1. The Will	23
2. Active Principles	24
3. Appetites	25
Acquired Appetites	25

LESSON V.

§ 1. Desires	26
2. Affections	27
3. Self-love	28
4. The Moral Faculty	30

LESSON VI.

§ 1. Intellectual Powers	33
2. Influence of the Will on the Feelings	34
3. Memory	35
4. Original differences in Mental Powers	36
5. Different subjects of the Intellectual Powers	37

LESSON VII.

§ 1. Seat of the Mental Powers	39
2. Ancient opinions as to the seats of the Passions	40
3. Nature full of Mysteries	42
4. Theory of Ideas	42
5. Vain attempts at explanation	44
Ready reception of empty Theories	44

LESSON VIII.

§ 1. Men differ in Mental Powers	47
Ear for Music	47
2. Mental Powers connected with Sight	48
3. Faculties connected with bodily Actions	49
4. Faculty of Places	50

LESSON IX.

§ 1. Faculty of Number	51
2. Abstraction	52
Sameness	52
3. Generalizing	54
4. Odd and Singular	55

LESSON X.

	PAGE.
§ 1. Language	56
Brutes cannot generalize	56
2. Deaf-mutes	57
3. An individual standing for a Sign	59
4. Comparison	60
5. Abstraction as employed at pleasure	61
6. Classification	62
Deaf-mutes	63

LESSON XI.

§ 1. Exercise of Will in Reasoning	64
Mental operations of Brutes, not under the control of Will	64
2. Dreams	65
Sleep-walking	66
3. Sound Sleep	66
4. Insanity	67
Passion	67
5. Reasoning suspended, in Sleep	67
Absurdity of dreams	68
6. Responsibility	69

LESSON XII.

§ 1. Fore-part of the Brain	70
2. Possible imperfections of Brain	71
3. Faculty of Comparison	72

LESSON XIII.

§ 1. Inquiry into Causes	74
2. Cause, and Proof, sometimes confounded	75
Necessary and Impossible	76
3. Different Talents	76
4. Men not born alike	77
5. Differences in kind	78
6. Practical mistakes	79
Ill-balanced minds	80

LESSON XIV.

	PAGE.
§ 1. Faculty of Number	81
2. Language	82
3. Imitation	82
4. Talent for Language	83

LESSON XV.

§ 1. Faculty of observing Individuals	85
Good Memory	85
2. Distinct Faculty for observing Individual things	86
3. Curiosity	87

LESSON XVI.

§ 1. Wit	89
2. Laughter peculiar to man	90
Mimicry	91
3. Humor and Wit	92
Pleasure of Imitations	92
4. Contrast	93
Enigmas	93
5. Mock-fallacies	95

LESSON XVII.

§ 1. Faculty of Construction	98
2. Different degrees of the Faculty	99
Constructive power in Brutes	99
3. Imaginative Faculty	99
4. Imagination in Brutes	100
Invention	101

LESSON XVIII.

§ 1. Natural Turns	103
2. Talents supposed incompatible	104
3. Chances against unions of rare qualities	105

LESSON XIX.

	PAGE.
§ 1. Errors in the exercise of the Faculties	107
2. Errors in Comparisons	108
Mandeville's argument	109
3. Importance of noticing differences	109
4. Analogies	111
Mistakes as to analogies	111
Memory described by analogy	112
5. Analogies to be varied	112
6. Parables explained	114
7. Parables like images	115

LESSON XX.

§ 1. Faculty of construction	116
2. Errors arising from excessive desire for System	117
3. Revelations partial	118
4. Scripture like a map of an inland region	119
5. Scripture-language perverted by theories	120
6. Scripture-terms not technical	121

LESSON XXI.

§ 1. Erroneous search for Causes	122
Theory of Ideas	122
2. Poetical-Imagination	123
3. False Humility	124
4. Danger from Works of Fiction	125
5. Imagined easiness of great Actions	126
6. Advantages of exercising Imagination	127
7. Supposed self-improvement of Savages	129
Imagination necessary for doing as you would be done by	130

LESSON XXII.

§ 1. Words denoting intellectual Powers	133
2. Memory and Recollection	134
3. Imagination and Fancy	135
4. Cleverness	136
5. Cleverness no one distinct Faculty	137
Skill	137
Genius	138

LESSON XXIII.

	PAGE.
§ 1. Wisdom	139
Prudence	139
Cunning	140
2. Wisdom perceives Analogies	140
Experience	141
3. Use of Experience	141
4. Experience and Analogy	142
5. Association	143
6. Association of places with thoughts	144
Associations in Brutes	144
Education	144

LESSON XXIV.

§ 1. Sentiments	146
2. Benevolence	147
Public Spirit	147
3. The benevolent the happiest	148
Good-humor	148
4. Veneration	149
5. Conscientiousness	150
Conscientious persecution	151
6. Errors of Conscience	151
Needful warnings	152
Renouncing the World	152
7. Non-resistance	153

LESSON XXV.

§ 1. False Generosity	155
Tenderness towards Sinners, and towards Sin	156
2. Injustice towards Friends	156
An inexorable Character	157
3. Self-Esteem	158
4. Humility	160

LESSON XXVI.

§ 1. Desire of Approbation	167
Praise, admiration, &c.	168
2. Differences in kind	169
Law of Honor	169

CONTENTS.

xi

	PAGE.
3. Dangers of the desire of Approbation	170
4. Vanity self-defeating	172
Unsteadiness of the Vain	173
5. Error in Education	178

LESSON XXVII.

§ 1. Desire of Society	175
Attachment	176
2. Love of Children	177
3. Emulation and Envy	177
Jealousy	178
Who are the objects of these feelings	178
4. Advantage to Society	179
Generous Emulation	180

LESSON XXVIII.

§ 1. Desire of Power	181
2. Conduct of Tyrants	182
3. Dangers of love of Power	184
4. Craving for Excitement	185
Nervous Sensitiveness	186
5. Desire of Gain	186
Avarice	187
6. Temptations to Avarice	187
Different forms of Avarice	188

LESSON XXIX.

§ 1. Idiocy and Insanity	189
Madness	189
Delirium	190
2. Mania and Delirium	190
Intoxication	191
Fever	192
3. Oblivion	192
Apoplexy	193
4. Restored Memory	194

LESSON XXX.

	PAGE.
§ 1. Partial Idiocy	195
2. Partial Insanity	196
3. Delusions of the Senses	197
4. Aversion to Friends	197
5. Treatment of the Insane	198
Varieties of Insanity	199
6. Criminal Lunatics	199
Prevention of Crime	200
7. Discussions about Moral Responsibility	201
Expected Impunity	201
8. Omissions in these Lessons	202

INTRODUCTORY

LESSONS ON MIND.

LESSON I.

§ 1.

EVERY one knows that we have something belonging to us besides a *body*. We all understand that there is a difference between a living man and a dead *Life* corpse. But what that thing is which we call *Life*, we do but imperfectly understand.

Life, in a certain sense, belongs to *Plants*, as well as to ourselves. We speak of a living Tree, and a dead one. What belongs to plants, we call *vegetable-life*. Then, there is also what we call *animal-life*, which is common to us with Brutes. But, besides this, Man has a something which we call *Mind*. And if brutes have anything that can be properly called Mind, at least it must be very different from Man's.

The word *Soul* is used by many persons to denote that thing—whatever it is—which is peculiar to *Soul*. Man. But in Scripture, the word which is

translated "Soul," is commonly used to signify merely *life*. Thus, we read of Joshua, when he extirpated the Canaanites, destroying "all the souls" that were in such and such a place. And the Psalmist speaks of "those who seek after his soul, to destroy it;" meaning, those seeking to kill him.

Our Saviour, however, speaks of "those who kill the body, and after that, have no more that they can do;" and of "Him who is able to destroy both soul and body:" meaning, evidently, that though men can put an end to this our life on earth, there is a future life after our natural death, which God alone can put an end to. And we are told, that, at the Resurrection, "He will change our vile body" [*i. e.* our body in this our humble state],* "that it may be like unto his glorious body."

But whether the human Soul is capable of being in an *active* state *without* a body at all, and what is the nature of the connection of Soul and Body—these are questions on which Scripture gives us no information,† and which are quite beyond the reach of human Reason. When we consider that it has long been a question among Natural Philosophers whether those three powerful agents, Heat, Light, and Electricity, are *substances*, or are merely certain conditions of substances, it does seem a most presumptuous and hopeless task to speculate (as some have done), and pronounce decidedly, concerning the substance of the Soul, and pretend to prove that it is, or that it is not, a material

* This is the exact translation of the original.

† See *Lectures on a Future State*.

substance, or an immaterial substance, or not a substance at all.*

§ 2.

The Mind has been compared to the Eye, which sees other objects, but does not see itself. And all that relates to the Mind is but dimly and im- *Mind.* perfectly understood.

Accordingly, in every language, almost all the words connected with the Mind and its operations are borrowed from something connected with the body; and were origin-

* It is a curious circumstance that the generality of mankind are decided *Materialists*, though without knowing it. If, indeed, you ask any persons whether they hold the Soul to be *material*, most of them will answer "No :—" and many would probably give the same answer if you asked them whether it is a *substance*. For, by "*material*," or "*substantial*," the common people understand something *tangible*. But they believe in the *appearing* of Ghosts (or Spirits, "Ghost" being only the old word for spirit); as we read that the Disciples of the Lord Jesus did, when they saw Him walking on the water, and again, after his resurrection: or at least, they believe that such an appearance is conceivable, and that to speak of a spirit's *appearing* would not imply anything absurd and contradictory. Now, whatever *occupies space*, and has a certain *magnitude*, and *form*, and *color* (which is supposed to be the case with these apparitions), must be something *material*, however thin, and insensible to the touch. It would be a manifest absurdity to talk of a *wish*, or a *sentiment*, or an *opinion* (or, in short, anything that is not material), being tall or short, blue, red, or white, round or square, &c., or of seeing it with your eyes. And to talk of *seeing* a Spirit would be no less absurd, supposing a Spirit to be immaterial.

ally Metaphors. Thus, to "ponder," meant originally to "weigh;" to "infer," is to "bring in;" and to "intend," is to "stretch out" towards anything. To "investigate," is to "track footsteps;" to "discuss," meant to "shake to and fro;" to "suppose," is to "place under:" "Spirit" originally meant "breath;" and it is plain what is the original meaning of "*understand*."

These words are used in a sense to which they are *transferred* from the original sense, by *analogy*;
Analogy. that is, we perceive, or fancy, something in the acts of the Mind *answering* to certain bodily acts. Thus, when you enter into a house and are sheltered under its roof, this is thought to be analogous [answering] to your knowledge of some subject on which your Mind is employed; and thence you are said to "*understand*" it. And when several persons give their opinions on some matter, and bring forward any objections to each other's opinions, this is something analogous to the *shaking* of things backwards and forwards; and hence the word "discuss" is applied to it. So also, when we lay down some fact or principle as the *foundation* of our judgment on any matter, this is thought to be analogous to the foundation-stone on which the wall of a building rests; and hence, we use the word "*supposition*," which originally meant "placing under." And so of the rest.

These words, and many others, have entirely lost their original meaning. But there are also several words which retain their original meaning, and are still in use, both in the literal and also in the metaphorical [transferred, or figurative] sense. Thus, we speak of an *acute* angle, and

of an acute Mind. We speak of the *inclination* of two lines towards each other, and of an "inclination" of the Mind. We speak of a looking-glass *reflecting* an object; that is, seeming to "turn it back;" which is the original meaning of the word "reflect;" and we speak of "reflecting" on some subject, when we turn back our thoughts to it. So also, we speak of *seeing* what is before our eyes, and "seeing" the truth of something that is said. We "*express*" [*i. e.* squeeze out] the juice of grapes; and we "express" our thoughts. And the like is the case with such words as "penetrate," "profound" or "deep," "superficial," and several others.

§ 3.

But though the nature of Mind can be but very imperfectly understood, it is very useful to have a clear view of how far our knowledge does extend, and what there is that is beyond it.

*Utility of
knowing what
we do and do
not under-
stand.*

Anything of a complete System, professing to explain everything that one might wish to have explained concerning the Mind, must be in great part guess-work and fanciful theory, without any well-established facts to rest on. But since it is a duty (as was pointed out in the *Lessons on Morals*) to regulate, as well as we can, on right principles, all our feelings and thoughts, as well as our outward actions, it is necessary, for this purpose, that we should learn as much as we can clearly make out concerning the Mind.

It is also very important to be, ourselves, accurate in the use of the words relating to the subject, and to understand as clearly as possible whatever is said concerning it by others.

LESSON II.

§ 1.

THE bodily Senses are common to Man with most of the Brutes. They are usually reckoned as five; *The bodily Senses.* Sight, Hearing, Smell, Taste and Touch [or Feeling]. But some Physiologists reckon more: that is, they make what may be called *subdivisions* of some of these; reckoning as *distinct Senses* certain different *kinds* of Feeling, &c. But this is a matter which need not be treated of here.

Further on, the case will be noticed, of those who, though possessing the sense of Sight in other respects, have not the perception of *Colors*.

These are external [outward] Organs [instruments], such as the Eye, the Ear, &c., for each of the Senses. But there is also a peculiar Nerve, or nerves, belonging to each; which nerve is connected with the outward Organ, and communicates with the Brain, in all animals that have a Brain. Thus, Anatomists point out the Optic-nerve, which communicates between the Eye and the Brain; — the Auditory-nerve from the Ear, &c.

No Anatomist could tell one of these nerves from another, if placed before him separate from the body. But each of them is affected (during life) in its own particular way; the Optic-nerve by Light, and not by Sounds; the Auditory, by Sounds, and not by Light; and so of the rest.

No one can explain *how* the Brain and the Mind are affected through these Nerves. We only know the fact. And it is known that if the Optic-nerve, for instance, be destroyed, or greatly injured, the person becomes blind, though the eye itself may remain perfect.

It is to be remarked of the Sense of *Touch*, that it is not (like the others) confined to one particular part of the body, but belongs to many parts, though in very unequal degrees. The tip of the tongue has (besides the Sense of Taste) a very delicate Sense of Touch. But the tips of the fingers the most of all. And if you try the experiment of placing some object, first, on your hand, and then higher and higher up the arm, you will find the perception becoming gradually less and less distinct.

§ 2.

When we hear a sound or smell any odor (and the like with the other senses), we have a certain *Sensation and Perception*, *sensation* — sometimes pleasant or painful — and we have also a certain *Perception* — a notion of some object without us, that causes that Sensation.

The word "Sense," in modern language, has come to be used very widely, and with various significations. For we speak of "taking in the sense" of what we hear or read, when we *understand its meaning*. We speak also of a person of *sense*, or of *good-sense*, or a *sensible* man; meaning one who is *intelligent* and judicious. And "*Common-sense*" is used to denote (not necessarily what is most frequently met with, but) any exercise of the Intellect in cases where we are not under the guidance of a particular

Science or Art, but judge and act as well as we can without the aid of fixed Rules.* And the word Good-sense is particularly applied to the judicious *management* and control of any of the intellectual powers and operations. A man who should make some observation that was quite true, and very forcibly and eloquently expressed, but at an unsuitable time, or in an injudicious manner, would be accounted clever, but wanting in good sense.

But we always distinguish these uses of the word Sense, from that in which we speak of the bodily-senses.

§ 3.

The *Sensation*, and the *Perception*, belonging to each of the Senses, though they go together, are two different things. And the strongest *Sensations*, and the most vivid *Perceptions*, do not necessarily go together. For instance, the sense of *Smell* is not, in Man, near equal to that of *Sight*, in the clearness of the Perceptions that it gives us; but its Sensations are much stronger: for, a fine perfume gives us a much stronger sensation of pleasure, than a beautiful color gives to the sense of Sight. And a loathsome Smell is far more painful than the mere view of dingy and ugly colors. And the only pleasures and pains of the sense of Sight, *merely as a sense*, seem to be those of beautiful and ugly *colors*, and the disagreeable effect of a dazzling light.

As for the pleasures and pains which we experience by

* See *Elements of Logic*, Preface.

means of the *perceptions* of sight, they are not, properly, *sensual* [derived from the Sense], but belong to the Mind. The pleasure we experience in admiring a fine prospect, or a picture by a first-rate Artist, and the gratification we express when we tell a dear friend how glad we are to *see* him in good health, and the pain we feel if we see him sick and suffering, — all these evidently arise from the Mind. They are not mere pleasures and pains of *Sense*, like the gratification felt from the odor of a rose, or the disgust at the scent of carrion.

§ 4.

Many of the Brutes exceed Man in the acuteness of some *Senses of the Brutes.* of their Senses. Vultures and Ravens will discover a carcass at a prodigious distance. And the hens in a farm-yard will be alarmed at the approach of a hawk, when so far off, that, to us, it is a speck hardly visible. And yet they can see the food which is so close to their bills that we could not, at so short a distance, see anything distinctly. Many animals, again, especially the dog, have perceptions from the sense of smell which astonish us. For a dog will not only scent his master's footsteps, and distinguish a stick which he has but once touched, but will perceive whether a partridge a long way off is sitting still, or moving, and in what direction. You may see a pointer moving his head, just as the bird moves.

Yet there is no reason to believe that the *sensation* of Smell, in those things which we do smell, is less acute in Man than in the dog. Dogs, indeed, and many other

Brutes, have a sensation of odors from many things, which, to us, have none at all. And their *perceptions* from the sense of Smell are far superior to ours. But if a dog, or a sheep, &c., to which almost *every* thing has some odor, had a *sensation* of Smell equally beyond ours, this would make their life intolerable. But they do not, as far as we can observe, feel more pleasure or pain, directly, from the mere Sensation of odors, than ourselves. A pointer's delight, when he *scent*s a covey of partridges, corresponds with that of the sportsman when he *sees* them: and neither can be reckoned a mere pleasure of sense.

§ 5.

It is to be observed, that the full *use* of the sense of Sight is not born with us, but is gradually acquired. An infant has as perfect eyes as a grown man; but it cannot judge of *distances*. *Use of the Senses, acquired.*

It will reach at the moon, or any other distant object that may attract its notice. And a person who has been born blind, and has obtained sight by a surgical operation when several years old, has been known to remark, that, at first, all objects seemed to touch his eyes; and for a good while he had no notion of their different distances. It was also observed that he had no notion of the *form* of any of the things he saw; and did not at all distinguish even those with which he had been already well acquainted by Touch, till he had viewed them and handled them at the same time. The dog and the cat, for instance, which he had long been used to while blind, and which he readily knew by the

Touch, he was a long time learning to know by the Sight.*

But many brutes seem to be born with the full use of their Senses; or at least to acquire it in a wonderfully short time. For you may see a lamb, or a colt, of a day or two old, galloping playfully about a field, and avoiding a tree or a post, which a human baby would be likely to run against, if it were able to run about as a new-born lamb does.

§ 6.

Some persons are inclined to think that the Senses may be *educated*; that is, improved by practice. *Attention to the indications of the Senses.* The Hottentots in Africa, the American Indians, and the New Hollanders, appear to excel us greatly in Sight: for they can tell at the first glance the footprints of any animal, and can tell whether the track is of a young or an old buffalo, &c., and how long it is since the beast passed, &c. And the blind have often a most astonishing power of Touch and of Smell.

But in all these cases, it is probable that there is no change brought about in the Senses themselves, but only in the degree of *attention to the indications* of those senses.

* We read that in one instance (*Mark viii. 22*) the Lord Jesus cured a blind man (probably one born so), in *two* successive stages. At the first touch, the man saw "men as trees walking;" that is, he could not tell men from trees but from seeing them walk. Jesus then, by a second touch, miraculously gave him that power of *using* the sight he had acquired, which otherwise it would have taken him a considerable time to *learn*; like the patient just mentioned.

Minute differences in the perceptions being habitually noticed with the utmost care, a habit is thus formed of judging from these in such a manner that those who have not cultivated such a habit of close attention, are likely to suppose that the Senses themselves are more acute in the others.

LESSON III.

§ 1.

By the word Instinct is usually understood a tendency to some act without *design*, and without any *Instinct.* thought of the object to be accomplished by that act. Thus a new-born calf or other animal, before it has tasted milk, is led by instinct to seek the udder of the Dam, and to suck. And birds are led to build nests, and bees, a comb, by Instinct, and without any design or thought of thus providing a suitable place for their young.

There are several Instincts which belong, in common, to the Human Species, and to the Brutes. But the Brutes are far more amply provided with them than we are : and the lower and less intelligent animals—such as the bee and the spider—are endowed with more instincts than the higher.

Hunger and Thirst are instinctive tendencies common to us with the Brutes. For though a man is aware *Hunger and Thirst.* that food nourishes, and is necessary for the support of life, a new-born infant is equally sensible of hunger and thirst, and is just in the condition of the Young of any other animal. It can have no knowledge that milk is nourishing, or that it is to be obtained by sucking. And the Instinct of sucking is, itself, when you come to examine

into the matter, something much more wonderful than you might at first suppose. Drawing in the breath exhausts the air within the mouth so as to form something of a "vacuum," as philosophers call it [*i. e.* empty space]: and the pressure of the air being thus removed from the part that is *within* the mouth, that which is *without* the mouth is so pressed by the air as to squeeze in the milk. Now neither a new-born lamb, nor a babe, nor indeed the greater part of grown men, know anything of this action of the air [the pressure of the atmosphere]; and yet they act, instinctively, just as they *would* do if they were well acquainted with the principles of Natural Philosophy.

§ 2.

All Instinct is something very curious, and quite mysterious: but some of the instincts of the lower *Instincts of Brutes.* animals strike us as peculiarly wonderful. In their choice of the proper food for each kind, they are probably led by the scent: but this cannot be the case in all instances; for the Squirrel, and the little bird called the Nuthatch, and several other animals, are led by instinct to seek for and to crack *nuts*, on the kernels of which they feed; and one can hardly suppose that they *smell* the kernel through the shell.

And it is very remarkable that several kinds of animals seek, and find, and provide, proper food for their *young*, when it is *not* food for themselves. Bees, for instance, collect the *pollen* of flowers, from which they prepare a food for the young grub [Larva, as Naturalists call it] that is

afterwards to become a bee. They never eat this themselves. And bees, when they have no access to *flowers*, will continue to live in perfect health, if supplied with honey; but can never rear any young ones; because these can only feed on that preparation of *Pollen* which is called bee-bread.*

Again, Sparrows, and several other birds which, when full-grown, feed entirely on seeds, yet rear their young nestlings on caterpillars and other insects; which they never themselves eat, but diligently hunt for, to put into the little open mouths ready to receive them.

§ 3.

Instinct is (as was remarked above) a *blind* tendency: — *Instincts*, that is, independent of any design, or any *blind*. knowledge of the object to be accomplished. Hence, you may often observe an instinct operating when it does not effect any object at all. For instance, the dog has an instinct to walk several times round the spot where he is going to lie down to sleep. And if this be in long grass, you will see the object of it. For by thus walking round, and round, he tramples down the grass, so as to form a bed, in which he lies down, curled round, as their manner is. But when he is about to lie down on a bare floor, he walks round the spot just in the same way.

Again, the Fox has an instinct to *bury* part of his food,

* Hence, no doubt, the notion of the Ancients, mentioned in Virgil's *Georgics*, that bees find their young ones in flowers.

so that he can return to the place where it is hidden, when he wants it. He scratches a hole with his paws, puts in the flesh, and scrapes the earth over it, which he carefully pats down; and so leaves it. But a tame fox, chained up in a paved yard, goes through all the same motions, when he has more meat than he wants to eat at once. He scratches on the pavement, lays the meat on the spot, and makes the same motions as if he were scraping earth over it; and then retires to his kennel well satisfied, leaving the meat on the surface of the pavement, just as it was at first.

And any one who is observant of the habits of animals, will find many other instances of the same kind.

§ 4.

It is remarkable that some Instincts seem to be, in some instances, *implanted*: that is, a certain Race of animals can be brought, through long custom, in *Implanted Instincts*. many generations, to transmit to their offspring some instinct that did not originally belong to the Species.

The *dread of Man*, in wild animals seems to be an implanted Instinct. For in Countries, uninhabited by men, our voyagers have found the wild animals fearless of them. But in inhabited Countries, a wild animal, on seeing a man for the first time, regards him as an enemy, and either flies, or prepares to fight; but shows no fear of a horse or a sheep, &c.

If you choose to maintain that the *dread of man* is the original Instinct, this comes to the same: for then, the *fearlessness* must be an implanted Instinct.

There are, in some Parks in Great Britain, breeds of wild cows, of the same species as the domestic, but very fierce. One of their calves, when approached by a man, bellows fiercely, and paws the ground, and tries to butt. The calf of a domestic cow, on the contrary, is born tame.

Again, a very thorough-bred young pointer, when he comes upon game for the first time in his life, will stand quite steady; which could not be an *original* instinct of any wild animal.

And other instances may be found which go to prove the same thing.

§ 5.

Brutes possess (as I have said) many more instincts than Man; and these make up to them for their deficiency in Reason. We have, for instance, no instinctive tendency to build houses, or to construct cradles for our offspring; answering to the burrows of rabbits and the nests of birds. And when we attempt to provide such things, from finding the need of them, we have no natural skill in doing this; but have to consider, and examine and consult with one another, as to the proper materials, and the mode of going to work.

Again, men have not the instinctive power that Brutes have, of distinguishing what is suitable *food*, and what is unwholesome or poisonous. All animals that feed on herbage, feed sometimes among plants that would be hurtful to them; and those they have an instinct for avoiding; so that it rarely happens that any of them are poisoned. But Man has no such instincts. The berries, for instance, of

the deadly Nightshade have no unpleasant smell, and taste sweet; so that children have often been poisoned by them. And a very remarkable instance is that of the Cassava root, which is the chief food of the people of many parts of South America. There are two kinds of it, very much alike in appearance; one of which — called by the West Indians the sweet Cassava — is commonly eaten roasted or boiled, like potatoes; and the other (called by them the bitter Cassava) is poisonous, unless prepared in a particular manner by squeezing out the juice. And this is the kind which is most used, as being more productive than the other.

There are also, in the Eastern Seas, several kinds of fish which have no disgusting smell or taste, but are poisonous.

§ 6.

Again, Man has no instinctive knowledge of the modes of obtaining *Fire*, or of its uses. If fire became known to untaught men, accidentally, as by a volcanic eruption, or a tree kindled by lightning, they would be likely to fly from it in terror; especially if on approaching it they received a burn. And there would have been no reason for their thinking that it could be employed to make corn and various vegetables fit for human food. Nor indeed could they have had any knowledge that these could ever afford them food at all; since it is only by the action of fire that corn, and most other kinds of vegetable food, can be made fit for Man's nourishment.

Accordingly, that the knowledge of fire, and of its use,

Use of Fire.

was a direct gift from Heaven seems hinted in the ancient Fable of Prometheus [*i. e.* the *Provident*], who is recorded to have brought it from Heaven.

There is good reason, therefore, to think [as was remarked in the *Lessons on Religious Worship*, L. i. § 7], that if the first generation of mankind *Man, not left originally untaught.* had been left — as Brutes are — wholly untaught, and under the guidance of unaided Reason, and Instincts, alone, the whole Race would have perished before they had learned to provide for their wants. They would have died either of starvation, from not knowing what things would afford them wholesome food, and from ignorance of the use of fire in preparing food, or from being poisoned, or from cold and wet, when they had not learned to protect themselves either by clothes, or houses, or fires.

But if enough of this first generation did survive, to invent those rude Arts which are necessary even for the wildest Savages (which is very unlikely), then the whole world would have been peopled with none but Savages at this day. For, all experience prove (as was pointed out in the Lesson above alluded to) that Savages, untaught and unassisted by civilized men, never did nor ever can, civilize themselves.

And since the FIRST generation of Mankind could not have been taught by other *men*, they must have received at least some small degree of instruction — enough to enable them to subsist, and to advance in the Arts of life — *from some superior Being.*

And thus we have, from the very nature of the case,

—from what we see around us, — a confirmation of what we read in the book of *Genesis* ; that Mankind had, at first, some direct communication from the Creator.

§ 7.

Man is, as I have said, far below the Brutes in Instincts. But this is much more than made up to us by a great superiority in *Reason*, and in the use of *Reason of Language*. Indeed, it is not uncommon to hear *Reason of Brutes*. people speak of Reason and Language as altogether confined to Man. But this is not correct : for the higher Brutes do manifestly possess some portion of such intelligence as we call Reason in *men* ; and we ought not to give it any different name, in other animals. We all know that many Brutes are capable of being *taught* various things ; and it would be absurd to speak of their doing by *Instinct* what they have been taught. And many Brutes, though they are not able, themselves, to speak, are capable of understanding much of what is spoken. A dog will easily be taught to know his name, — to lie down at the word of command, — to fetch what he is sent for, &c. And it is curious to observe, in the Shepherd's-dog in particular, how well he understands his master's words and signs, and takes the best means for effecting what he is told to do. In many parts of the Continent, you may see a corn-field adjoining a pasture-field, without any fence between them. The Shepherd's-dog is made to understand that it is his office to keep the sheep that are grazing in the pasture from trespassing into the corn. And for this purpose he keeps

constantly coursing up and down between the two fields. He never molests the sheep that are browsing on the grass nor do they at all shrink from him as he runs close to their noses. But whenever a sheep has crossed the boundary, the dog rushes at it, to bite and drive it back, and the sheep, on seeing the dog coming, starts back in terror. Now this plainly shows intelligence, not only in the dog, but in the sheep also. To speak of their acting in this manner, *by Instinct*, would be absurd.

§ 8.

The differences, however, between Man and the Brutes, seem, in many points, to be not mere differences in *degree*, but in *kind*. For, an intelligent *Difference of Man and Brute.* Brute is not like a stupid Man; but in some respects very superior, and in others, very inferior.

Some of the human faculties seem to be nearly, or altogether, wanting in Brutes: among others, the power of using language as an *instrument of thought*, so as to form *General-terms*, by means of which we can carry on a *process of Reasoning* (as was pointed in the *Lessons on Reasoning*, L. viii.) This seems to be totally wanting, even in the most intelligent Brutes. And this seems to be the main difference between the Brute-mind and the Human. They have some portion of what may be fairly called *Reason*, but are incapable of *Reasoning*; because that is a process which can only be carried on by the use of general [common] *terms*. And the degree to which they can be brought to understand Language, does not extend to that.

LESSON IV.

§ 1.

WE all know that many acts of the Mind, and of the body, are under the control of our Will. The *The Will*. Heart indeed beats, and the Blood circulates, quite independently of the Will: but we can stand up, or sit down, or speak, or take hold of anything with the hand, &c., as we *will*. And though there is much that is very mysterious connected with the action of the Will, every one has, thus far, some notion of it.

All bodily movements depend on contractions of the Muscles. And the Muscles, it is found, are acted on by certain Nerves, through which the Mind acts on them. For if these Nerves are destroyed, or greatly impaired, by disease, all voluntary motion is stopped. But how the Mind acts on those Nerves, no one can explain.

It is something very remarkable, that, though it is by means of these Nerves and Muscles that every bodily act is performed, we never *think about them* when we form a Will to do anything. We think only of the *end* to be effected, and not at all about the *means*. For instance, when you wish to touch some object, or to step on a particular spot, you look attentively at that object or spot, and never think at all about the muscles of your arm or leg. So, also, if you are learning some language, and try to pronounce

rightly some word, you listen carefully to the *voice* of the Teacher, and take pains to imitate the *sound*; seldom thinking at all of the Muscles of your tongue, and lips, and throat. And so, in other cases.

§ 2.

What are called the *Active-Principles* of the Mind—*Active* those, that is, which immediately influence *Principles*. the Will—are of several different kinds: some of them common to us with the Brutes, and some, peculiar to Man.

These are *Appetites*, *Desires*, and *Affections*; besides *Self-love* [the desire of happiness] and *Conscience* [or the *Moral-Faculty*, or *Sense of Duty*, as it is variously called]. Different Writers, however, differ from each other in the senses in which they employ these words. We will hereafter explain each in the sense in which it is the most commonly used.

As for the word *Passion*, it is most frequently applied to some feeling that is excessively *violent*, and disturbs the mind so as to prevent us from acting deliberately. Thus, when a man's anger is so violent that he has lost all self-command, we say "he is in a *passion*." And we speak of Love, or the desire of Gain, or of Glory, &c., as a *passion*, when a man is so hurried away by the violence of any of these as to make no use of his Reason.

The word *Feeling*, again, is extremely wide in its signification: for we speak of a Feeling of Anger, or of Pity, &c.—a Feeling of Hunger or Thirst;—of Joy, or Sor-

row, — of Pleasure, or Pain. And some of these feelings lead to Action, while others do not.

§ 3.

The *Appetites* — such as Hunger and Thirst — are (as has been above said) common to Man with the Brutes, and are *instinctive*; that is, *Appetites*. they are not necessarily connected with any *design*, or any knowledge or notion of the object sought. A new-born Infant, or the Young of any other animal, has the feeling of hunger, just like one of us, and the impulse to seek food to allay the want, before it has even tasted any food, or can have any notion of what it is.

It is curious to observe that there is — in very young animals especially — a kind of appetite for *exercise*. You may see young lambs, and colts, &c., when a few days old, scampering to and fro in the field, without any object, except to stretch their limbs. And a little baby, though it cannot run, yet delights to kick and to stretch out its little arms and legs. And again, on the other hand, the desire of repose and of sleep, every one must perceive to be of the nature of an Appetite.

Besides the *original* Appetites implanted by Nature, there are also *acquired* Appetites. Those *Acquired* who have accustomed themselves to spirituous *Appetites*. liquors, for instance, or to opium, in time acquire a craving Appetite for those stimulants, answering to the natural Appetites for food and drink.

LESSON V.

§ 1.

THE Appetites are not *constant*, but *occasional*.

Desires.

When you are hungry, and have then eaten enough to satisfy the hunger, you wish for no more food; and it would be even disgusting to have it forced on you. But it is not so with what are properly called *Desires*. The Desire of Glory, for instance, in one in whom it is very strong, though it is *gratified* when he acquires glory, is not *satisfied*, or at all diminished. He is as eager after glory as ever. And it is the same with the desire of Gain, in one of a covetous disposition; and with the desire to do good to others, in one who is benevolent; and, in short, with all the *Desires*, properly so called, as distinguished from Appetites.

You may indeed hear people speak of a desire for food, &c. But it will be more convenient to use the word, in these Lessons, in the sense now given, distinguishing *Desires* from Appetites.

What I have here called *Desires*, differ from the Appetites in this point also, that they are always accompanied (in Man at least) with some notion of the object sought. One who is desirous of *Praise*, for instance, must have some notion of what Praise is, and of the pleasure it will afford him. One who desires *Gain*, has some thought of

the money or other property which he seeks. And so, of the rest.

Some of the Desires are found in Brutes as well as in Man; and some, not.

§ 2.

By the Affections most people understand our feeling so and so disposed *towards other persons*. Thus, *Love* (which is often denoted by the very word *Affections*. *affection*) consists in a favorable feeling towards the person loved. So also, Gratitude, must be towards some *person*. And what are called the malevolent Affections — as Anger, Jealousy, and Hatred — are evidently feelings directed towards *persons*. For if any one says that he *loves* Music, or that he *hates* rainy weather, or anything of that kind, we always understand him to be using the words “love” and “hate” in a different sense; meaning merely our feeling such and such things to be agreeable or disagreeable.

So, also, when we speak of *Self-Love*, the word “love” is thus applied in a figurative sense, and does not denote any *affection* such as we feel for a friend. We use the word in this manner, from a *resemblance* in the *effects*. For we seek our own *welfare* as an *end*; just as we seek the welfare of any one we love, for its own sake, and without looking to anything beyond. But no one would be called *affectionate* towards himself: or would be reckoned of an affectionate disposition for seeking his own welfare.

And again, when we speak of “loving one’s neighbor as oneself” (meaning by a neighbor, as our Lord explains

in the Parable of the Good Samaritan, *any* one whom we can benefit), and when we speak of Love to all mankind, including (as our Lord commands us) our enemies, the meaning is, that we should treat them kindly, and seek their welfare. And one who is thus disposed, would not in general be described as *affectionate*, but rather as *philanthropic* and *benevolent*. We reckon such a disposition rather among the *Desires* (as above noticed) or the *Sentiments* (see Lesson XXV.) than the *Affections* in the sense in which we have now been speaking of them. For by the *Affections* we understand being so and so disposed towards certain *individual* persons, *as such*, rather than towards *classes* of persons, or towards other objects.

§ 3.

Self-love is (as was observed in the *Lessons on Morals*,

L. xvi. § 3) a rational deliberate desire
Self-love.

for our own welfare, and for anything we consider likely to promote it. It exists in various degrees in different persons; but it is impossible to conceive a rational Being completely destitute of it. No one can be completely indifferent about his own happiness, who is but capable of forming the notion of happiness.

The brutes, and young infants, are destitute of self-love, properly so called, from their being incapable of forming such an *abstract* idea as that of *happiness*. A horse or a dog can indeed perceive, and seek for, some *particular* object which affords gratification; such as food, or a comfortable bed; and will shrink from any particular pain or

danger, such as a stroke of a whip. But the *general* notion of welfare — a prosperous or unhappy course of life — is what the Brute-mind cannot take in.

And Self-love, you should observe, is quite distinct from all our other desires and propensities, though it may often tend in the same direction with some of them. One person, for instance, may drink some water because he is *thirsty*; another may without thirst, drink—suppose from a mineral spring — because he believes it will be *good for his health*. This latter is impelled by self-love; but not the other.

So, again, one person may pursue some course of study, in order to qualify him for some *profession* by which he may advance in life, and another, from having a *taste* for that study, and a desire for that branch of knowledge. This latter, though he may perhaps be, in fact, promoting his own welfare, is not acting from self-love. For, as the object of thirst is not happiness, but drink, so the object of curiosity is not happiness, but knowledge. And so of the rest.

Self-love may, of course, like any of our other tendencies, be excessive, or improperly indulged, or ill-directed; but it is nothing evil in itself. And for one person who goes wrong through excess of self-love, there are ten who do so for the sake of gratifying some appetite or passion. A drunkard, for instance, or a gambler, or a quarrelsome man, &c., do not lead the life they do from *calculating* that this will conduce to their happiness; but the one from his craving for strong drink, another from covetousness, and another from pride and malice.

You must be careful not to confound *Self-love* with Sel-

fishness, which consists not in the indulging of this or that particular propensity, but in disregarding, for the sake of *any* kind of personal gratification or advantage, the rights or the feelings of other men. It is therefore a *negative* quality: that is, it consists in *not* considering what is due to one's neighbors, through a *deficiency* of justice or of benevolence. And selfishness accordingly will show itself in as many different shapes as there are different dispositions in men.

§ 4.

Conscience, again [the Moral Faculty] is wanting in *The Moral* Brutes. The notion of *Duty* is one too *abstract Faculty*. to be taken in by their mind. A dog, indeed, may be cured of worrying sheep or poultry, by being beaten for it; and may be taught to fetch a stick, and do other things, by being rewarded with a morsel of food. And a dog of superior intelligence will feel himself punished by a *reproof*, and will judge from your looks and voice when you are displeased with him for anything; and even the mention of the name of that thing afterwards, will make him hang down his tail, and look ashamed. But all this is only from an *association* formed in the animal's mind between such and such an act, and punishment or reward. And if it were the same with *us*, — that is, if we had no notion of what we ought to do or not to do, except from expecting reward or punishment, — then Man would be no more a moral agent than a dog or a horse. We should be acting merely from *prudent* calculation, and not from any sense of *duty*.

And some persons are accustomed to speak as if they thought that this really is the case. For they speak of Man's having no natural notion of any difference between moral good and evil; and of our deriving all our notions of right and wrong from the revealed will of God, who is able to reward or punish us.

But you may easily prove to most of those who speak thus, that they do not really themselves mean what their words express. For if any persons tell you that our first notion of right and wrong is entirely derived from the divine Law, and that those words have no meaning except obedience and disobedience in the declared will of God, you may ask them whether it is a matter of *duty* to obey God's will, or merely a matter of *prudence*, inasmuch as He is able to punish those who rebel against Him? Whether they think that God is *justly entitled* to obedience, or merely that it would be very *rash* to disobey one who has power to enforce his commands?

They will doubtless answer, that we *ought* to obey the divine commands as a point of duty, and not merely on the ground of expediency — that God is not only powerful, but good — and that conformity to his will is a thing right in itself, and should be practised, not through mere fear of punishment, or hope of reward, but *because* it is *right*.

Now this proves that they must be sensible that there is in the human mind some notion of such a thing as Duty, and of things being right or wrong in their own nature. For, when any persons submit to the will of another merely because it is their interest, or because they dare not resist, we never speak of this submission as a matter of *duty*, but merely of *prudence*.

And the same thing is proved by our speaking of God as *just* and *good*. For if we had no notion at all of goodness except that it is what God wills, then, to speak of Him as good, would be merely saying that He is what He is, and that his Will is his Will ; which might equally be said of every Being.

It is evident, also, that there could be no such thing as *Sin* committed by a Being that had no notion of moral right and wrong. Accordingly, we never impute sin to brute animals, or to idiots ; though they do things which *would* be sinful in a rational Being. Brutes may be taught (as was observed just above), by reward or punishment, to do, or to abstain from, certain acts. But we never apply to Brutes such terms as "virtuous" or "sinful ;" precisely because they do not possess a *moral sense*.

ug
e a
ting
ise c

LESSON VI.

§ 1.

BESIDES those parts of the Mind which we have been speaking of, and which we have called the *Ac- Intellectual tive Principles*, as being connected directly with *Powers*.

the Will, we are conscious of perceiving — observing — thinking of various things — remembering — understanding — judging, &c., sometimes with a deliberate intention so to employ the Mind, and sometimes without any such design. These *Intellectual Processes*, as they are generally called, are, as has been just above said, not connected *directly* with the Will, though *indirectly* they may be. A person, for instance, who has observed others acquiring glory, and gratified by it, and whose thoughts have been dwelling on the subject, and who has considered in what way that glory was acquired, may perhaps thus form in himself a strong desire for it. Or if he has been thinking and inquiring much about wealth, this may cherish in him the desire of gain. And one who has inquired into, and reflected on, the sufferings of the afflicted, may thus be led to desire, and to exert himself, to relieve them. And so of

nd
or,
caus
neve
ely o.

rest.

§ 2.

It is remarkable that people sometimes suppose the Feelings to be more under the control of the Will than they really are. For they often *deceive* themselves (strange as it seems) as to the actual state of their own feelings. A man will perhaps say, without any designed insincerity, that he is "very glad of this," and "very sorry for that," or that he feels pity, or veneration, or contempt, &c., for so and so, when in reality he feels no such thing, but is mistaking for the *actual feeling*, the *conviction* of his *understanding* that the object is one which calls for it, and that he *ought* to feel so. But this *conviction* is as different a thing from the *feeling* itself, as a blind man's belief that the sky is blue and the grass green, is, from the actual seeing of those colors.

If you were to attempt, by a direct act of the Will, to feel pity, or love, or any other emotion, or if you were to exhort another to do so, this would be as vain as to will that the stomach should digest, or the blood circulate, &c. A Physician does not *tell* his patient to alter the Circulation or the Digestion; but he administers some Medicine which will have that effect. And as we can, by an act of Will, swallow such a medicine, so, we can, by an act of Will, bring before the mind such thoughts as will excite or allay some feeling. If, for instance, you think over the favors and kindness you have received from some benefactor, such thoughts will bring you to feel gratitude. If you dwell on the thought of the sufferings of some one, this will excite

the emotion of compassion. If, when you feel angry with any one, you reflect attentively on the provocation he may perhaps think he has received, or his imperfect knowledge, or infirm health; and above all, if you reflect on the Parable of the Servant who had been forgiven a debt of ten thousand talents, and then rigidly exacted payment from a fellow-servant, such reflections will tend to allay your resentment.

And so, in other cases.

§ 3.

We often hear people speak of a good or a bad *Memory*; or of a person of good, or of deficient *Judgment*; or of a person of *Inventive* genius. *Memory*. But this way of speaking rather tends to indistinctness and confusion: because the same person is often found to have a good, and also a bad *Memory*, for different kinds of things. You may meet with one man who has a good memory for *words*, but who cannot well remember places, or persons. Another, perhaps, will seldom forget any place or person, that he has once seen, but will have rather a bad memory for words. And you may meet with many other such differences.

We usually describe any one as having, or not having, a good *Memory*, in reference to the particular matter which happens to be occupying our attention. In a School, for instance, the boys who are remarked as having a good *Memory*, are those who readily *learn words by heart*. But among grown people, a man is usually spoken of as having

a remarkable memory, who can tell many *anecdotes*, and can relate accurately all the circumstances of any transaction he has witnessed.

One man, again, may have an excellent *Judgment* in Agriculture, or in Navigation, but not in framing *Laws*; and another may be just the reverse.

Then, again, one who has what is called a *turn* for Mechanics, and may have an *inventive-genius* for Machines, but not at all for composing a piece of Music, or a Poem. And a great Statesman, skilful in devising Government-measures, might be very unskilful in building a ship or a house. And so, in other matters.

§ 4.

If then any one says — as sometimes you do hear such things said — that Shakspeare and Milton might have been as great Mathematicians as Newton, *if they had turned their minds to Mathematics* instead of Poetry, or that Newton might have been as eminent in Music as Handel, if he had but *directed his attention* to that, this is merely saying that if Newton, or any one of the others had been a totally *different kind of man* from what he was, he might have done so and so. For, all experience shows that different persons have not only different *degrees* of ability, but also different *kinds* of intellectual power; that some have more of what is called a *natural-turn* for one thing, and some for another.

It will be best, therefore, not to treat of Invention, or

Judgment, or of Memory, each, as one distinct Intellectual-faculty, but to consider them as *modes of action* of each of the Faculties.

One person, for instance, who has something of an ear for Music, *perceives*, and can distinguish a Tune : another perhaps is able to *remember* it correctly; and learn it : a third may have a good *taste* — *i. e. judgment* — in Music, and can decide rightly what is the better or the inferior Music : and another can *compose* — *i. e. invent* — a piece of Music. All these are different operations of the Musical-faculty.

So, also, one person on viewing some Machine, will perceive and understand its construction : another, perhaps, will also *remember* this, so as to be able himself to construct such a one ; and a third will be able to *invent* a new kind of machine. And all these are *modes* of action of the Mechanical-faculty.

The like takes place with each other of the Intellectual-powers ; which are possessed in very different degrees by different persons.

§ 5.

To speak, therefore, of persons having a good, or a defective *Memory*, or a good or a bad *Judgment*, *Different* or much, or little of Inventive power, without ^{*subjects of*} saying “Memory,” &c., ^{*the intellec-*} *for what*, is at best, ^{*tual-powers.*} very indistinct. But if you speak of any one’s having much or little of a turn for Mathematics, or of a turn for Languages, or for Music, or for Poetry, or for some other particular kind of subject, this will be clearly intelligible.

And this will answer to the way in which we speak of the Active-principles. We do not usually speak of any one's having strong or weak Desires, — vehement or moderate Affections, — without specifying "*for what.*" But we speak of one man having a great Desire for *Glory*, another, for *Gain* ; or having great or moderate *Benevolence*, &c., describing each man according to the *objects* he is most inclined to.

Some persons indeed are remarkably vehement and energetic in most of their desires ; and others, more calm and languid ; and some are generally steady and persevering in pursuing any object, and others, fickle. But what we chiefly characterize men by, is, the *kind* of objects which they are the most occupied with, or the most disposed to aim at.

LESSON VII.

§ 1.

THE Intellectual-powers are, in ordinary speech, referred to the *Head*, as having some dependence on the *Brain*. People often say, when any one makes some great mistake, “Where were your brains?” And we speak of a man’s having a good or a bad *head for business*; of having a good or a bad *head for calculations*: and we speak of a man’s carrying such and such knowledge *in his head*, &c.

*Seat of
the mental-
powers.*

It is common also to speak of the “qualities of the *Head*, and of the *Heart*,” as if the Head were the seat of the *Intellect*, and the Heart, of the *Affections and Sentiments*. But in former times the Heart was often spoken of as the seat of the Intellect also. You may see many instances of this in the Bible; where we read of the Lord’s having “hardened the heart of Pharoah;” meaning, evidently, that his *understanding* was stupified, so that he did not perceive what a hopeless contest he was engaged in, and what mischiefs he was bringing on *himself*. *Hard-hearted* indeed he was, in the modern sense, of *cruel* and tyrannical; but this, he was, *from the first*. The “hardness of heart” which led him to hold out, in spite of the plagues inflicted, was evidently an infatuation of the *Intellect*, sent on him as a punishment for that cruelty. So also we read of “understanding with the heart;” and the like.

One remnant of this kind of language we retain ; we speak of “ learning by heart.” But usually we speak of the Heart as the seat of the *Feelings*. And the cause of this is, no doubt, that the *action of the heart* is much affected by the emotions of the Mind. Any eager desire, or sudden joy, or alarm, will make the heart beat quicker. And thence, people were led to suppose that the Heart was the original seat of those emotions.

§ 2.

Among the Ancients, several other parts of the body were supposed to be the seats of certain acts or emotions of the Mind. They often speak of the *Liver* as the seat of Love, Hatred, and Jealousy : probably because the functions of the Liver are apt to be deranged by any violent passion. The Latin word for *Anger* was derived from one signifying the *Stomach* ; and the Greek word for *Compassion*, from one signifying the Bowels ; as indeed you may see from several passages in our Bible-version. And the gland called the Spleen, the use of which Anatomists have not yet discovered, was imagined by the Ancients to be the seat of Mirth and *Laughter*. Hence, a man of gloomy and harsh disposition was supposed to have some defect or disease of the Spleen. And accordingly *Spleen* — meaning “ a diseased spleen ” — came at length to signify a cross and surly temper.*

* In like manner we often speak of a man’s “ suffering from bile ;” meaning some *distemper* of the Bile : for Bile is not itself a disease, bu

But it seems to be well ascertained, and is, now, generally admitted, that all the actions and emotions of the Mind are connected with some parts of the Brain: though *how* it is that the Brain — or indeed the Body, at all — can be an organ of the Mind is a mystery which no one can explain.*

is necessary to life. Dr. Campbell, in his valuable work on *Rhetoric*, expresses his wonder that the word *Spleen* should have come to be used in its present sense. It is strange that a man of his acuteness should not have perceived how naturally this came about.

* It is worth remarking that, though no philosophical system can afford any firm rational assurance of a *Future State* (for that we must resort to the evidence of a divine Revelation), one system may *prepare the way* better than another for the reception of such evidence. And it does seem probable that the belief in *several* distinct organs in the brain will better prepare the mind for believing in Man's existence after death, than the belief that the Brain is single.

Suppose a man to hold this latter opinion, he will think — with Dr. Johnson — that one who has a certain amount of mental power, may direct this in any way he pleases, even as a man who has the use of his legs, may (according to Johnson's illustration) walk East, West, North, or South; forgetting that though this is true, because the legs are fitted for the action of walking, we cannot walk on our *hands*, or see with our ears, or hear with our eyes.

But if a man has this belief, he may naturally conclude that the Brain is *himself*; and that when, at death, the Brain is decomposed and moulders into earth, *he* will altogether cease to exist.

If on the contrary any one believes in the plurality of cerebral organs, he cannot regard any *one* of these as *himself*; nor again, *all* of them together. For then he would not be *one* person, but several combined; and a human body would be like a great Lodging-house, where several distinct families reside, though with a common stair-case, and the joint use of a kitchen. Any one therefore who, while conscious of

§ 3.

But in truth, we are surrounded with mysteries quite beyond our explanation: though many of *Nature full of mysteries.* them are so *common* and familiar to us, that we are apt to forget that there is in them anything at all mysterious, or that needs any explanation. If any one asks why a stone falls to the ground, many people would be satisfied with saying that "it is the nature of it:" and a natural-philosopher would say that it is attracted to the Earth by the force of gravitation; which is the same that attracts the Earth to the Sun, and keeps it moving round that, instead of flying off in a straight line. But what this force is that is called Gravitation, and *why*, and *how*, it is that the Sun can thus act on the Earth at a vast distance, no one is at all able to explain; any more than, how the Body and the Mind act on each other.

§ 4.

Some persons do attempt to explain in some degree, the operations of the Mind by theories respecting *Theory of Ideas.* *Ideas*; using that word in a peculiar sense.

being one single person, believes that there are several distinct organs in the Brain, must believe that there is a something which he calls *himself*, which acts on, and through, these organs.

And he is thus prepared to believe in the possibility of this something — whatever it is — surviving the destruction of his Brain.

In ordinary language, those who are not thinking of setting up any theory, use the word *Idea* nearly in the same sense as the word *Thought*. When any one says "I have an idea that so and so will be a good plan," he usually means merely "that is what I think." When he says "I have no idea where such and such a man is," he means "I do not at all know." And when he speaks of several persons "having all the *same Idea* on such and such a subject," he means that they are all "*thinking alike*" about it: just as we speak of several persons being all in the *same posture*, when they are all *placed alike*, and all of the same complexion, when they are *alike* in the color of their skins.

But an *Idea*, in the sense in which some Philosophers use the word, means, not a *Thought*, but an *object* of thought; a something which they say is *in* the mind, and *on* which the Mind is employed. Now ordinarily when any one says that such and such a thing, was, or was not, *in* his mind, he merely means that he was, or was not, *thinking* of it. But those Philosophers suppose that any object of thought must be really and *literally, in* the Mind, just as the heart is *in* the body, or the kernel of a nut, in the shell. And since, when we are talking, for instance,* about the Sun or the Moon, or about Alexander the Great, or about Kings, generally, the real Sun or Moon, &c., cannot itself be *in* each of our minds, thence, they say that the object of our thoughts is not the real Sun itself, but the *Idea* of the Sun, &c., which they describe as a kind of *picture* or *image*, resembling the thing itself. Now the picture of a square grass plot must surely be something *green*, and *square*: and anything exactly *resembling* a cannon-ball, must be something *round*,

•

and *heavy*; and so of other things. And if the Mind be not itself a *material* substance, having a certain weight, and shape, and color, and other properties of Matter, one cannot understand how there can be *in* it any pictures or images resembling objects that have these properties.

§ 5.

Such theories, therefore, as I have been speaking of, are not distinctly intelligible, and do not really furnish any explanation whatever of the operations of the Mind, but merely bewilder us with words that have no clear meaning. It is best to confine ourselves to a simple and plain statement of such *facts* as there can be no doubt about.

When you are thinking of an absent friend, or of a house, or any other object, that is not before your eyes, you can, and often do, form what is called a *conception* of that object; or, as we sometimes say, "*figure it to yourself*:" that is, you bring your Mind into a state *somewhat resembling* the state it *would* be in if the object were present to your senses. This is the simple statement of the *fact*; which is much better than any theories about images existing in the Mind.

It seems strange that people should be so ready as they often are, to receive as satisfactory some theory which is not established by any sufficient proof, but is a mere conjecture, framed to explain a mystery which after all it does *not* explain. But when a man is told that so and so is

Vain attempts at explanation.

Ready reception of empty theories.

the "explanation given by eminent Philosophers," he is likely to take for granted that it must be quite right, without examining carefully whether he clearly understands it. And if he finds that it conveys a dim, indistinct notion to his mind, he supposes this must be from its being very *profound* Philosophy. For as muddy water is likely to be thought deeper than it is, from your not being able to see the bottom, while water that is very clear, always looks shallower than it is, so, in language, obscurity is often mistaken for depth. And when a man has thus received some theory as sound, and has learnt it by heart, and repeated it to others, who receive it just as he had done, they will be likely, all of them, to overlook the circumstance that they have been deluded by grand-sounding words, to which they attach no clear meaning at all.*

* There is a story told of a lady who having had but little education, asked an acquaintance who was reputed a literary man, to lend her some book that might improve her mind. He lent her Locke's *Essay on the Understanding*; and asked her, when she returned it, what she thought of it. She replied that she had found some very good things in it; but that there was one word in it which she *did not clearly understand*, and which occurred frequently; the word "*idea*." She pronounced the word with the accent on the first syllable; which, it is remarkable, is the way in which the word (which is taken from the Greek) is always pronounced when we meet with it in a Greek book; though in English it is commonly pronounced "*idéa*." For this pronunciation, and for not understanding the meaning of the word, he held her in great contempt, and told her in derision that it was the Feminine of "*Idiot*."

She was probably, though without book-learning, the more intelligent of the two. For she had at least the sagacity to perceive what it

was that she did *not* understand. And the other probably did not understand the word any better, but fancied that he did.

Thus much at least is certain: that among the admirers and professed disciples of Locke, there are two opposite sects of philosophers, who draw exactly contrary conclusions from his theory. *One at least*, therefore, of these parties, if not *both* (which is most likely) must have no clear understanding of it.

LESSON VIII.

§ 1.

THERE are great differences [as has been already said] between different persons, with respect to their mental faculties. And so it is also, in the bodily Senses. One man has a better Sight, or better Hearing, than another. But there are some things which might appear, at the first glance, to depend entirely on the Senses, but which, on a closer examination, will be found to depend on some peculiar *mental* powers, distinct from the Senses, and probably connected within certain portions of the Brain.

Thus, what is commonly called an "Ear for Music" might be supposed to depend entirely — as the name seems to imply — on the Sense of Hearing. And some of those persons who are nearly destitute of it believe this to be the case; supposing that their Hearing is so far defective that they cannot distinguish as well as some others can, one sound from another. Yet these same persons will be found to distinguish readily the *different voices* — nay, sometimes even the very sound of the footsteps — of a great number of persons, and to know one of their friends by his voice when he speaks but a single word. Now the distinctions between the voices of different persons (and there are hardly any two quite alike) is so delicate that no words can fully describe it.

But the Musical-faculty, though of course it is connected with Hearing, seems evidently to be something distinct from it, and not to depend merely on that sense, and on the perfection of the real literal Ear.

§ 2.

Again, though it is by the Eye that Colors are perceived, there are some persons who have eyes very good in other respects, but who cannot perceive

Mental powers connected with Sight.

Colors. They see only lighter and darker shades, just as we do in a *Print*, or a Pencil-drawing. And some who have this defect in a less degree, perceive *some* colors, but not all. Some of them cannot distinguish *Green* from *Red*; and to others, Green and Brown appear alike. And among those who do distinguish colors, some greatly exceed others in what is called an "Eye for Colors," — a delicate perception of the smallest shades of difference.

Certain portions of the Brain are believed, by the most eminent Physiologists, to be the seats of the Musical-faculty, and of the power of perceiving Colors. And it does certainly appear that at least they depend on something distinct from the Ear and the Eye.

Then, again, there are persons who possess in a greater or less degree, what is called "an even eye;" — a power of perceiving readily and correctly whether any object leans out of the Perpendicular, even but a very little; while other persons whose eyesight is equally good, do not perceive this.

And some, again, have what is called a good "eye for Form," and learn easily to draw figures correctly; while others, with eyes and hands just as perfectly formed, can hardly be taught to draw at all.

§ 3.

Whether it be true or not that the Powers just mentioned are (as some eminent Physiologists maintain) *Faculties connected with certain distinct portions of the Brain, and that the same is the case with the rest of our Faculties and Propensities,* — is a question not to be treated of here. But certainly there is reason to think that several Powers which, in common language, seem to be referred to the Eye and the Hand, do in reality depend more on some mental qualities than on the external organs.

Some years ago a lady named Biffin, exhibited publicly her truly wonderful performances. She was born without arms or legs, having only in their place very short stumps. Yet she performed the works of the most accomplished women, better than most; and was what *would* have been called, if she had been formed like other people, uncommonly *handy*. She threaded a needle with her mouth, and worked the most delicate embroidery, as well, and as quickly, as the best needle-woman. She wrote well and rapidly; and maintained herself by portrait painting; holding the pen, or the pencil, in her mouth; and using, in all her works, no implements different from the ordinary ones.

§ 4.

Some persons, again, possess in a much greater degree *Faculty of Places.* than others, who have equally good eyes, the *Places.* Power of observing and remembering *places*; so that they find their way in a manner which seems to those deficient in that Power, quite wonderful. Most savages possess this Faculty in a higher degree than civilized men; chiefly, no doubt, from their having been led to cultivate it very carefully from childhood, on account of their roving kind of life. And the degree in which many Brutes possess this Faculty is most astonishing. In some of them, indeed, the power of finding their way seems to be something different not only in degree, but in kind, from any human faculty. For, dogs, and other brutes, have often been known to find their way home from distant places to which they had been carried by *sea*; travelling in the right direction over a country which they had never seen at all. And birds of passage are directed by some instinct which we cannot at all understand, to take the right course through the air.

LESSON IX.

§ 1.

THE Faculty of Number, again, seems to be wholly wanting in Brutes, and very deficient in Sav- *Faculty of*
ages. And among civilized men it is possessed *Number.*
in very different degrees by different persons. Some count
very readily; and notice, and correctly remember the num-
bers of any objects, and easily learn to calculate; while
others have much less aptitude for all this. And Savages
can seldom count correctly beyond five. Indeed some tribes
are said to have no word in their language for any number
beyond four.

As for the Brutes, they seem to have no notion at all of
Number. A cat, though she knows each one of her kittens,
singly, seems to have no notion of *how many* there are in all;
and if one of them be taken away in her absence, she does
not seem to miss it. And if you remove them all, and she
finds them, and brings them back to the nest, one by one,
when she has replaced them all, she will not be aware that
she has done so, but will continue to search for another.

A bird, indeed, will go on laying eggs if some of them
be taken away before she begins to sit. She seems to have
a notion, generally, of a *large or small quantity*; — of the
nest's being *full* or half-empty; but no distinct notion of
Number.

This deficiency in the brute-mind seems to depend on the same cause as that which was noticed above,—their incapacity for *reasoning*. The power of *Abstraction* is wanting in them. And as no process of *reasoning* can be carried on without that, so, without that Power, no distinct notion of NUMBER can be formed.

§ 2.

Abstraction is — as was explained in the *Lessons on Reasoning* (L. vii. § 4) — that process of the mind *Abstraction.* by which we are enabled to *generalize*; that is, refer several individual things to a Class, and give them a name — a common name [or general name] denoting that Class. When, in contemplating several objects that *agree* [are *alike*] in some point, we draw off [*abstract*] and consider separately that point of agreement alone, disregarding anything wherein they may differ, and the separate existence of each of them as an individual, we can then designate all or any of them by a *common term*, applicable to them only in respect of that which is “common” to them all, and which expresses nothing that can distinguish them from each other.

And the words “*same*,” “*one-and-the-same*,” and “*identical*,” are often applied when we are speaking *Sameness.* of several things that are *alike*, and altogether in reference to that *similarity*. Thus, we speak of the Cedars on Mount Lebanon being the *same* as those used by Solomon in building the Temple. And if you borrow a shilling of any one, and repay him a shilling, you are said

to repay the same money as you borrowed; though it is not ~~the same~~ individual piece of coin, but a similar one of equal value.

In all such cases, the words "same" and "one" are used because *one single name* or *description* will apply to each of the things thus classed together.

It is important to distinguish in your mind this sameness — figuratively so called — from real, *literal* singleness and identity. Whatever this latter does consist in, it is plain that it has nothing to do with *similarity*. For when you speak of a man as being the *same person* whom you saw several years before, as an infant, you do not mean that he has any resemblance, now, to an infant.

But what adds to the perplexity in this subject, is, that we often do judge of identity (in the strict sense) from similarity. For if a man who has robbed you of a watch, is arrested, with the watch upon him, and you swear to both, as being the individual man and watch, this is from their appearance.

It is worth observing that, in the *secondary* [figurative] sense of the word "same," we often speak of something as being "*nearly the same* with something else, but not *quite*:" which means that they are very much alike, but with some little difference. For, similarity may be in a greater or a less *degree*. But "sameness" in the original and strict sense, does not admit of degrees. If you were asked, "Is this man the *same* that you met with last week?" or, "Is the Architect who built this house, the same who built that Church?" it would be absurd to say "he is *nearly* the same." It is either he, or it is not.

§ 3.

Now the *generalizing* process just noticed is required in order to enable us to *count*, or to form any *Generalizing*. notion of Number. For, suppose you see in a field a black horse, and a bay, and a grey; in order to reckon them together, you must lay aside all thought of their different colors, and of every distinction between one and another; and you must abstract the one circumstance in which they are alike; and then you can call them *three*; namely, three *horses*. And suppose there are half-a-dozen cows in the same field, in like manner you can speak of them as *six*, only by disregarding the differences between them. And if you go on to lay aside the consideration of the differences between a cow and a horse, and *abstract* that wherein they agree, you can then say that there are *nine beasts* in the field. And thus you may proceed with other things.

But you may go still further, and speak of Numbers without specifying *any* kind of objects at all;—without saying “number of *what* :”—as when you say that “three and six make nine;” which means that “three *things* (of whatever kind) added to six things, make nine things.” This is carrying on the process of Abstraction still further; “thing” being a term *more* general than “beast;” as that is more general than “horse” or “cow.”

And this [“thing”] is the term that is always understood whenever we speak of Numbers simply as numbers. When you say, for instance, that a hundred is twice fifty, you mean

that a hundred of *whatever things* is double of fifty of those same things.

§ 4.

In order, then, to *reckon together* several objects so as to form a notion of their *number*, we must disregard all their *differences*: and when, reversing this process, we *separate* them, and consider each singly, we take notice of their differences. And all this is so familiar to our minds, that it affects our ordinary language. For, the words "*Odd*" and "*Singular*," which originally mean merely "standing alone," have come to denote whatever is very *unlike* other things.

LESSON X.

§ 1.

It has been pointed out above that the Brutes have not the power of employing *Language* as an *instrument of Thought*. Some of the higher Brutes are not wholly without the use of language; for, the Dog, for instance, can be taught (as was remarked above) to understand much of what is said to him. He will lie down when bid, and fetch a stick, &c. And some of them have been taught to utter such sounds as they are capable of, to express what is passing within them. A dog may be taught to bark when bid, or to whine in a particular way for a piece of meat. And if dogs were, in point of Mind, just the same as men, they would doubtless have a complete Language (though it would be a very unmelodious one), answering the same purposes as ours.

But Brutes, from their deficiency in the power of *Abstraction*, are incapable of *generalizing* so as to form what Logicians call Common-terms; that is, *Signs* — spoken or written — to stand for Classes of objects. And without such signs (as has been explained in the *Lessons on Reasoning*, L. vii.) no process of Reasoning can be carried on. For, all Reasoning consists in referring that which we are speaking of to some Class, concerning which we know that so and so does or does not belong to it.

Thus, if the skeleton of some extinct species of animal has been dug up, and you find that there are horns on the skull, you are enabled to conclude that it was a Ruminant [chewing the cud]; because the *whole Class* of horned-animals are ruminant.

And such is the reasoning-process universally. There can be no reasoning without a Common-term, expressed or understood.*

§ 2.

The General-signs commonly employed are Words uttered. But Deaf-mutes have been *Deaf-mutes*. taught to read and write, and also to use the finger-language. And there is a curious case in America of a girl named Laura Bridgeman, who being blind as well as

* As, however, the Common-term is often not expressed but *understood*, those who are not accustomed to analyze the mental-processes, often overlook this, and fancy that one may reason without any general term at all. Nay, this has actually been asserted in a professed *System of Logic*; in which it was maintained that we may reason from one "particular instance" to another, without any need to resort to a general proposition: which, it was said, is "only marching up a hill for the purpose of marching down again." But when any one talks of "*particular instances*," he should be asked "*Instances of what?*" "Will instances of Gales of wind enable us to reason about Poor-Laws? Or will instances of a man's catching cold, help us to judge of his political opinions?" No; they must be, we are told, instances of *the same kind*: in other words, belonging to the same *Class*; and the name of a Class is a *general term*; which is just what I have been saying. See Mr. Kidd's valuable little work on *The Principles of Reasoning*. (Bentley.)

deaf, was yet taught the finger-language ; those who speak to her making the signs on *her* fingers ; so that their meaning is conveyed to her through the sense of Touch.*

But Deaf-mutes who have not been taught reading, or the

* The following is extracted from the *Lessons on Reasoning*, L. viii. : “ There have been some very interesting accounts published, by travellers in America, and by persons residing there, of a girl named Laura Bridgeman, who has been from birth, not only Deaf-and-dumb, but also blind. She has, however, been taught the finger-language, and even to read what is printed in raised characters, and also to write.

“ The remarkable circumstance in reference to the present subject is, that when she is alone, her *fingers are generally observed to be moving*, though the signs are so slight and imperfect that others cannot make out what she is thinking of. But if they inquire of her she will tell them.

“ It seems that, having once learnt the use of *Signs*, she finds the necessity of them as an *Instrument of thought*, when thinking of anything beyond mere individual objects of sense.

“ And doubtless every one else does the same ; though in *our* case, no one can (as in the case of Laura Bridgeman) *see* the operation ; nor in general can it be *heard* ; though some few persons have a habit of occasionally audibly talking to themselves ; or as it is called “ *thinking aloud*.” But the signs we commonly use in silent reflection are merely mental *conceptions* of uttered words : and these, doubtless, are *such as* could be hardly at all understood by another, even if uttered audibly. For we usually think in a kind of *short-hand* (if one may use the expression), like the notes one sometimes takes down on paper to help the memory, which consist of a word or two, — or even a letter, — to suggest a whole sentence ; so that such notes would be unintelligible to any one else.

“ It has been observed also that this girl, when asleep, and doubtless dreaming, has her fingers frequently in motion : being in fact, talking in her sleep.”

finger-language, cannot carry on a process of Reasoning ; nor have they any clear notion of Numbers, for want of Signs to denote them.. And those of them who have grown up untaught, and have afterwards received proper instruction, have themselves declared, that, in their former condition, nothing that could properly be called a process of Reasoning had ever passed in their mind. One of them also described the difficulty he used to find in knowing whether his brothers were all present, or how many of them were absent ; because, though he knew each of them separately, he could not count them. And to remedy this, he devised a kind of Signs for his own use. He made his thumb stand for one brother, his fore-finger for another, his middle-finger for another, &c., and thus, by looking at each brother, and each finger, he could tell whether they were all present, or *which* was absent.

§ 3.

We sometimes employ an *Individual* of some Class to stand as a kind of Sign to denote the whole Class. Thus, in Geometry, the learner has before him a Diagram of a single Triangle or Circle, &c., concerning which he demonstrates so and so : understanding that this Triangle *represents*, as a Sign, *all* Triangles, or all similar ones ; and that the demonstration holds good equally with every one of them.

This answers to what one often sees in Shops. You may see a parcel containing a certain description of gloves, for instance, or buttons, or any other Article, and having — in-

stead of the *name* and description *written* on the outside, one button, or glove, &c., placed outside the parcel, and thus serving as a Sign.

§ 4.

In all cases where we generalize, it is evident *Comparison*. that we make a *comparison*; since we could not give one common-name to several distinct things, without perceiving some point of *resemblance* between them.

Now it is true that Brutes are capable of *perceiving* resemblances. A dog, for instance, on seeing a man whom he had never seen before, knows that it is *a man*. And hence, some persons who profess to explain many things by their theory of *Ideas*, may be led to say that a dog has in its mind the "abstract-idea" of Man. But though Brutes do perceive resemblances, it is only that *similar* qualities produce in them, when presented to their senses, *similar* sensations. Thus a dog that has been whipped, has an association formed in his mind between the sight of a whip, and pain: and he will shrink from a whip that he had never seen before, because it looks *like* that which he had suffered from.

But Brutes have not, like Man, a *command* over the Power of perceiving resemblances, [*comparing*] so as to direct it *at pleasure*, and thus to abstract, by choice, *this* or that circumstance of resemblance, and thus to refer objects to various different classes, as it suits our purpose. And it is this *command* over comparisons that enables us to *frame* General terms.

§ 5.

If, for instance, you abstract from a red-cloak the circumstance of *color* alone, you may class it along with other *red*-objects, such as a field-poppy, a red-covered book, and other things quite unlike except in that one point, of color. And all of them will agree in appearing red in day-light or candle-light, and *black*, in twilight. Or, again, you might abstract from such a Cloak, the single circumstance of its being *woollen*, and so class it along with blankets and carpets, &c., of whatever Color. And these are found all to agree in being subject to the attacks of moths.

Or you might abstract the single circumstance of its being an *article of dress*; and so class it along with gowns, stockings and other clothing, of whatever material and of whatever color.

And in this way it is that we form the "*common terms*" which we employ in Reasoning. We are able to fix on whatever circumstance we choose to abstract from several distinct objects, according to the particular purpose we have in view.

Suppose, for instance, it is some individual "Building" that we are considering: in respect of its *materials* we may refer it to the class (suppose) of "Stone-buildings," or of "wooden," &c.; in respect of its *use*, it may be (suppose) a "house," as distinguished from a Chapel, a Barn, &c.; in respect of Orders of *Architecture*, it may be a "Gothic building," or a "Grecian," &c.; in respect of *size*, it may

be a "large," or a "small building;" in respect of *color*, it may be "white," "red," "brown," &c.

§ 6.

And it is thus we proceed with respect to anything else that may be the subject of our reasoning, on each occasion that occurs. We arbitrarily fix on, and abstract, out of all the things actually existing in the subject, that one which is important to the purpose in hand. So that the same thing is referred to one Class, or to another, (to any of those to which it really *is* referable,) according to the occasion.

For instance, in the example above, you might refer the "building" you were speaking of, to the Class [or Predicable] of "*white-buildings*," — or even of "*white-objects*," — if your purpose were to show that it might be used as a *land-mark*; if you were reasoning concerning its danger from *fire*, you might class it (supposing it were of *wood*) not only with such *buildings*, but also with hay-stacks and other combustibles: if the building were about to be *sold*, along with, perhaps, not only other buildings, but likewise cattle, land, farming implements, &c., that were for *sale* at the same time, the point you would then abstract would be, its being an *article of value*. And so in other cases.

This is a kind of operation of which the Brutes are not capable. And, among men, Savages have the least of the power of Abstraction: and the most uneducated among civilized men differ more in this point than in any other, from those whose minds have been more cultivated.

As for deaf-mutes, they differ from the most intelligent of the Brutes somewhat in the same way that a man shut up in a dark room does *Deaf-mutes.* from the blind. Neither can see, at the present time; but the one has the natural Power of which the other is destitute, and can use it as soon as light is admitted. Even so, the Deaf-mute is able to use General-signs, and thus to employ Language as an Instrument of Thought, as soon as he has received instruction.

LESSON XI.

§ 1.

It is likely that in every instance of Reasoning there is an act of the *Will*; [an exercise of volition] *Exercise of Will in Reasoning.* though very often this passes so easily and quickly as not to be noticed. When, indeed, you deliberately *set* yourself to demonstrate a mathematical proposition, or to decide some question as a Juryman, after hearing and examining the arguments on both sides, — in such cases you are conscious of an act of the Will, and often a laborious effort to fix your attention on the matter. But numberless acts of Reasoning certainly do take place every day, which are so entirely without effort, — so short, simple, and easy, — that we are unconscious of any Volition, or of Reasoning at all.

Now Brutes appear to want — what Man has — a power of exercising the Will on the operations of the *Mental operations of Brutes, not under the control of Will.* Mind. We know that we can, and often do, deliberately *turn our thoughts* in some direction. We *withdraw* our attention — sometimes with a great effort — from one subject, to fix it on another. We resolve to meditate carefully on such and such a matter. And this power of the Will, though it is very little exercised by the rudest Savages, appears to exist in Man universally.

The Brutes, on the other hand, even the most intelligent of them, appear to have no control of the Will over the mental operations. Their minds are merely *acted on* by the circumstances that are presented to them. One cannot conceive a Brute turning its thoughts at will, in this or that direction. And hence probably it is, that they want that power of Abstraction (above described) which Man has; and thence are incapable of the process properly called Reasoning.

§ 2.

Something nearly the same is our own condition when sound *asleep*, and dreaming. Whether we are *always* dreaming when asleep, though we often *Dreams.* do not remember our dreams, is a question which cannot be completely determined; though it is certain that we often do have dreams of which we have no recollection. For a person will often show, by TALKING in his sleep, that he is dreaming; though, on awaking, he will perhaps have no remembrance of it. And you may observe that when you are *suddenly* awakened, you almost always are conscious of some dream that has been broken off. But when you awake *spontaneously*, at your usual time of rising, you often have no remembrance of any dream, because the waking is *gradual*, so that your sleeping-thoughts slide, as it were, into your waking thoughts. But even in this case, it will often happen that something in the course of the day will recall to your mind a dream of which, on first waking, you had remembered nothing.

Now, in perfect sleep, the power of the *Will*, over both body and mind, seems to be completely suspended. We dream, indeed, of having a will to walk, or to speak, or to eat, &c., and thereupon we *dream* that we do it; but *Sleep-walk-* we do it not. For, as for Sleep-walkers, and *ing.* those who talk in their sleep, theirs is manifestly a case of *imperfect* sleep; or, at least, of a peculiar kind of sleep; what some call the Somnambulist, or *sleep-waking* state. And in that state, persons have been known not only to speak and walk, but to dress themselves, and even (as Shakespeare represents Lady Macbeth) to sit down to a table and write.

And something of this imperfect sleep is often observed in dogs also; which will often be seen to move their limbs, and will faintly bark, doubtless when dreaming of hunting.

§ 3.

But in ordinary perfect Sleep, the power of the Will seems to be completely suspended. In a dream, *Sound Sleep.* during sound sleep, one conception after another passes through the mind, according as they are linked together by Association; one suggesting another. And all appear to us to be realities, because we have not, as when awake, the *power to dismiss* them at pleasure. When, in your waking hours, you conceive ["figure to yourself," as we often say] some person, or place, or event, you can at pleasure dismiss this thought from your mind. And thence it is that you know it to be all unreal; because if the real

place, &c., were present before you, you could not help seeing it. But in sleep, as you have not this power, you cannot distinguish your conceptions from realities.

§ 4.

And in this respect, there is a close resemblance between Sleep and *Madness*. For, an insane patient will often be such merely from being haunted, *Insanity.* while awake, with some conceived object, over which he has lost the control of the Will. And hence he mistakes it for a reality, because he has not the power to *dismiss* it, any more than we can avoid seeing what is before our eyes.*

And persons under some strong *passion*, — such as terror, anger, eager desire, — sometimes mistake their fancies for realities, and imagine that they see *Passion.* or hear what is only suggested to their thoughts by what they really do see or hear; because the mind is then too much agitated or weakened to be able to *banish* the conceived object [or idea] from its view.

And the like happens with those who are under the influence of intoxicating drink.

§ 5.

Now if any one should ask you how you know that you are not, at this moment, asleep, and in a dream, it would not be sufficient to answer, “I know *Reasoning suspended, in Sleep.* and am conscious that I am awake, and that the

* See Lesson XXIX. § 1.

things around me are real;" for you generally believe yourself to be awake, when you are dreaming; and think the objects to be real which your fancy presents to your mind.

But it is probable that no process of what can be properly called *Reasoning* (and which is connected, as has been above said, with *Will*) ever takes place in sound sleep. For though you sometimes dream of stating an argument, and perhaps a very correct one, it will always be found to be one you had used, or heard, before; and that there is only a repetition of it by memory.

And hence it is, no doubt, that our dreams, in perfect *Absurdity of sleep,* are so absurd and inconsistent. We *dreams.* dream, for instance, of conversing with some friend, whom, at the very same moment, we know to be far away, or dead. When we are awake, there are very short and simple acts of Reasoning passing in the mind, so rapidly as not to be noticed by us, which prevent our falling into such inconsistencies. We never find it necessary to state to ourselves distinctly in words such an argument as this: "No one who is in India can be now with me in London; my friend so and so is now in India; therefore he is not here." But this kind of reasoning passing rapidly through the mind, without any perceptible effort, is not noticed by us, but serves to prevent such absurdities as occur in dreams.

It is worth observing, that it is very happy for us that our dreams are usually thus absurd. For if they were more consistent and rational, we should be likely often to mistake them afterwards for realities, and believe things to

have been really said and done, which we have only dreamed.

It is worth observing, also, that a Brute does sometimes apparently make just such mistakes as we do in our dreams. For instance, a dog that has been used to hunt for and fetch a ball or other object, will leap at it and try to reach it, if, by way of sport, you put it up on some high place; and if, after several trials, he fails to reach it, you may see him go to seek for it in some corner where he had often been used to find it; though he sees it before him in another place. And this resembles what often occurs to us in dreams, when we fancy some object to be in two places at once.

§ 6.

From what has been said, of the exercise of the Reasoning faculty being *voluntary* [dependent on the Will], you may easily see why, and how far, we are *Responsible* morally *responsible* for the beliefs or opinions we form, or fail to form, by Reasoning. Our Intellectual Powers are all bestowed on us by divine Providence for our good; and it is evidently a duty to make a good use of them; even as the Servants in the Parables of the "Talents," and the "Pounds," were required to employ rightly what had been entrusted to them. If we squander away the Talent committed to us, or if we bury it, and let it lie idle, we shall be condemned as "bad and slothful servants."

LESSON XII.

§ 1.

It is generally supposed, and seems highly probable, *Fore-part of the Brain.* that those Intellectual Powers which are peculiar to Man, are dependent on that portion of the Brain which is seated within the higher part of the *Forehead.* That the Brain, or some part of it, is an Organ of the Mind, or in some way connected with it, is what, in the present day, hardly any one denies. And, as has been above said, many of the most eminent Physiologists hold that each of certain particular mental Faculties is connected with a distinct portion of the brain. But even those who disagree with these Physiologists as to several particulars, yet acknowledge the general truth of what I have just said concerning the Forehead. For any one who compares the skulls of several animals with the human, will perceive the comparative *lowness* — the receding — of the Brute forehead. And he will also see that the more intelligent of the Brutes have more of forehead than the stupider ones.

Something of this difference may also be observed in different men. The rudest of the savage-tribes have the forehead much more receding than that of highly-civilized men. And if you make a drawing of a man's head, with a forehead exceedingly low, almost approaching to that of an Ape, any one to whom you showed it would be almost sure to remark that it was the portrait of an *Idiot.*


Now if it is fully established that a very great deficiency in a certain portion of the *Brain* is always accompanied with a deficiency in a certain kind of *intellectual power*, and that every one who possesses the Power in a remarkable degree, has a larger development than the average of men, of that part of the Brain, this amounts to a strong proof that there is some connection between the two things.

§ 2.

Some, however, have remarked, on the other side, that you may meet with men who have the forehead well developed, who yet are not at all remarkable for *Possible im-*
perfections of
Brain. intellect, or who even fall below the average.

But this is no disproof of what has been just said. For, it is possible that there may be some defect in the *substance* of the Brain, or of some portion of it; so that, though not deficient in *size*, it may be wanting in activity. And this corresponds with what is observed in all the bodily Organs. We have good reason for calling the Eye an Organ of Sight; though all who have eyes do not see. If the optic-nerve is diseased or destroyed, a man will become blind, though his eyes remain perfect. Or there may be some disease in the Eye itself, which will impair the Sight. But those who are *without* eyes, cannot see; and those whose eyes are defective, cannot see well; and all who do see well, have good eyes: and it is on this ground we call the Eye the Organ of Sight.

So, also, though a man without hands cannot handle, a man who does possess hands may be unable to use them, or



may use them but very feebly, if they are paralysed. And so, of the rest.

The deficiency therefore in certain intellectual Powers which may be found in some who are not deficient in a certain portion of the Brain, does not at all prove that there is no connection between the two. But, on the other hand, if any man or other animal could be found, that did manifest those intellectual powers in a high degree, while that portion of the Brain was wanting, or was very small, *this* indeed *would* be a disproof of the connection. But it does not appear that any instance of *this* has ever been found.

§ 3.

Those Physiologists above mentioned (commonly called *Faculty of* "Phrenologists" from a Greek word signifying *Comparison*. "Mind"); believe that there is a certain portion of the fore-part of the Brain — which they call the "Organ of Comparison" — on which depends that faculty of *comparing* and *generalizing*, above mentioned as essential to Reasoning. At least, such we must suppose to be their meaning; since they describe the Faculty as one *peculiar to Man*. They cannot, therefore, mean merely the perception of *resemblance*; that is, being affected in a similar manner by similar objects; since this is found in Brutes. A dog, for instance (as was observed above), knows a man, or a whip, which he had never seen before, to be what they are, from their resemblance to what he *has* seen.

But what is peculiar to Man, is, the power of so comparing together several objects as to abstract from them, at

pleasure, some circumstance wherein they agree, disregarding all the points wherein they differ ; and thence forming a *common-term* ; — either what is called a *concrete-common-term*, denoting the Class they are thus placed in, or an *Abstract-common-term*, denoting the *circumstance itself* wherein they agree. Thus, from so comparing together water, and oil, and spirit of wine, we arrive at the common-term *Fluids*, which applies to all of them ; and the term *Fluidity*, which denotes what belongs to them all.*

And this we must suppose, is the office, according to the Phrenologists, of their Organ of Comparison.

* See *Lessons on Reasoning*, L. vii. § 4.

LESSON XIII.

§ 1.

CLOSE adjoining to this portion of the Brain is that which the Phrenologists call the "Organ of Causal-
Inquiry into Causes. ity;" on which depends, according to them, the Faculty of discerning Causes.

Be this as it may, it is certain that we have a belief, generally, that there must be *some* cause for everything that happens, — for every *change* that takes place. We are convinced that whatever is not eternal, must have been *caused* by something. And we are conscious of a desire to investigate Causes. All this is something quite distinct from the reasoning-faculty above described. For though we use the word "because" to denote the following of a Conclusion from the Premises by which it is proved, we are well aware that the Premises are not (necessarily) the Cause of the Conclusion itself, but only the cause of *our knowing* it. When, for instance, we see the ground wet, and thence conclude that there has been rain, and perhaps say "There has certainly been rain, because the ground is wet," we do not mean that the wetness of the ground was the cause of the rain; since we well know that the wetness was caused by the rain. But what we mean, is, (if expressed at full length,) "*I am sure* that it has rained, because the ground is wet;" or "the ground is wet, and *therefore* I *know* that it has rained."

§ 2.

But plain as this is when distinctly stated, there is a danger of falling into confusion of thought on this point, from the use of such words as “follow” — “consequence” — “because” — “therefore” — “since,” and several others, and also the corresponding words in all languages. For, all these relate sometimes to the sequence [following] of an *effect* from a *Cause*, and sometimes, of a *Conclusion*, from an argument. We are apt to confound together the cause of anything’s *being* what it is, and the cause of our *knowing* or believing it.

And, universally, there is a danger of falling into the mistake of attributing to *things themselves*, what belongs to *our knowledge*, or our thoughts concerning them.

For instance, we commonly speak of events being *certain*, or *uncertain*, or *contingent*, when in truth it is *we* that are certain or uncertain. Whether, for example, such and such a ship, did, or did not, arrive yesterday at a port in India, is a matter of uncertainty to those in England, but of certainty to those on the spot. And if we had the same full knowledge of all the causes that are in operation, future events would be no more uncertain to us than many past occurrences are; and indeed, some future ones also; such as an Eclipse; which Astronomers can now foretell with perfect certainty; though in former times it was a *contingency*; — what is called a matter of *chance*.

When we say that a man who is locked up in Prison

Necessary and impossible. *must* necessarily remain there, and that it is *impossible* for him to go to his home, we mean

that it is out of his *power* to go home, and that he must remain in prison whether he will or no. But when we say that a thirsty traveller in a desert *must* eagerly drink when he comes to a spring, we mean, not, that he is compelled to drink whether he will or no, but that we cannot help expecting that he will.*

§ 3.

The mental Faculty of inquiring into and discerning *Different Causes*, though belonging to the Human Species, *Talents.* is found in very different degrees in different men. And so it is, with the Reasoning-Faculty, as observed above ; and with every kind of Mental-Power.

* So strong is the tendency to attribute to the things we are speaking of, what belongs to our thoughts concerning them, that it sometimes leads to gross absurdities. For instance, a person who was tried, in France, for an atrocious murder, was found " guilty, with *extenuating circumstances* : " the only *extenuating* circumstance being, confessedly, a *doubt* in the minds of the jury whether the murder had been committed or not ! And a mitigated penalty was thereupon pronounced.

And in Homer's *Odyssey*, one of the departed heroes in Elysium is represented as saying that he would prefer the life of a poor laborer, on Earth, to the condition of being king of all the Shades below. Now it is plain that *existence* does not admit of *degrees*. Either the deceased hero did exist in Elysium (in which case he might be as happy as on Earth, or happier) or he did *not*, and was *nothing*. But the Ancients having a doubtful, half-belief in a future state, attributed to the persons themselves who were departed, a sort of half-and-half shadowy life ; as if they could be *partly existing*, but not quite.

And this inequality seems to be implied in our modern use of the word "Talents," as applied to any of these Powers. For, this expression is manifestly borrowed from the Scripture-Parable of the Talents; of which one servant had five entrusted to him, another, two, and another, one; each being required to make the best use of his deposit. And it would be well, if, whenever the word is used, it should serve to remind us that all our Powers great or small — are bestowed by our divine Master; before whose judgment seat we shall have to give an account of how we have employed them.

Why it is that the Creator has appointed that there should be natural differences and inequalities between men, we can no more explain, than we can, why, in the course of Providence some are born in a civilized and christian country, and others, among Heathen Savages. We only know the fact, that to one person five Talents are committed, to another, two, and to another, one. What are called the "gifts of *Nature*," and the "gifts of *Fortune*," are equally divine gifts. And it is for us, instead of wearying ourselves with vain inquiries, and rash conjectures, to endeavor to make the best use of our own deposit, be it great or small.

§ 4.

There are still however some few — though but a few — who maintain that all men are born alike, and *Men not born alike.* that all the differences between one man and another are owing to Education alone. These persons seem to think that in this respect we resemble the *Bee*. It has

been ascertained of late years by the most skilful Naturalists, that the Queen-bee does not originally differ, when first hatched as a Larva [grub] from any one of the common working-bees ; and that the bees have the power, when they are in need of a Queen, and are led by their instinct to make one, to rear as a Queen the Larva of a common bee, by supplying it with a particular kind of food. Even so, those persons we have been speaking of, fancy that by a suitable education from the Cradle, we might rear any infant to be a Statesman, a General, a Philosopher, or a Poet, &c.

But all Experience, and all Reason, are against this notion. For we see, that, though undoubtedly education has a great effect, yet persons who have been educated exactly alike, turn out very different. And as there are, manifestly, from birth, great differences in the color of the hair, and skin, in the shape, and in the bodily-constitution, so, it is what we might have reasonably expected, even if we did not see so many signs of it around us, that there should be also original differences in the Brain, or whatever else it is on which the mental-character depends.

§ 5.

And these differences seem to be not only in *degree* of *Differences* ability, but in *kind* also. For, you may often
in kind. meet with a person who is very clever, and also, very dull ; in different things. Some persons indeed fancy (as was above remarked) that though all have not *equal* ability, any one who has a certain *amount* of intellectual power, may *turn* this one way or another, at pleasure ; so

that Milton, for instance, might have been a great Astronomer, or Newton a great Poet, if their attention had been so and so directed.

But this is as unreasonable as to conclude that because a man has remarkably good *eyes*, he might have been trained to *hear* better than most people; or that because his *legs* are particularly strong, he might be made uncommonly handy. For, the eyes, and the ears, do not differ more from each other, than a mechanical genius does, from a poetical. And as for the "turning of the attention" this way or that, we continually see instances of persons turning out exactly the opposite of what their friends designed, and endeavored to make them. Handel, for example (and it was the same, with some other eminent Composers), was discouraged by his parents in his pursuit of Music; and every effort was used to train him to some other profession. And one may see instances of youths whom their friends take great pains to qualify for some learned Profession, and who show a great inaptitude for the study of it, but who readily acquire skill in some Mechanical pursuit, and excel in that, as soon as they are allowed to follow their own bent.

§ 6.

It is a great practical mistake therefore and one which has caused man's failure in after-life, for a *Practical* parent to fancy that his son may be made an *mistakes.* able Lawyer, because he is very *clever*, perhaps in building, or in gardening; or because he has written some clever verses, or shown a talent for drawing, &c.

Some people have been told (what is very true) that the Memory — like other Powers — may be strengthened by exercise. But if, thereupon, they expect to improve a boy's memory for *persons*, or for *places*, or for daily *occurrences*, by setting him to learn by heart Poems and Speeches, they are as much in error as if they should think to strengthen his eye-sight by exercising his arms or legs.

We should, however, be very careful, on the other hand, not to commit the contrary fault, of cultivating only one portion of the Mind, and neglecting the rest. If you train a youth to be a mere Mathematician, because he shows a mathematical turn, or a mere Linguist or a mere Poet, &c., leaving his other Faculties uncultivated, because they are not likely to be brought to any high degree of excellence, you are not doing justice, either to him, or to Society.

Ill-balanced You will thus have been producing an *ill-*
minds. *balanced* Mind; — a sort of distorted intellectual growth, answering to the mis-shapen bodily frame of those Mechanics who by one uniform kind of labor have increased the growth and strength of some particular muscles, at the expense of all the rest. Our object should be, not to make any one a mere *machine* for working Problems, or writing Verses, &c., but a good and happy *man*. And, with this view, though we ought to take due advantage of any peculiar endowment that any one may possess, we should not do this so as to narrow the mind, and leave the rest of its powers unimproved.

LESSON XIV.

§ 1. .

AMONG the Faculties which have been enumerated as distinct, and supposed to be connected with distinct portions of the Brain, is that which is *Faculty of Number.* concerned with *Number*. For although — as was pointed out above — this is dependent on Abstraction, it is not the same thing. There cannot, indeed, be Numeration without Abstraction ; but there may be Abstraction without Numeration.

When we compare together several objects, and abstract some circumstance common to all of them, we may, or we may not, attend to the point of “how many” there are of these objects. And some people have more, and some less, of a tendency, and a power, to abstract in that particular way. There are some who readily count, and notice, and remember, the numbers of objects, and have a facility of calculation ; though, perhaps, they are not remarkable for power of abstraction in any other respect. And, again, there are some who show, in many points, great powers of Abstraction, though they have no remarkable aptitude for Calculations.

§ 2.

There has been supposed to be also a certain distinct Faculty of *Language*, connected with a distinct portion of the Brain. For though, as has been above explained, there could be no such use of Language as we possess, without an exercise of *Abstraction*, by which we form General-terms, it does not seem probable that there is something else needed, at least, for the ready and fluent use of Language. For we find some persons who show in other things, very superior powers of Abstraction, yet who do not at all excel in the power of expressing themselves; or are even somewhat deficient in that: while others, who in this are greatly their superiors, yet fall short of them in abstracting-power.

Then again, there is a vast difference among different men in their power of learning foreign languages. And some who possess this in a high degree, are but very ordinary men in all other respects.

§ 3.

In acquiring a foreign Language by the *Ear*, much must depend on the power of *Imitation*; which is also reckoned as one of the distinct mental faculties; and in which different persons are very unequal.

It is one of those Faculties that are not peculiar to *Man*. For even when applied to sounds, we know that Parrots and several other birds can be taught to pronounce words,

and to whistle tunes, and to imitate various noises. And the Monkey-tribes, though they have not such vocal organs as to be able to imitate sounds, are well known to be most ready imitators of any actions they see. Indeed the very word, to "*ape*," is thence used to signify imitation.

Children generally have more of this faculty than grown people. And this, no doubt, serves the purpose, among others, of helping them to learn a Language. Their tendency to imitate is often so strong that we are obliged to check it. But grown persons, as has been just said, differ much from each other, as to the degree in which they possess the faculty. And this probably is one of the causes which gives some persons an advantage over others, in learning a Language; at least as far as regards the *pronunciation*.

Some suppose that a good *musical-Ear* has also something to do with a readiness in learning to pronounce a Language correctly. But this is a point which has not been decided. And, of course, as far as any Language is learnt by the *Eye*, — by reading and writing — the ear can have nothing to do with it.

§ 4.

It has been remarked by intelligent persons that there is a great difference between a "*Talent for Language. guages*" and a "*Talent for Language;*" and that the two do not always go together.

By a "*Talent for Languages,*" they mean a very great readiness in learning any foreign Language, so as to be able to understand and to use it. And this is sometimes found

in persons who never attain any critical accuracy, and are not at all remarkable for using language with great precision, and observing the minute shades of difference between words, or for tracing derivations. Some, again, who perhaps do not equal these in the facility with which they "pick up a language" (as the phrase is) yet having more of a philosophical turn, are superior as accurate scholars, and employ with more correctness any language they do know.

And that part of *Eloquence* which depends on the language, is often found unconnected with any remarkable facility in acquiring foreign Tongues. One who has what is called a "good *command of language*," being able to express himself fluently in the most choice terms, may perhaps not be equal, in the learning of a new language, to some who are far inferior to him in this kind of eloquence.

LESSON XV.

§ 1.

THOSE Philosophers formerly alluded to, maintain that there is also a distinct Faculty, or faculties, for observing and remembering *individual ob- Faculty of observing individuals.* *jects and events.* They remark (what is certainly true) that in this Power there is much difference between persons who are not unequal in point of general intelligence. One man will take much notice of every occurrence, and every object, that comes in his way; and will be able to relate accurately all the most minute circumstances of any transaction: while another, not inferior to him in other respects, will remember all this but imperfectly, or not at all. The former of these is the sort of person that is commonly described (as I formerly observed) as having an uncommonly "good Memory." *Good memory.* And yet perhaps the latter may exceed him in retaining in his mind all the steps of a long train of Reasoning; and may remember much better the substance, and perhaps even the very words, of what he has read.

In the well-known children's book called *Evenings at Home*, there is an amusing little Tale called "Eyes, and no Eyes;" in which two boys are described who had made the same excursion, but one of whom had noticed a great number of things which the other passed by without at all

observing them. But then, one of these boys is represented as being not only observant but *intelligent*; reflecting attentively, and reasoning sensibly on all he saw. This, however, is not the case with all persons who are observant. There are some who attend to, and accurately remember, all the most minute particulars of everything that comes before them, yet have little or no power of *turning to account* any knowledge they gain: while others again reflect carefully and intelligently on what they have observed, and draw useful inferences from it. The former resemble a man who reaps a field of corn, and brings it home, and stores it up, leaving it just as it is: and the others are like one who proceeds to *thresh* the corn, and winnow it, and grind, and sift it, so as to be fitted for making bread.

§ 2.

Now all this seems to indicate the existence of a distinct

Faculty for the observing of individual things.

*Distinct
faculty for
observing
Individual
things.*

Some few persons indeed possess in a high degree both the endowments of a Talent for *Observation*, and also, a Talent for drawing Conclusions from what has been observed. But many who possess one of these Powers in a remarkable degree, do not at all excel in the other.

For instance, there are hundreds and thousands of Sailors and other travellers, who have, from time to time, visited various Regions inhabited by Savage Tribes, and have observed, and fully described, all the particulars of their rude kind of life. And they have also heard or read

the accounts given by other travellers, who have visited the same, or other, savage countries. Now Savages are always found to have remained, when not instructed by civilized men, completely unimproved from generation to generation. Yet very few of these observant travellers have ever thought of drawing the inference which evidently follows: namely, that since it appears that Savages, when *unaided from without*, never can civilize themselves, hence, if Mankind had always, from the first, been left in what some call a "state of nature," without any *instruction from above*, the whole Human Race, all over the world (supposing they could have subsisted at all) would have remained mere Savages down to this day.

§ 3.

When that tendency we have been speaking of is very strong, and predominates in a man's character, we call such a person "*inquisitive*," or *curious*. *Curiosity.* Curiosity, in a more extended sense, — a *desire for knowledge*, generally, is found — though in different degrees — in all men. But the particular *turn* which this desire of knowledge takes, depends on each person's character in other respects. A Philosopher, such as Bacon or Newton, seeking to investigate the Laws of Nature, would not be called an *inquisitive* man. That word is seldom applied where there is a pursuit of the knowledge of things important or admirable, or useful. But we call a man *inquisitive* who seeks for a knowledge of little trifling particulars, which even he himself does not consider as important in

themselves ; especially, if he pries into *secrets* that do not at all concern him, and which he seeks to know, chiefly *because* they are secrets.

Sometimes indeed such a person will afterwards find some use — good or bad — for the knowledge he has acquired : but if he had no such use *in view*, we call him inquisitive

LESSON XVI.

§ 1.

THE word *Wit* is derived (as also the words “wise” and “wisdom”) from an Anglo-Saxon word signifying to *know*, or understand. And accordingly it was formerly used to signify *intelligence*, generally: in which sense you may find it in Shakspeare, and other Writers of his time. *Wit.*

There are still some remnants in modern language, of this ancient usage; as when you speak of being “at your wit’s end,” or frightened “out of your wits,” or of one man having “outwitted” another. But ordinarily the word is used in a much more limited sense.

What we now call Wit is usually reckoned a distinct Faculty. That portion of the Brain, however, which some Physiologists have considered as the “Organ of Wit,” there is good reason for believing to be rather (what the Ancients thought the *Spleen* to be) the seat of *Laughter*. And these are far from being necessarily connected. For, the persons most remarkable for Wit, are not usually the most prone to Laughter: nor indeed are they the persons that the most excite laughter in others. For, genuine Wit seldom causes laughter; which is oftener caused by what is called *Humor* as distinguished from Wit: though the two

are often mixed together. There is a *Smile* called forth by Wit ; indicating the peculiar kind of gratification it affords : but it does not usually, of itself, make us laugh.

§ 2.

It is remarkable that though the Faculty of Laughter would hardly be reckoned among the *intellectual Powers*, it certainly is peculiar to *Man*. Some *Laughter peculiar to Man.* of the higher Brutes do indeed *Smile*. You may see a very evident smile of delight on a dog's face, when he greets his master. But of Laughter they all seem incapable. And it is remarkable that those muscles of the face which are set in motion when we laugh, are not found in Brutes.

Laughter, therefore, it would seem, must be connected with some of the peculiar-human Faculties. And although (as has been above said) there are reasons for thinking it is connected with a certain peculiar Organ of the Brain, it does seem to have something to do with the faculty of *Comparison* above spoken of. For, it seems to be always excited by the perception of some *contrast* ; — a sudden, *striking*, and unexpected appearance of *incongruity*.*

* It is thought by some, and not without reason, that besides the laughter excited by anything that strikes us as *ludicrous*, there is also a laugh of *exultation* ; — a distinct kind of laugh, occasioned by a sudden triumph, — an unexpected delight of any kind, whether at the overthrow of an opponent, or any other cause. This kind of laughter seems to have been in the mind of Hobbes, who defined Laughter as a “sudden glorying.” And it seems to be alluded to in the proverbial expression of “Let them laugh that win.”

Now any incongruity is then only perceived when two things are brought together which might be *expected* in some way to agree, and which very much disagree. For there is nothing laughable in the mere perception of two things that are very different, when there is no reason to expect any agreement between them. Hence, *Mimicry*, *Mimicry*. for instance, generally excites laughter. When any one exactly imitates the voice and gestures of another, though these should be not at all absurd or unbecoming in themselves, this is apt to make people laugh ; because there is an incongruity between the person and the voice. For if we were completely deceived, and thought the person speaking to be really A. [the person imitated] and not B. [the Mimic], we should not laugh.

The same may be said of that kind of imitation called *Parody* ; in which the language of some serious Work is applied to something trifling or absurd.

And children and the Vulgar generally laugh when a man imitates the sounds of some Brute ; such as the cackling of a fowl, or the lowing of a cow ; because there is an incongruity in these sounds proceeding from a *man*. For there is nothing laughable in the natural lowing of a real cow. Nor again would any one be at all disposed to laugh at merely perceiving two objects — as a man and a cow — to be very different. It is only when two very different objects are, in some unexpected way, *brought together* and conjoined, that we are struck by a laughable incongruity.

§ 3.

Wit, properly so called, and which, as has been above said, seldom causes Laughter when quite un-*Humor and* mixed with *Humor*, has been, not unreasonably, *Wit*, distinguished from that, [humor] and everything that does excite laughter, as being in some measure, the *opposite*: that is, it has been described as consisting in the exhibiting of a sudden and unexpected *congruity* between things the most unlike, and remote from each other. And here also therefore there is something of *comparison* employed. And as there is not (as I have just observed) anything laughable in the mere perception of two objects widely different, so, neither is there any gratification in the mere perception of a likeness between two objects, unless there be also a very great *unlikeness*.

If, for instance, we see two trees, or two horses, very much *Pleasure of* alike, though they may chance to be beautiful, *Imitations.* we do not admire them the more on account of their *resemblance*: but a good *picture* of a tree or a horse, gives us pleasure from its resemblance to the Original, because it is a thing of quite a different kind.*

And this seems to be somewhat of the kind of pleasure that we derive from Wit. We are struck and startled, and

* A *Statue* being, not (like a *picture*) the imitation of a solid body, on a flat surface, but one solid body carved into the shape of another is an imitation of the original by something of a *less different* kind. And hence it is that the *coloring* of Statues is generally disapproved. It makes the Image *too little different* from the thing represented.

amused, at the unexpected *congruity* in some point, exhibited between things extremely unlike.

It may be added that a great part of the pleasure afforded by Wit arises from our admiration and surprise at the *surmounting of a difficulty*; like what we feel at a clever sleight-of-hand trick. Hence, anything that is somewhat of the character of Wit, but which is very *easy and obvious*, affords so much the less pleasure. It is often said that there is no Wit in profane or indecent allusions. Yet one could hardly give any definition of Wit, that should exclude all such. The true statement is that (besides the disgust produced in well-disposed minds) the extreme *easiness* of this kind of Wit, would alone destroy, to persons of intelligence, a great part of the amusement that Wit affords.

The contrast is always the more striking, and the more pleasing, the more *difficult* and *unexpected* is the bringing of the things together.

§ 4.

If you examine anything that is acknowledged to be witty, you will see something of that *contrast* *Contrast.* between congruity and incongruity, — between agreement and disagreement, — which is what amuses us.

For instance, a good Enigma, which when explained affords this kind of amusement, most people *Enigmas.* would call a piece of Wit. The following (translated from the French) is one of the best: —

"The Child of Nature, and the Child of Art,
 As I grow old, I grow too young and smart.
 Without prolonging life, I death defeat :
 And then am truest when I'm most a cheat."*

Again :

• "Form'd long ago, yet made to-day,
 I'm most employ'd when others sleep.
 What few would wish to give away,
 And fewer still would wish to keep."

Again :

"Mid constant change, the same I still remain,
 And still, though wandering far, my place retain.
 Always in motion, though I keep my bed ;
 And wide my mouth, though little is my head."

And again :

"If you had it not, you would be sorry to have it :
 If you had it, you would be sorry to lose it ;
 And, if you have gained it, you have it not."

When these are explained as descriptions of a Portrait, a Bed, a River, and a Law-Suit, we are struck by the unexpected seeming agreement (made out chiefly by a play upon words) between things in reality quite at variance.

* "Enfant de l'Art, enfant de la Nature,
 Plus je suis vrai, plus je fais l'imposture.
 Sans prolonger la vie, j'empêche de mourir :
 Et je deviens trop jeune, a force de vieillir."

§ 5.

It has been observed by intelligent Writers, that in most instances of Wit, there is something of a *Mock-Mock-Argument*;—a fallacy too palpable to be *fallacies*. meant to deceive, but which affords amusement by its resemblance to a real Argument. Thus, what is reckoned the humblest kind of Wit,—a Pun, or Conundrum,—will generally be found to be a mock-argument, consisting of a Syllogism with the Middle-term ambiguous; as you may easily see by making trial of any that occur to you. For example: “The reason why well-bred people never *whisper* in company, is, because it is a mode of Speaking not allow’d [aloud].”

It may be added, that when a fallacious argument, seriously brought forward, is detected, and thoroughly exposed, and the fallaciousness clearly and neatly exhibited in a brief space, this often has very much the effect of Wit.

Sometimes, again, you may meet with an expression that has somewhat the character of Wit, except that it is something *beyond*:—something that *would* be witty, were it not that it is sublime, or beautiful, or a real and valid Argument. In such a case we feel that to regard this as Wit, would be *lowering* its character; though it often calls forth the same kind of smile of surprise and gratification.

NOTE.

MANY examples of this may be found. For instance, an Author is pointing out the dangerous folly of those who expect to find revealed in the Bible, not only the truths of Religion but those of Physical

Sciences, — such as Astronomy and Geology, — and who would restrict scientific inquiries ; requiring Philosophers to teach what is conformable, not to ascertained facts, but to a certain interpretation of Scripture ; like the Inquisitors who compelled Galileo to renounce as heretical the doctrine of the Earth's Motion, because in the Bible (as indeed in our own ordinary language even now) mention is made of the Sun's rising and setting. The natural result of this is, that the Christian Religion itself is not unlikely to be rejected by those who have been thus taught to regard it as contrary to truths which have been demonstrated, and which cannot long be suppressed. This the Author expresses by saying, “ When science has long been compelled to *labor in chains*, as the *bond-slave of Theology*, it never fails in the end to take a *stern revenge on its oppressor*.”

Again : When some one who has not been trained to habits of accurate reasoning, possesses perhaps less knowledge of facts indeed than is needful, yet more than he understands how to apply to any good purpose, the attempt to improve such a person by imparting increased knowledge, has been likened to an attempt to enlarge the prospect of a *short-sighted* man by bringing him to the *top of a hill*. Since he could not, when on the Plain, see distinctly all that was before his eyes, the wider extent of horizon from the hill-top is utterly lost on him.

Again : “ There was a time when the most powerful of human intellects were deluded by the gibberish of the Astrologer and the Alchemist ; and just so, there was a time when the most enlightened and virtuous statesmen thought it the first duty of a Government to persecute heretics, to found Monasteries, to make war on Saracens. But time advances, facts accumulate, doubts arise. Faint glimpses of truth begin to appear, and shine more and more unto the perfect day. *The highest intellects, like the tops of Mountains, are the first to catch and to reflect the dawn*. They are bright, while the level below is still in darkness. But soon the light which at first illuminated only the loftiest eminences, descends on the plain, and penetrates to the deepest valley. First come hints, then fragments of systems, then defective systems, then complete and harmonious systems. The sound opinion, held for a time by one bold speculator, becomes the opinion of

a small minority, — of a strong minority, — of a majority, — of mankind.”

Again : “ Neither has the understanding the absolute dominion in the formation of our judgments, nor does she occupy an ‘ unshaken throne.’ A *seditionous rabble of doubts*, from time to time, rise to dispute her empire. Even where the mind, in its habitual states, is unconscious of any remaining doubt, — where it reposes in a vast preponderance of evidence in favor of this or that conclusion, — there may yet be, from one or other of the disturbing causes adverted to, a momentary eclipse of that light in which the soul seemed to dwell ; — a momentary vibration of that judgment which we so often flattered ourselves was poised for ever. Yet this no more argues the want of habitual faith than the variations of the compass argue the severance of the connection between the magnet and the pole ; or than the oscillations of the “ rocking-stone ” argue that the solid mass can be heaved from its bed. *A child may shake, but a giant cannot overturn it.*”

Again : “ The folly and the wickedness which we often see displayed on the occasion of a revolution, or a violent party-contest, and which often fills us with surprise, are, for the most part, not *created*, but only *called forth*, by the contest ; and must have been dormant in men’s minds before, unsuspected both by others, and by themselves. For, according to the Proverb, —

‘ The pond that when stirred doth muddy appear,
Had mud *at the bottom* when still and clear.’ ”

Again : The celebrated Bacon was setting forth (most wisely) the great importance of careful circumspection in *planning* any measure, and of energy and promptitude in *carrying it out*. This is expressed by saying, “ that the beginning of an enterprise should be entrusted to *Argus* with his hundred eyes, and the execution to *Briareus* with his hundred hands. This would be called witty, but that the illustration is so happy, while the matter is so important.

LESSON XVII.

§ 1.

It has been maintained, and seems probable, that there is a peculiar Faculty for *constructing*; that is, *Faculty of* for putting things together so as to form a *Construction*. *Whole*. And the tendency to do this, together with a delight in it, and a skill in doing it, is, in some persons, much greater than in others, who are not, in other respects, inferior to them.

If a large endowment of this Power be combined with a large endowment of what are called the *knowing-faculties*, — those by which we notice the qualities of *material* things, which are objects of Sight and Touch, — then, the man will have a Turn for building, or for constructing *Machines*, &c. But if the constructive-faculty be combined with a large endowment of what is usually called *intellectual* power, — the *reflecting* faculties, — then, he will be disposed to frame *Systems*, — to found *Institutions*, — or to compose *Books*; — in short, to employ himself in the construction of things more purely intellectual.

But in both, there is the tendency to *combine* several things, so as to form a *Whole*.

§ 2.

Different men differ very much (as I have said) in the degree in which they possess the disposition, and the power, to do this. You may find one man, of perhaps much acuteness and observation, when he is speaking or writing on any subject, dealing chiefly in detached remarks, and single Maxims, not combined into anything of a *System*; while another will not be satisfied unless he can bring his matter into a connected Whole.

It has been supposed that this Constructive-Faculty, or something corresponding to it, is to be found in some of the Brute-creation; such as the Beaver, which makes dams to streams, and constructs lodging-places; and those Birds which build nests.

How to build, is taught to Brutes by Instinct, and to Man, by reason: but the *propensity* to construct appears to be common to both.

§ 3.

The word *Imagination* is often used to signify any *Conception*; as when we "figure to ourselves" (as the phrase is) the person or voice of some absent friend; or imagine ourselves viewing some past transaction which we have witnessed. But in more strict language, *Imagination* denotes our framing a conception of something unreal, or at least, which we have never witnessed: as when we imagine to ourselves the Garden of

Eden; or when we compose a fictitious Tale. And hence the word "*imaginary*" is used to denote something unreal.

But in all cases, whatever is imagined must be *made up* of *parts* of things of which we have had some experience, or of things resembling these. No one can imagine anything of which every portion consists of what he has never met with; any more than a born blind man can form any conception of visible-objects.

The Ancients had fables of imaginary monsters such as never existed, nor could exist; but these were made up of parts of real animals, unnaturally combined. Thus the fabled *Chimæra* (from which we call any very extravagant thing "chimerical") had the head of a goat, the body of a lion, and a serpent's tail. And the Sphinx was made up of a lion and a woman.

And even so in any Work of Fiction, the personages introduced are either real persons, or some that resemble these, performing actions which, though they were never really performed, have each of them some resemblance to something that has actually occurred.

In short, the work of the Imagination is like the building of a new house, with the stones, or bricks, and timbers, taken from several other Buildings. The *materials* are old, but the complete Building, new.

§ 4.

Something of the Imaginative-faculty is found in some *Imagination* of the higher Brutes; as may be seen in their *in Brutes.* *playing.* By "Play," I do not mean merely

running about to exercise their limbs, but what children call "playing at make-believe;" — a mock-fight, or a mock-hunt. This you may often see among dogs, and among cats. Dogs will chase one another, in evident imitation of the pursuit of game; and will amuse themselves with a sham-fight; pretending to bite, but taking care not to hurt. And the play of kittens is evidently an *acting* of the chase of a mouse.

The play of Brutes corresponds in this respect to our own. For, what are called *Games* are evidently imitations of real action. The game of Chess, for instance, represents a battle between two armies. And Cricket is a kind of imitation of the assault and defence of a fortress. And so, of the rest. Dancing also appears to have been originally imitative of some action; as it certainly was among the ancient Greeks, and still is, among most Savage tribes.

It may be said that there is an act of Imagination, in a certain sense, in every case of *Invention*. The person, for instance, who first devised a Steam-ship, must have framed to himself a conception of a boiler, and a piston, &c., put together in a manner he had never seen, so as to act on certain wheels. But though such a one would be said to have "an *inventive-genius*," the expression of a "fine *Imagination*" would not be applied in such a case. We generally apply it to one who forms a conception of something *beautiful* or *sublime*; such as a fine Poem, or Historical-Painting, or a Musical-Composition like one of Handel's Oratorios. And the Phrenologists hold that there is a distinct Faculty (called by them

“Ideality”) for perceiving, and contemplating, and imagining, objects of that kind.

But as for Invention, generally — that is, the creating in the Mind of a new object — it is plain (as was formerly observed, Lesson VI.) that this cannot depend on any *one* Faculty; since some persons have a turn for inventions in Mechanics, others, for Works of Fiction, others, for a System of Cyphers, others, for Music; and so on.

In any kind of Invention indeed, that Constructive-faculty above mentioned will be an important aid: but this will be *differently directed* (as was there pointed out), according to the other Faculties with which it is combined.

LESSON XVIII.

§ 1.

WITH respect to the different natural *turns of mind* of different persons, it has been pointed out above, *Natural-* that we should guard against two opposite *turns*. errors : (1) that of fancying that a certain amount of ability may be directed this way or that, at pleasure ; and endeavoring to force a person into some Profession for which he is unfitted by Nature ; while in some other pursuit he might have done well : even as Handel's father tried hard to make him a lawyer : and (2) that of cultivating to excess some one Faculty, and leaving the rest entirely unimproved.

One who shall become a distinguished Poet or Painter, at the expense of leaving his reasoning-powers totally uncultivated, or an eminent Linguist or Mathematician, quite incapable of managing the common affairs of daily life, will have paid very dear for his pre-eminence.

Some persons possess very superior endowments of more than one kind ; and are qualified to succeed well in any or in all of several different departments. But those who can attain excellence in some one pursuit, and only in one, should not therefore omit to take pains in the general cultivation of their minds, though in some points they can never get beyond mediocrity.

§ 2.

It is a mistake not very uncommon, to take for granted that because a man possesses some Talent in a remarkable degree, he must be deficient in all others : — that if he is a good scholar, and a man of literary taste, he cannot be so good a man-of-business as the illiterate : — that if he is eminent in Mathematics, he cannot be a good Theologian, &c.

*Talents
supposed
incompatible.*

And others, again, make the opposite mistake, of concluding that a very able man in one department, must be highly competent in another ; especially if the two seem any way connected ; though they may perhaps call for very different mental qualities. A skilful General may be far from a skilful Minister of State ; and an excellent Lawyer may be an indifferent *Legislator* ; though both are concerned about *Laws* : but the study of the one is as to what the Law *is*, and of the other, as to what it *ought* to be.

In truth, there are many different mental Faculties so completely independent of each other, that excellence in one does not prove either excellence, or deficiency in another ; except indeed so far as a man may have been led to devote so much of his *time and attention* to one pursuit as to have comparatively neglected others.

§ 3.

Some people, however, fall into mistakes as to this point from not taking into account the *chances* there are against the *union* of *any* two things that are not at all connected. They will observe, perhaps, that it is very rare to find a man who is both an eminent Astronomer, and also a good Political-Economist; — that remarkably good Linguists are seldom remarkable Mathematicians; — that it rarely happens that one who has an extraordinary Musical-talent, is also a particularly able Reasoner: and so on. And thence they infer that there must be something *incompatible* in the qualities themselves which are so seldom found united, in a high degree of excellence.

*Chances
against
unions of
rare quali-
ties.*

But they might equally well have remarked that it is rare to find unusually *tall* men who are also great Poets; though the two things have no more to do with each other — one way or the other — than the letters of a man's name have with the color of his hair. When there are any two things that are not either at all *connected* or *opposed*, the chances that there are against meeting with each of them *separately*, must be *multiplied together*, to express the chances against meeting with both *united*. Thus, if the chances are ten to one against a man's being of a certain extraordinary *stature* [that is, if only one man in ten is of that height], and if it is five to one against a man's having a certain amount of scholarship, then, it is not ten, or fifteen to one, but fifty to one, against a man's being both thus

extraordinarily tall and also an extraordinary Scholar : supposing always, that the two things have nothing to do with each other.

This you may see by a very simple calculation. For, out of a thousand men taken at random, only a hundred [$\frac{1}{10}$] will be (by supposition) of this remarkable stature : and this hundred being persons taken at *random in reference to their scholarship*, will contain (by supposition) only *twenty* [$\frac{1}{5}$] of superior scholarship : so that only twenty out of the thousand will have these two qualities combined. And yet this proceeds on the supposition that there is not anything *inconsistent* in the two.

Just so, there are several Intellectual-Faculties which are not in themselves at all incompatible, but which you must expect from the calculation of chances to find *very rarely* combined, in great perfection, in the same person.

LESSON XIX.

§ 1.

THERE are several errors which people are apt to fall into the exercise of their Intellectual-faculties.

For instance, in exercising the Power of Com-
parison, many are apt to be hasty and inaccurate ; Errors in the exercise of the Faculties.
sometimes overlooking some important point of difference between the things compared. By an "important point," I mean something important to the *particular matter* we are engaged in. For, things may be widely different in many respects, and yet may agree in the one circumstance that is essential to the question which happens to be before us : or again, they may differ as to that point, though they agree in most others.

Sometimes, when a Comparison is introduced that is strikingly *beautiful*, and at the same time has a real force as an Argument, people are apt to mistake it for a mere *simile* ; that is, a comparison introduced for the mere *ornament of the Style*.

And when two things are compared which are very *unlike*, except in the one point which is essential, the argument founded on that one point, is sometimes overlooked, though it may be a very sound one.

On the other hand, in things very much alike, or very exactly analogous, in most points, people often overlook a

failure in the resemblance in that which is essential to the question.

§ 2.

One or two instances will serve to explain the character of those errors. It would be admitted by every *Errors in Comparisons*. one that a great and permanent diminution in the quantity of some useful commodity, such as corn, or coal, or iron, throughout the world, would be a serious and lasting loss; and again, that if the coal-mines yielded regularly double quantities, with the same labor, we should be so much the richer; hence it might be inferred, that if the quantity of gold and silver in the world were diminished one-half, or were doubled, like results would follow; the utility of these metals, for the purposes of coin, being very great. Now there are many points of resemblance, and many of difference, between the precious metals on the one hand, and corn, coal, &c. on the other; but the *important* circumstance to the supposed argument, is, that the *utility* of gold and silver (as coin, which is far the chief) *depends on their value*, which is regulated by their scarcity; or rather, to speak strictly, by the difficulty of obtaining them; whereas, if corn and coal were ten times more abundant, (*i. e.* more easily obtained,) a bushel of either would still be as useful as now. But if it were twice as easy to procure gold as it is, a sovereign would be twice as large; if only half as easy, it would be of the size of a half sovereign: and this (besides the trifling circumstance of the cheapness or dearness of gold-ornaments) would be all the difference.

The analogy, therefore, fails in the point essential to the argument.

Again, Mandeville's celebrated argument against educating the laboring classes, "if a horse knew as much *Mandeville's* as a man, I would not be his rider," holds *Argument*. good in reference to *Slaves*, or subjects of a tyranny; governed, as brutes, *for the benefit of a Master*, not, for their own; but it wholly fails in reference to men possessing civil rights. If a horse knew as much as a man, — *i. e.* were a rational Being, — it would be not only unsafe, but *unjust* to treat him as a brute. But a government that is for the benefit of the *Subject*, will be the better obeyed, the better informed the people are to their real interests.

Now the Subjects of a good Government, and children under the care of Parents or Schoolmasters, have certainly this point in common with domestic-animals, and Slaves, that all are *under control*; and again, a free Laborer *works*; and so does a horse. But the difference between the two cases is one that is essential to the question.

§ 3.

And so important is it to perceive *differences* as well as resemblances, that in many Languages the words denoting intellectual *ability*, are mostly, *Importance of noticing differences.* derived from words signifying *Distinction* and *Separation*. Such is the case in our own Language, with the words "*Skill*," "*Discernment*," and "*Discretion*;" all of which originally meant *Separation*.

There is no case in which it is more important to notice the

points of difference between things in many respects alike, than in what relates to the evidences for the truth of Christianity. For, all religions — true or false — have of course, some points of resemblance. Miracles were attributed to Jesus of Nazareth ; and so they are, by the Hindoos, to their gods. He professed to be a Messenger from Heaven : and so did Mahomet : and both gained disciples.

These points of resemblance lie, as it were, on the surface, and appear at the first glance : just like the resemblance between a genuine coin and a counterfeit. And the unthinking sometimes look no further. But when you come to examine more closely, — like a man applying a chemical test to two pieces of coin — you find a difference, and even a contrast, in all the most important points, between the Christian Religion and every other.* Let any clear-headed man examine the matter carefully and candidly ; and though it would be going too far, to say that he will necessarily be a believer in Christianity (for there are *other* hindrances to belief besides want of evidence), it may safely be said that he cannot fail to perceive a wide *difference*, as to the most important points, between Jesus, and all other persons that ever existed : — between his Religion, and every other. He must admit (believing or disbelieving) that Christ and Christianity, stand quite *alone*, in the whole history of mankind.

* See *Lessons on Christian Evidences*.

§ 4.

In the instances given a little above, the comparisons are founded on what is called *Analogy*. Analogy is a likeness between things, not, in themselves, *Analogies*, but in their *relation* to certain other things; either in their position, or in their use, or any other circumstances. And many things receive their names from analogy; as when we speak of the *foot* of a mountain, from its being in the same place relatively to the mountain, as the real foot of an animal, to the body. And we call Ships our wooden *walls*, because they afford the same protection to an island, that real walls do, to a city.

There are two mistakes which are often committed in what relates to Analogies: (1) That of con- *Mistakes as* founding Analogy with *direct-resemblance*; *to Analogies*. that is, fancying that the *things themselves* must be alike, because they have *like relations* to some other things: and (2) That of supposing the Analogy to be more exact and complete than it really is.

You may easily see what false conclusions, and what groundless theories might be founded on these mistakes. For instance, in the two examples above given, of the comparison of the precious metals to corn, coal, &c., and of a laboring man to a horse, the analogy, which does hold good as to some points, fails as to that which is essential to the argument.

Again, we often, in speaking of the *Memory*, use analogical [figurative] expressions, as if it were a kind *Memory* of book or writing-tablet. We speak of things *described by* being "*recorded*" in the *Memory*, — "*impressed*," — or "*engraved*" on the *Memory*; or again, of their being "*obliterated*," or "*erased*" (literally, "scratched out") from the *Memory*. And a man might be led by the use of such language, to fancy (as indeed some Philosophers actually have) that certain real literal *impressions* are made on the substance of the Brain by anything that we remember.

We also often speak of the *Memory* under the figure of a kind of *Store-room*. We speak of things being *kept* and *stored up*, in the *Memory*; or again, of being *lost*, or having *escaped* from the *Memory*.

Now these two Figures serve mutually to check and correct each other. For, since it is plain that the same thing cannot be both a literal writing-tablet and a literal store-room, this serves to remind us that it is literally *neither*, but is so called merely by Analogy.

§ 5.

And hence you may learn a useful rule for guarding *Analogies* against such mistakes as those just noticed: *to be varied*. which is, that when we use figurative expressions, — as we often must do, — we should frequently *vary* the Figures employed; which will thus serve to explain and correct each other, and will not lead us to form false theories. We have a remarkable instance of this practice in our Lord's Parables; which are drawn from a very great number of

different objects, quite unlike each other, and most of them differing much from the things represented by them, in most points except the one on which the comparison is founded. Thus, the Kingdom of Heaven is compared to corn sown in the fields, — to a grain of mustard-seed, — to a wedding feast, to leaven that is used for bread, — to a net cast into the sea, and to many other different things. And even the Parable of a *dishonest* steward is employed, to show the importance of provident care ; and the Parables of an *unjust* Judge, and of an *unkind* neighbor, to show the efficacy of persevering prayer. Now no one could be so absurd as to suppose that Christians were to imitate the Steward *in his dishonesty* ; or that our Heavenly Father can really resemble an *unjust* Judge.

All these parables turn upon *Analogy* ; though they are usually introduced by such words as “ like,” or “ likened,” or “ compared.” But the simplest child would hardly make such a blunder as to suppose that members of the Church are literally *like* plants of corn, — sheep, — fish caught in a net, — and fruit-trees.

Sometimes, indeed, we find not only the word “ like,” but the word “ *is*,” employed to denote one thing’s being *represented* by another. Thus, we read, “ The Seed *is* the Word of God,” and, “ This *is* my body ;” meaning evidently that the Seed *represents* God’s Word, and that the bread represents Christ’s body.

§ 6.

Some, however, of our Lord's hearers were so dull as *Parables occasionally to take literally his figurative expressions. Nicodemus, for instance, asked "how can a man be born when he is old?" And the Disciples, when warned against the leaven of the Pharisees, which is "hypocrisy," supposed their Master to be speaking of the real literal leaven of bread. Some, again, inquired, "how can this man give us his flesh to eat?"*

But he was always ready to give explanations to his Disciples. And his Disciples comprised *all* who had placed themselves under Him; as all men had good reason for doing, even *before* they understood his doctrines, because his miracles proved Him to be a "Teacher sent from God."

Thus, he condescended to explain to their dull understanding that the "Seed is [represents] God's Word;" and after having said, "The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the *life* of the world," He afterwards adds, "It is the *Spirit* that quickeneth [giveth *life*], the flesh profiteth nothing.

And yet some, even still, from such expressions as the above, and from the same sort of language of the Apostles, saying, "The blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin," &c., cling to the notion that it is not the *death* of Christ for us, but his real, literal, material, body and blood, that is to benefit us: whence it follows naturally that these literal substances must be actually taken into the mouth, and swallowed.

§ 7.

Whenever we exercise the Faculty of Comparison, so as to illustrate one thing by another, we are forming a kind of *Image*, or Picture, or Emblem, *Parables like Images.* which serves to *represent* what we are treating of. Now every one would see how absurd it would be to attempt to *dissect* a statue, and to expect, that, because it has the outward form of a man, one may find in it blood, and lungs, and heart, &c., such as those of a real human body. And it is an error somewhat like this, to reason from analogical Terms as if they were *not* analogical, but were the real, exact names of the things to which they are applied.

If any one is inattentive to such cautions as those above given, no degree of *ability in Reasoning* will save him from the grossest errors. And accordingly, much confusion of thought, and unsound speculation, has, in this way, been introduced into the Writings of Authors not wanting in ability, when treating of the very subject we are now engaged on, — the Human Mind; and, even still more, in treating of all that relates to Religion: because, on these subjects we are *obliged* (as was remarked in Lesson I.) to employ analogical language.

LESSON XX.

§ 1.

THAT faculty of *Construction*, again, above noticed, is liable to abuse and misapplication, if not duly *Faculty of Construction*-regulated. I am not now speaking of such a case as that of persons who have such a passion for *building*, as to spend in that way more than they ought. Against that error, a man will be guarded by a prudent calculation of his income, and a due regard for other claims upon it. But what I now have in view is the over-eagerness of some persons to construct *Systems* : — to build up complete and harmonious Theories, — before they have sufficient knowledge of the matters they are engaged upon, to enable them to do this correctly. This error corresponds to that of a man erecting a finely-built house on an insecure foundation.

Those in whom this tendency is very strong, and is not under control, cannot rest satisfied with single insulated facts, — slight glimpses of truth, — fragments of knowledge : and they are tempted to substitute *conjectures* that seem plausible for well-established facts, and to sacrifice exact truth to their craving after a complete, well-constructed, and neat System.

§ 2.

From this cause have arisen many great errors in various branches of Philosophy, and especially in what relates to the philosophy of the Mind. And the evil that has been done in all that relates to *Religion* by this eagerness to 'frame complete and compact Theories is very great. For, there is this difference between *religious* knowledge, and all other, that the chief part of all that we know, or *can* know, of the nature of the Most High, and of his dealings with his creatures, is derived from the Revelation He has bestowed ; and in this He has seen fit to give us no more than a very *incomplete* knowledge. Any *complete and full* theological system, therefore that men may frame, *must* necessarily be incorrect. We cannot know more, in these matters, than the Inspired Writers did, or more than they were commissioned to impart to us.

In Natural-Science, on the contrary, there is no such limit placed to the knowledge we may attain. Fresh and fresh facts may be discovered, as Science advances, and may enable us hereafter to form correct theories where at present there are none. We should be careful indeed to avoid framing theories hastily and rashly, before we have attained sufficient knowledge. But this caution is, in the study of *Nature*, *all* that is necessary. In what pertains to Religion on the other hand, *every* complete theory is to be condemned, as *necessarily* rash and presumptuous ; because it relates to matters on which we are not competent to form *any* such theory at all.

§ 3.

For, what is revealed to us must be (supposing the religion to be true) but a part, and perhaps but a *Revelations partial.* small part, of the whole truth. There are many things of which at present we can know little or nothing, which have or may have, a close connection with the Christian religion. For instance, we are very little acquainted with more than a very *small part* of the *universe*; of the *whole* history, past and future, of the *world* we inhabit; and of the whole of *man's existence*.

This earth is but a speck compared with the rest of the planets which move round the sun, together with the enormous mass of the sun itself; to say nothing of the other heavenly bodies. It is not unlikely that all these are inhabited; and it may be, that the Gospel which has been declared to us may be but one small portion of some vast scheme which concerns the inhabitants of numerous other worlds.

Then, again, we have no knowledge how long this our world is to continue. For aught we know, the Christian religion may not have existed a fifth part, or a fiftieth part, of its whole time; and it may, perhaps, have not produced yet one fiftieth of the effects it is destined to produce.

And we know, that, as it holds out the hope of immortality beyond the grave, it is connected with man's condition, not merely during his short life on earth, but for eternity.

Seeing, then, that Christianity, if true, must be a scheme

so partially and imperfectly revealed to us, and so much connected with things of which man can have little or no knowledge, we might have expected that difficulties should be found in it which the wisest of men are unable to explain. And men truly wise are not surprised or disheartened at meeting with such difficulties; but are prepared to expect them from the nature of the case.

§ 4.

The view which we have of any portion of a system, of which the whole is not before us, has been aptly compared to a map of an *inland country*; *Scripture like a map in which we see rivers without source or mouth, of an inland region.* and roads that seem to lead to nothing. A person who knows anything of geography understands at once, on looking at such a map, that the sources and mouths of the rivers, and the towns which the roads lead to, are somewhere beyond the boundaries of the district, though he may not know where they lie. And to attempt to give a neater and more finished appearance to the Map, by supplying imaginary Sources and Mouths to the Rivers, and marking down unreal Cities as terminations to the Roads, would be to sacrifice accuracy to embellishment.

But any one who was very ill-informed might be inclined presumptuously to find fault with the map which showed him only a part of the course of the rivers and roads. And it is the same with anything else, of which we see only a part, unless we recollect that it is but a part, and make allowance accordingly for our imperfect view of it.

§ 5.

It is also to be observed that there is a danger of men's being led, through an excessive eagerness in forming Theories, to pervert the sense of Scripture, by always understanding certain words of the Sacred-Writers, in a strict *technical* sense that has been assigned to them in some theological Scheme of Man's devising, and without reference to the *context*; — without looking to the particular drift of the Writer, in each passage.

Scripture-language perverted by theories.

In a Scientific Treatise, this is right, and necessary. Each technical Term in any Work of Science, must be strictly confined to the one meaning laid down in the Definition. Any one who has been studying Anatomy, for instance, or Chemistry, or Mathematics, may be asked at an examination, “What is a Muscle?” “What is a Nerve?” or “What is Hydrogen? Oxygen? Carbon, &c.,” or “What is a Triangle? What is a Circle? What is a line? a Solid, &c.” And he will be expected to answer at once, without reference to any sentence in which one of those words occurs.

But it is not so in common discourse, or in any Work not of a *Scientific* character. We commonly call Ice a *Solid*, as distinguished from Water which is a liquid; though, in Geometry, a Solid denotes merely a certain *space*. And if you were asked, What is a *line*? you might say that when we are speaking of Poetry, a “line means a *verse*”; when we are speaking of fisheries, it means a string for

catching fish; and in War, it signifies a certain mode of arranging troops or ships, &c.

§ 6.

Now the Writings of the Evangelists and Apostles are not scientific, but popular. They did not compose technical Systems, but popular narratives, and instructions, and exhortations. And therefore

*Scripture-
terms not
technical*

any one asks "what is the meaning of this or that word in Scripture?" a sensible man, who understands the real character of our Sacred Books, will reply by asking "In what passage?" He will remember that each word used by the Sacred Writers was meant to be understood, in each place where it occurs, in *reference to that place*, and in conformity with the whole context of the passage.

And any one who departs from this fair mode of interpreting, and fixes on each word a technical sense, according to some human System of Theology, will be likely often to mistake, in very important points, the real meaning of Scripture.

Much damage has been done to the cause of religious truth by the errors above noticed; — by confounding together *Analogy* and direct-*Resemblance*; — by fancying an *Analogy to extend to more points* than it does; and by rashly constructing theological Systems, and forcing the words of Scripture into a uniform technical sense in conformity with such a System.

LESSON XXI.

§ 1.

THAT Faculty (above noticed, Lesson XIII.) by which we investigate Causes, is also one which requires care to keep it within due bounds, and to guard against its abuse.

Erroneous search for causes.

So are some impatient of finding themselves unable to explain, and *account for*, anything that they believe, that they are tempted to frame conjectures, and imagine causes which either do not exist, or have not been proved to exist, or which cannot produce the effects attributed to them.

When this error is combined — as it often is — with that just mentioned, — an over-eagerness to build up a complete Theory, — much confusion of thought, and false philosophy, is thus introduced into every branch of knowledge.

For instance, that theory of *Ideas* formerly noticed (Lesson VII.) arose from an impatient desire to *explain* (what is beyond the reach of the human powers) the mode in which we *think*, — the operation of the Mind or the objects around us. It was there pointed out that there is no reason to believe in the existence of Ideas, in the Sense of Images or Resemblances existing literally *in* the Mind, even as the Heart is *in* the Body, or the kernel of a nut in the shell: and that even if any such Ideas *could* be proved so to exist, this would not at all explain how the Mind acts on them.

§ 2.

Great care is also requisite in regulating and keeping under due control, what is called by some a *Poetical-poetical-imagination*, and by others "Ideality:" *Imagination*. by which we are led to notice, and to delight in, whatever is strikingly beautiful or sublime, and to form pictures of such things in the mind. This tendency becomes a great evil, whenever it is so indulged as to lead us off from the pursuit of truth, and from the guidance of Reason. Some persons, for instance, are led to adopt some System of Religion, not from a sober conviction of its being established by sufficient proofs, as *true*, but from its being showy and striking, and affording that gratification of the Imagination which they have a craving for. And in this way, even men of good abilities will bring themselves to adopt, and cling to, the most groundless and fanciful religious belief, from their having given themselves up entirely to the guidance of Taste and Feeling, laying aside all exercise of Judgment. For, it signifies nothing how good a man's eyes may be, if he resolves to go about blindfolded.

A Roman Catholic writer (De Maistre) says: "The Catholic Church is not in its nature argumentative; it believes without disputing: for Faith is a belief through Love; and Love does not reason."

A good many other Writers have expressed, in substance, the same sentiment.* And probably twenty times as many

* See *Thoughts on Conversions and Persecutions*, p. 41.

have acted on it without openly avowing it. And many, when they have made up their minds in this way, *afterwards* set themselves to find arguments in support of their belief; and if they can devise any that are plausible, they then flatter themselves that their belief is *founded* on reasons, when in fact their reasons are founded on their belief. A Jury that should *begin* by finding a verdict, and afterwards call in evidence to justify it, would not be likely to decide well.

§ 3.

But there are even some who consider it a part of laudable humility thus to give up the exercise of *False humility*. their Reason: because, they say, things pertaining to Religion are *above* our Reason; and we should guard against the danger of being led by what they call the "pride of Human Intellect," into the presumption of judging of the character of the Most High, and his dealings with mankind, which we are not competent to judge of at all.

And certainly, this *would* be presumptuous rashness. But though Reason is not to be made a *substitute* for divine revelation, there is no real humility in "putting under a bushel" the light with which God's Providence has supplied us. It is given us to enable us to perceive and to prove *what* it is that God *has* made known to us, and to distinguish this from human fictions and fancies. And to take our Imaginations, or our Feelings, for a guide, instead of taking pains to "prove [try] all things, and hold fast that which is right," would be quite as presumptuous as to trust wholly to the guidance of our Reason.

If a Steward or Agent receives a letter from his master, his duty is to employ his faculties as well as he can in understanding the letter, and learning what it is that his Superior means him to do. And if, instead of this, he takes upon him to consider what that Superior *ought* to have directed, or if he forms *guesses*, according to his own Imagination, and acts in the way most gratifying to his own feelings, he is guilty of an unpardonable presumption.

The *tastes* and *fancies* of the Human Mind are as much a *part* of the Mind as its philosophical speculations; and we ought not to make either of them a measure of what God has declared and enjoined.

§ 4.

There is also a danger to be guarded against, in young persons especially, of an over-indulgence of Imagination in reading Works of Fiction, and in what is called "Castle-building." Not that such an exercise of the Imagination is to be condemned, as an evil in itself; supposing, of course, that we avoid immoral books; but an excess in the perusal of Fictions is apt to disqualify any one for real life, by creating a distaste and disgust for actual every-day scenes, and humble practical duties, which do not equal in brilliancy the ideal scenes, and imaginary transactions of Fiction. The heart may even become hardened against real objects of compassion, from our having been too much occupied in dwelling on the elegant and poetical pictures of ideal distress which

*Danger from
Works of
Fiction.*

Tales and Poems exhibit. For, in these, a pleasing excitement being all that is aimed at, there is, of course, a studied exclusion of all those homely, and sometimes, disgusting circumstances which often accompany real distresses, such as we are called on to sympathize with, and to relieve. .

And there is also a danger of our becoming dissatisfied with estimable friends, because they do not come up to the standard of the Heroes and Heroines of Romance. And what are usually reckoned as *moral-tales*, and are written with a good design, are sometimes the most hurtful in this way. For they commonly represent the good characters as perfect Angels, and the bad ones as Fiends; both being quite unlike what we meet with in real life, and therefore serving to engender false notions.

It is allowable, indeed, and right, to bestow cultivation on the *Flower-gardens* of your mind; only, these must not be allowed to take the place of the plain but necessary *Corn-fields*, or to lead you to neglect their cultivation.

§ 5.

Care must also be taken not to let the reading of Works of Fiction, or any other exercise of Imagination, lead you to suppose some enterprise or action, of any kind, to be *easier* than it really is. It is a very easy thing to fancy yourself a hero of Romance, performing splendid deeds, and bearing afflictions with admirable fortitude. But in actual practice, there are difficulties and dangers to be encountered, and strong temptations to be resisted, and labors and pain to

be endured. And if you do not fairly take these into account, and carefully reflect on them, you will be ill-prepared for what you will meet with in practice, and will be likely to fail when you come to the trial.

Not that it is at all wrong, or useless, to dwell on the noble conduct of fine characters — real or imaginary, provided you take care also to employ your Reason, and to make the proper calculations, and to fortify your mind accordingly. It is a useful thing for young soldiers to be exercised in Reviews and Sham-fights. Only, they ought to consider how differently they will be likely to feel in actual battle, when they come to engage a real enemy, and to face a storm of bullets.

§ 6.

A well-regulated exercise of the Imagination, however, not only is allowable, but tends to elevate and refine the character. It helps to keep us from ^{*Advantages*} ~~being too much engrossed with worldly occupa-~~ ^{*of exercising*} ~~tions, and mere sensual gratifications.~~ ^{*imagination.*}

And it is essentially necessary (though some may think this strange) to the right study of *History*. For in order that History may put before us anything beyond a dry list of facts, we must transport ourselves, in thought, to distant Ages and Regions, and *imagine* ourselves the persons we read of. We are, else, likely to forget how *probable* many things must have seemed, which we know did *not* happen; how alarming, some dangers, which were real, but which did in fact pass away; — and how strange, many

things with which we are now familiar must formerly have appeared.

Any one therefore of feeble and uncultivated Imagination is likely to fancy the people of other times and Countries — their feelings, and customs, and habits of thought — much more like what he now sees around him than they really are. And thence he will form not only indistinct but often very erroneous notions of the state of things among them.

To take one instance out of many : when some European Missionaries introduced into New Zealand the culture of wheat, telling the Maories [the aboriginal people of the islands] that bread is made of it, they were much rejoiced. For, bread — in the form of ship-biscuit — they had often tasted, and much relished. But when the corn was grown tall, they dug some of it up, expecting to find eatable *roots* ; and when they found only fibres, they thought the Missionaries were making game of them. This anecdote being told, to a man not wanting, generally, in good sense or knowledge, he derided it as a most extravagant falsehood. But if he had had a better-cultivated Imagination, he would have seen that it was just what might have been expected. The Maories had derived *all* their vegetable food from *roots* ; and therefore naturally supposed bread to be made of roots. That little hard *seeds* were to be *ground* (a process they had never seen, or imagined), and the powder made into a paste with water, and then baked, was what could never have occurred to them. And when they saw it, they were as much astonished as delighted.

§ 7.

It is doubtless from a defective Imagination, that so many people speak of Savage-tribes *civilizing themselves*, and inventing the various arts of life ; as if this were quite a natural and easy thing ; though there is good reason to think that it is what never did, or can, take place.

*Supposed
self-improvement
of
Savages.*

Perhaps, when you try to fancy yourself in the situation of a savage, it occurs to you that you would set your mind to work to contrive means for bettering your condition ; and that you might perhaps hit upon such and such useful inventions ; and hence you may be led to think it natural that savages should do so, and that some tribes of them may have advanced themselves in the way above described, without any external help. But nothing of the kind appears to have ever really occurred ; and what leads some persons to fancy it, is, that they themselves are *not* savages, but have some degree of mental cultivation, and some of the habits of thought of civilized men ; and therefore they form to themselves an incorrect notion of what a savage really is — just as a person who possesses eyesight, cannot understand correctly the condition of one born blind.

It is easy to imagine yourself blind. You have only to shut your eyes or go into a dark room. And you may easily imagine yourself to have *become* stone-deaf. But to form a correct notion of the state of mind of one *born* deaf or blind is not so easy. And even so, it is very difficult for a civilized man to form a just notion of one brought up a Savage.

So also, it is easy to imagine yourself a *Slave*; that is, to conceive yourself captured by Pirates, and sold into Slavery. But it is quite another thing to imagine yourself a person *born and brought up* a slave. And accordingly, the character of those Slaves who have never known freedom, is usually much misunderstood by those who have been always free men, and have lived among free men.

Hence it is, that a description which is really unnatural, will often seem *more* natural than a correct one. The Brazilian Savages, for instance, described in Robinson Crusoe, are such as never could have existed; and yet, to many readers, they appear more natural than if they had been represented with the stupidity and indocility that are always found in real Savages.

It may be added that an exercise of Imagination is also necessary in order to enable us to bring *Imagination* into practice the maxim of “doing as you *necessary for doing as you would be done by.*” You are to conceive yourself in the place of another, and consider* not *by.* indeed, necessarily, what you would *wish* if you were in his place, but what you would expect as *fair* and reasonable. Now to do this, and to conceive yourself with different opinions, and tastes, and feelings, from your own, requires a strong effort of a lively imagination. †

* See *Lessons on Morals*, L. iv.

† The following beautiful passage on the dangers of Imagination is from Scott’s *Rokeby*: —

“ But Wilfred, docile, soft, and mild,
Was Fancy’s spoiled and wayward child;

The same may be said in reference to *instruction*, when the learners are children, or the lower orders, or, in short, of a different class from the instructor. He must, by an effort

In her bright car she bade him ride,
With one fair form to grace his side,
Or, in some wild and lone retreat,
Flung her high spells around his seat,
Bathed in her dews his languid head,
Her fairy mantle o'er him spread,
For him her opiates gave to flow,
Which he who tastes can ne'er forego,
And placed him in her circle, free
From every stern reality,
Till, to the Visionary, seem
Her day-dreams truth, and truth a dream.

“Woe to the youth whom Fancy gains,
Winning from Reason's hand the reins,
Pity and woe ! for such a mind
Is soft, contemplative, and kind ;
And woe to those who train such youth,
And spare to press the rights of truth,
The mind to strengthen and anneal,
While on the stithy glows the steel !
O teach him, while your lessons last,
To judge the present by the past ;

Remind him of each wish pursued,
How rich it glowed with promised good ;
Remind him of each wish enjoyed,
How soon his hopes possession cloyed !
Tell him we play unequal game,
Where'er we shoot by Fancy's aim ;

of Imagination, put himself in their place, and conceive himself as ignorant, and uncultivated, and perhaps dull, as they are; else, he will not have good success with them. And hence some very able men (especially such as have always been themselves very *quick* at learning) are unskilful in imparting their knowledge, except to just such persons as themselves.

And ere he strip him for her race,
Shew the conditions of the chace.
Two Sisters by the goal are set,
Cold Disappointment and Regret;
One disenchant the winner's eyes,
And strips of all its worth the prize,
While one augments its gaudy show,
More to enhance the loser's woe.
The victor sees his fairy gold
Transformed when won, to drossy mold,
But still the vanquished mourns his loss,
And rues, as gold, that glittering dross."

LESSON XXII.

§ 1.

THERE are several words denoting some qualities or operations of the Intellect, which it will be worth while to notice, because each of them is used occasionally in different senses. It is useful, therefore, to explain as clearly as possible, the sense or senses in which each is the most commonly employed. For, it is the actual, ordinary acceptation of a word that we should inquire for, when the object is to express ourselves distinctly, and to understand rightly what is said by another. This may seem a truism not worth stating; but it is sometimes overlooked in practice. You may find persons insisting on it that such and such a word *must* signify so and so, because that is the original meaning of the *root* it is derived from: or that it *ought* to be used in such and such a sense, because that is the most rational, and consistent, and philosophical.

All this might be very proper if we were *coining a new Language*; but if we mean to use an existing language, we should remember that “the true sense” of any word, in *that* language is, what is *understood* by it; and that “the right name” of anything is that which *it goes by*. The study indeed, of Etymologies, and inquiry into various questions relating to Language, are interesting and useful.

But in actual practice, we ought to keep in mind the principle now laid down.

§ 2.

By the word *Memory* (which has already been spoken of) we usually understand the *retaining* of *Memory* something in the Mind; and by *Recollection*, *and Recollection.* the *recalling* of it. Often, when we want to recollect some name, &c., it will be like an article safely put away in some drawer, but which we cannot put our hand on when we want it. And it is worth observing, that, in such a case, though you might weary yourself for hours in vain efforts at recollection, if, instead of this, you *turn away* your thoughts, for a time, to *something else*, and then return to the task, the word will often spontaneously occur to your mind at once. Your thoughts will, as it were, have got out of a certain wrong track, in which you might have been long bewildered.

And this suggests a useful practical rule.

The same holds good in the case of any difficulty you may meet with in any study. You might sometimes puzzle yourself in vain for hours, in trying to understand a passage in some book, or a mathematical demonstration: and if you turn aside your thoughts to something else, or leave it till next day, you will, perhaps, find yourself understanding it with ease.

§ 3.

The words "Imagination" and "Fancy" are often used in the same sense; as appears to be the case in *Imagination* that passage above cited from the poem of *and Fancy. Rokeby*; where the word "Fancy" seems to express what might have been equally well called "Imagination."

But sometimes there is understood to be a distinction. In the following extract from a Book of *English Synonyms*, some distinctions are well pointed out, in some of the uses of the words "Imagination, Fancy, and Conception."

"'Imagination' and 'Fancy' are frequently confounded together, but are, nevertheless, very distinct in their signification. In the first place, 'imagination' implies more of a *creative* power than 'fancy'; it requires a greater combination of various powers, and is therefore a higher exercise of genius. 'Fancy,' on the other hand, is more an employment of ingenuity and taste, though it also requires inventive power. Secondly, 'imagination' implies a longer flight; 'fancy,' rather a succession of short efforts: the one is a steady blaze, the other a series of sparkles. An epic poem would require an exercise of the first; a ballad, or other lighter production, of the last. Hence we may see that, as it has been well remarked, the difference between the two is, in some measure, one of subject-matter; for the same power which we call 'fancy,' when employed in a melody of Moore, would be called 'imagination' in the works of Dante or Milton.

"In short, the efforts of 'fancy' bear the same relation to those of 'imagination' that the carving and polishing of a gem or seal does to sculpture.

“In the third place, *wit* may come into works of ‘fancy,’ and could not be admitted into the province of ‘imagination.’ The same with what are called *conceits*.

“‘Conception’ has something in common with imagination, but it implies more decidedly a creative power, and is referred to something tangible and real; whereas, in efforts of fancy and imagination, there is always a consciousness of unreality. The province of ‘conception’ is that which has a real existence. Hence, the productions of painters, sculptors, and musicians are called ‘conceptions.’

“‘Conception’ also denotes something framed and originated in our *own* mind; whereas the imagination or fancy may be acted on merely from without. The poet or writer of fiction exercises his own conceptions, but awakens the imagination of his readers.”

§ 4.

The word “clever” seems to be derived from the verb to “cleave,” to *separate*; and if so, it agrees
Cleverness. in this with the words “Skill,” “discretion,” and several others noticed above (Lesson XX.), as having originally the meaning of *dividing* and distinguishing, and afterwards having come to denote some intellectual powers. “Clever” is employed by some, who are careless in their use of language, to denote *any* kind of intellectual ability. But it is a bad practice, and one which young persons ought to be warned against, to employ some one favorite word to express a great variety of different things, which may be, each of them, expressed more distinctly by its own

appropriate term. This is like the conduct of some ignorant and slovenly cottagers, who, if you supply them with a sufficient store of proper utensils and articles of furniture for several uses, will lay aside most of them, and make one iron pot do duty as a boiler, a wash-tub, a pig-trough, and a slop-pail.

Those who speak carefully and correctly, apply the word “clever” to *quickness* in the mental operations; — to a ready ingenuity in devising expedients on the spur of the moment; — in forming shrewd guesses, &c. But they would consider it improper to use the word in describing an able General, or an eminent Statesman, or Philosopher.

§ 5.

Cleverness does not denote any *one* distinct Faculty, but a quality which may belong to each of several different mental Powers. One person, for instance, may be clever at guessing riddles; another, at finding his way through a difficult country; another, at picking up a foreign Language, &c.

*Cleverness no
one distinct
Faculty.*

Skill, again (as has been above said), is also a word derived from one signifying *division*; — distinguishing one thing from another by small points of difference. It is commonly applied in cases where there is some *practical* result effected. We speak of a skilful Physician, or Architect, or Agriculturist; but we should not apply the word to an able Mathematician, or Philosopher of any kind.

Skill.

This word also — like Cleverness — does not denote any one distinct Faculty, but a quality of each of several dif-

ferent ones. And those who have great Skill in one kind of thing, may have little or none in others.

The same may be said of "*Genius*;" by which we usually mean an admirable *inventive* power in *Genius*. some department. Thus, we speak of a *scientific*, or a *poetical*, or a *musical* genius, &c.

One who has read much, and *understands*, and remembers it, and does well what he has been *taught*, would not, for that, be called a man of genius, but rather a "learned man," and an "intelligent" man. And hence, it is commonly said, that "Genius begins where Rules end; that is, where no precise directions how to proceed can be given; or at least where none have yet been given.

But some persons need to be warned not to infer that it is a mark of Genius to *neglect* all rules. This is a common error of the indolent and the conceited. They are for trusting altogether to their own supposed Genius, and disdain to avail themselves of the guidance of able men who have gone before them. But any one of real good-sense when travelling through any country that is new to him, will make use of the high-roads and the direction-posts, and Maps, as far as these will serve him; and will resort to the guidance of the Stars, or the Compass, only, when he is entering on an unexplored region. And even so, a sensible man will, in all matters, make use of whatever good rules he can learn; well knowing that there will be ample room left for the display of more Genius than any man possesses, in cases for which no rules can be laid down.*

* See *Elements of Logic*, Preface.

LESSON XXIII.

§ 1.

Wisdom, Wit, Science, and Cunning, are all derived from words signifying to *know*: and yet every one is aware that they now denote very different things. And this may serve to show how unsafe it would be to look to *Etymology* to decide as to the actual meaning of any word. *Wisdom.*

By *Wisdom* is understood the employing of *right means* for some *good end*; and that, in some important matter: for the word is never used in reference to small concerns. A fisherman who spreads his nets in the best way, or a farmer who tills his land well, would be called skilful rather than wise.* But a King, or a Minister of State, would be called *wise* for governing a nation in the best manner.

So, also, we speak of the “divine *Wisdom*.”

The word *Prudence* (derived from one signifying originally to *foresee*) is applied rather to the right conduct of *minor* affairs: and it also relates more especially to the *avoiding of errors*. We speak of a man as “prudent” in the management of his income, when he takes due care not to outrun it. A Statesman is called *Prudence.*

* In our Bible-version we read of “a wise master-builder.” But this would be, in modern language, “a skilful architect.”

“prudent” who commits no blunders, and keeps out of difficulties. But one who devises some important measure which greatly benefits his Country, is honored with the higher title of a “wise Statesman.”

And again, a man may be called “prudent,” in reference to some *particular object*, if he takes the best means with a view to that object; though he may possibly be very imprudent with respect to other things: as, for instance, if his careful and well-calculating pursuit of gain should peril his soul. But we should never account a man *wise*, whose conduct was, in some important point, very *unwise*.

Cunning, again, [and so also *Craft*, which originally signified a trade],* is applied exclusively to little *Cunning*. paltry tricks, by which any one cheats or entraps his neighbor; or to the devices by which he eludes the tricks of another.

§ 2.

Wisdom depends chiefly on the *ready* and *accurate* *re-*
ception of Analogies. For without this, it is
impossible to profit by *experience*, either an-
other's or our own. The knowledge of the
 past cannot serve as a guide for the future, or for any un-
 known case, except so far as we can discern a *correspond-*
ence [Analogy] between the known and the unknown
 instances. And (as was observed above) if we overlook
 some important *differences* between the two, we shall fall

* Acts xviii. 3.

into mistakes. Without, therefore, a *ready* perception of Analogies, the knowledge of the past is uninstructional : and without a clear and *accurate* view of them, it is deceptive.

It is a common saying, that "Experience makes fools wise." But the Proverb is far from true. For, *Experience.* a man may have had much Experience, — that is, may have seen many objects, and witnessed many occurrences, — yet may but ill-understand how to *profit* by Experience. He may be like one looking into a book, who has never learned to read, or who does not know the language ; and who, therefore — though he plainly sees black marks on white paper — can derive no instruction from what he sees.

§ 3.

Experience does not, of itself, create Wisdom : it only supplies materials for wisdom to work upon. *Use of Ex-*
It can no more make a fool wise, than a great *perience.* supply of bricks and timber could make a man an Architect who knew nothing about building.

People often talk, indeed, of knowing *by experience* some *general* Maxim or Law of Nature. But, in truth, all that you *know by* Experience, is, the *past*, and what has come under your own observation. Concerning the *future*, or anything that we have not witnessed, we *judge*, by Analogy, *from* Experience. Thus, if you have seen many patients under Ague, take Bark, and all of them recover, you may speak of their actual recovery as a fact which you

know by Experience; and if you judge, from this, that the Bark cured them, and that it is a remedy for Ague, your judgment is probably right; but it is not correct to say that you know this *by* Experience: it is an *inference* — and probably a very fair one — *from* your Experience.

But very often men draw some conclusion hastily, and on insufficient grounds, yet are confident that they know it *by* Experience. Thus most sailors dread setting sail on a Friday, which they hold to be an unlucky Day; and this they think they know by Experience, because they know of several instances of ships being wrecked which sailed on a Friday. And the Rustics in several parts of England suppose themselves to know by Experience that it is dangerous to transplant a bed of Parsley; because they know of instances where this has been done, and a death has happened in the family soon after.

§ 4.

When we reason from one case to another that *very closely* resembles it, we commonly call this arguing *Experience* from Experience. But we speak of arguing *and Analogy*. from *Analogy*, when the correspondence is less exact, — when the instance adduced is rather more remote from that to which it is applied.

Thus, we should be said to believe from Experience the noxious effect of a certain drug, on the human constitution, if we had often known men apparently poisoned by it. But if we thence conjectured that it would be noxious to *some* other kind of animal, we should be said to reason from

Analogy. And this is the usual distinction of the two words in common conversation.

The German Monk, who was the first person that ever administered Antimony, having dosed the *swine* with it, and found that it agreed well with them, proceeded to administer it to his brother-monks; and he would be said to have reasoned from *analogy*. But if, after finding that it greatly disagreed with the monks, he had persisted in dosing *men* with it, every one would have said that he was acting against *experience*.

§ 5.

When one thing brings to the mind something else that has no natural connection with it, merely from their having been before presented to the mind together, this is called *Association*, or “Association of ideas.” This is the use of the word with those who speak carefully and correctly. They would never apply the word “Association” (as some do, who are careless in their language) in cases where the connection between two things is *natural*, and essential; as between Cause and Effect, or Premiss and Conclusion, or between two things that are similar.

That Association I am speaking of, — i. e. *accidental Association*, — is what every one must be familiar with. Indeed the *words* of any Language afford an instance of it; for they bring to the mind the thought of the *things* signified by them; though they are *arbitrary* signs, having no natural connection with those things. If indeed I draw a

picture of a tree, this brings to your mind the thought of a real tree, from its resemblance to it ; but if I *write* the word “*tree*,” this brings to your mind the thought both of the *sound* of that word, and also of the tree itself ; though these three things, the tree, the sound, and the letters of the word, have no natural connection.

§ 6.

Almost every one must have observed that sometimes the sight — or even the thought — of a particular *Association of places with thoughts.* house, bush, milestone, or other object, has recalled the thought of some conversation, or reflection that was going on when he was passing by that object some time before. And hence, some persons have formed for themselves a kind of artificial Memory. They contemplate or figure to themselves, a room stored with various objects, and then endeavor to connect in their mind each of those objects with something which they wish to remember ; and are thus enabled, by thinking of this room, to recall the thing to be recollected.

The power of Association is very perceptible in many *Associations in Brutes.* Brutes. Beasts, and Birds, and, it is said, even Fishes, have been thus taught to come to be fed at the sound of a whistle, a bell, or a horn.

And with us, a great part of *Education.* Education, both good and bad, consists in the forming of Associations. If, in the mind of a child you establish an Association of whatever is right, with the thought of anything pleasant, you will have been forming in him a habit of

delighting in what is right, for its own sake ; so that he will at length come to pursue it when it leads to no other gratification, or even when it is toilsome or painful. If, on the contrary, you proceed (as some well-meaning but unwise teachers do), in the opposite way, the result will of course be the reverse. If you allow Associations to be formed in a child's mind, between some duty, and the idea of irksome labor, dullness, confinement, punishment and rebuke, you will have been training him to a disgust for that duty.

But some injudicious people * fancy that any one will be brought to *like* whatever he is accustomed to : forgetting the obvious truth, that contrary habits are formed from being accustomed to the same thing, in contrary ways.

We may see this, even in the training of Brute-animals. For instance, of sporting dogs, there are some, such as the grey-hound, that are trained to *pursue* hares ; and others which are trained to *stand* motionless when they come upon a hare, even though they see it running before them. Now both kinds are accustomed to hares ; and both have originally the same instincts ; for all dogs have an instinctive tendency to pursue game. But the one kind of dog has always been encouraged to run after a hare, and the other has always been chastised if it attempts to do so, and has been trained to stand still.

The above are some of the principal words employed when we are speaking of the *intellectual* Powers and operations.

* See *Lessons on Morals*, L. ii. §§ 1, 2.

LESSON XXIV.

§ 1.

THE word *Sentiment* is used in various senses. Most commonly, however, it denotes a certain habitual state of feeling of approbation or of disgust, towards some class of objects; accompanied more or less, with a tendency to *act* in a certain way, agreeably to such feeling. Thus, we speak of *Benevolence* as a *Sentiment*; it being distinct as was remarked above,* from good-will [or love] towards a particular *individual, as such*; which we should call an *Affection*. Benevolence, on the other hand, is a feeling of delight in the happiness, or sympathy with the sufferings, of *any* person; or indeed of any Sentient Being. And it implies a tendency to *do* whatever may promote their enjoyment or relieve their sufferings. It implies also a feeling of warm approbation, or even admiration of benevolent actions, and an abhorrence of hard-heartedness and cruelty.

Hence probably it is that we do not apply the word *Sentiment* to the *desire of gain*: not that this is a thing wrong in itself, when not carried to an excess: but we do not contemplate with anything of a pleasurable sympathy, or feeling of admiration, a man's pursuit of gain; nor feel any disgust towards one who is indifferent about it.

* Lesson V. § 2.

§ 2.

Benevolence (which, in small every-day matters, is called *Good-nature*), though one of the most amiable and most useful Sentiments, yet requires to be *Benevolence*. kept under the guidance of Reason: else it may defeat its own object by doing much more harm than good.* Thoughtless indiscriminate alms-giving, for instance, is sure to promote idleness and imprudence, and thus to lead to an enormous amount of distress and immorality. And again, to be led by weak *compassion* towards bad men, to recommend them to situations of which they are unworthy, or to let loose on Society hardened villains, may produce a vast amount of mischief.

But one who is influenced not by mere kindly feelings alone, but by a conscientious desire also to do what is right, will hold himself bound to use the utmost care in inquiring and considering *how* he can do the most good, with the least hurt to any one.

What is called "*Public-Spirit*" consists in *Benevolence* combined with *Abstraction*. Those who are *Public-Spirit* deficient in the faculty of Abstraction, and are not accustomed to take wide and comprehensive views, will perhaps be kind and helpful to those *individuals* who come in their way, but will not exert themselves for the benefit of the *Public*; — of their Country, of Posterity, — or of the Human Race. And it often happens that benevolent men of this character, will even sacrifice, unthinkingly, the public good, to that of some individual.

* See *Lessons on Morals*, L. xvi. § 1.

§ 3.

A benevolent disposition conduces very much to one's own happiness. This is a fact of which no explanation can be given except that such is the appointment of Providence. For, though a benevolent man has pleasures of his own in promoting, or in witnessing the happiness of others, he has also *pains* of his own, from the view of sufferings which he cannot relieve, and which would not at all distress a hardhearted man. And moreover, he often has to make great sacrifices of personal interests, and ease, and enjoyment, for the benefit of others. Yet certain it is, that, as a general rule, one who is the most studious to promote the welfare and gratification of others, sometimes at the expense of his own, will generally be a far happier man than one who sets himself to promote his own benefit and comfort, and troubles himself little about his neighbor's.

The rule in this matter seems to be, "Seek, and ye shall not find." *

We should be careful to distinguish from *Good-nature* [Benevolence] what is called *Good-humor* or *Good-temper*. A cheerful disposition, and a freedom from Constitutional impatience of temper, does, indeed—like *Good-nature*—conduce much to happiness, both in ourselves, and those around us. But they are not the same thing, and do not necessarily go together. A benevolent man, indeed, will, if he is naturally irritable,

* See Bacon's *Essay on "Goodness,"* note.

take pains to restrain this temper, out of kindness for others, as well as because it is his duty to do so, and is conducive to his own comfort. But one who is constitutionally good-humored, if he is deficient in Benevolence, and also in good principle, will be regardless of the welfare of others ; and may even find amusement in taking advantage of another's infirmity of temper, to tease him, and provoke him.

§ 4.

What has been said of the care requisite for the right direction, and regulation, of Benevolence, may be said also of the Sentiment called by some *Veneration*. "*Veneration*," and by others, "*Piety*." If this is rightly directed, no one can have, absolutely, *too much* Piety ; but when misdirected, it becomes *Superstition* ; which is a thing both wrong, and highly mischievous. And accordingly, of the ten Commandments, the first two are directed against false Worship. The Lord is there described as "*a jealous God* ;" i. e. not allowing the honor due to Him to be paid to any other. Those who bow down to Images or Pictures, or who worship either gods so called, or Saints, or who carry their veneration for the Blessed Virgin or other holy persons, so far as to invoke them as if they could hear us when not present, all these are liable to the heavy displeasure of the "*jealous God*."

And besides the direct evil of the dishonor to the true God, by giving to others what is due to Him alone, it is found that, as true religion is the greatest improver of our nature, so, false religion is one of its greatest corrupters.

For, though the Sentiment of Veneration is not so directly practical as some others, it is so in a great degree ; since it prompts us to *do* something to testify the veneration we feel, and to strive to recommend ourselves to the Being we reverence by acting as we suppose will be acceptable to that Being. And *what* that something shall be — whether leading a virtuous life, or performing certain ceremonies, or offering human Sacrifices — must depend on our notions of the character of the Being we adore.

Some are apt to fancy that though the truest religion is the best, *any* religion is better than none. The Bible, on the contrary, tells us, concerning the false worship of the ancient Heathen, that “every abomination unto the Lord, which He hateth, have these nations done, unto their gods ;” i. e. as a part of their religion. And the same may be said of the Hindu Idolators of the present day. And wherever the Christian Religion has been corrupted, morality has been corrupted also.

§ 5.

The Sentiment of *Justice* [or the *Moral-faculty*, or *Conscience*, or *Conscientiousness*, or *Sense-of-Duty*] *Conscientiousness* is not quite so liable, indeed, to misdirection and dangerous abuse, as the Sentiment of Veneration ; but it needs the guidance and control of right Reason to guard against many mistakes that may arise.

Conscience is the rightful *supreme ruler* over the whole *Man* ; — over all actions, words, and thoughts. That is, nothing can be right which Conscience condemns, even

though the condemnation be a mistaken one. And this is the meaning of the Apostle, who says, "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind; . . . whatever is not of faith" [i. e. whatever is not done in a full belief of its being allowable] is sin.

But it would be a great mistake to suppose that whatever one's conscience does approve, is right. For, no one has any ground for claiming to be *infallible* in the decisions of his conscience. There have been Conscientious persecutors : and some of them persecutors of the truth ; as our Lord warns his disciples that "those who killed them would think they were doing God service;" and as Paul "verily thought that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus."

Conscience, then, being (as I have said) a kind of absolute Sovereign of the Mind, should act as an absolute Monarch does, if he is a good one. He commands the services of all his subjects; and among the rest, calls on the wisest of them to aid him with *their counsel*: and he shows his power, not by acting *against* their advice, or without it, but by employing their wisdom in his Service.

And even so, should Conscience command the services of Reason, and inquire by the aid of that, *how* to act in the best manner.

§ 6.

For want of such control and guidance, men may commit many mistakes, besides that of conscientious persecution, just mentioned. For instance, a person, who has observed that most men are apt to seek too

much for present gratification, and ease, and that Duty often requires us to undergo privation and suffering, may be led thence to conclude that pains and privations are in themselves a part of virtue, even when undergone without any farther object; and that whatever affords enjoyment must be, for that reason alone, sinful. But (as was pointed out in the *Lessons on Morals*, L. xiii. § 4) such a notion has no countenance from the precepts or practice of the Apostles, and is at variance both with Scripture and with Reason.

If any one should object, that the opposite fault of over-
Needful indulgence is greater, and is more *common*, he
warnings. should be reminded that to tell people how wrong such and such things are, which all men *know* to be wrong, and to point out the path of Duty to those who care little about Duty, is less useful, than to warn well-intentioned persons of the mistakes they may fall into while aiming at what is right. For “if the *light* that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!”

Of a like nature with the above-mentioned mistake is
Renouncing that of an erroneous and extravagant dread of
the World. the danger (which certainly is a real and a great one) of an over-attachment to the things of this world. Some have thence been led to suppose that it is a virtue to withdraw from the society of our fellow-men, into some Hermitage or Monastery, and to divest oneself of all property; not considering* that in attempting to escape the temptations of Life, they abandon many of its duties.

§ 7.

Some, again, from their interpretation of the Precept, "Resist not evil," have a conscientious scruple *Non-* against forcibly opposing any one who should *resistance.* attempt to rob or murder them, to outrage their wives and daughters, and to carry off their children as slaves:—Slaves who would probably be trained up (as the Turks did the original Janissaries) as soldiers of some warlike Despot.

And any one who would act consistently on such a principle,* should make a point of never resorting to the aid of *law*, or of any magistrate, officer of law, or civil governor of any kind. For it is plain that all human laws and human government must rest ultimately on physical *force*. The ruler "beareth not the *sword* in vain," but "is ordained for the *punishment* of evil doers." A law that should merely *exhort* men to pay their just debts, but should denounce no penalty for non-payment, nor be supported by any power of arrest or seizure of goods, would be a mere jest. On the above principle, therefore, you would be bound to leave it to the choice of your tenants and other debtors, whether they should pay you or not. Nor would it be allowable for you to call in the Police to help you against robbers. For it would be absurd to pretend, that though it is a sin to employ force *yourself*, it is no sin to *employ others* to do it for you.

* See *Lessons on Morals*, L. xiv. § 5.

Now if a large portion of mankind were to act on such a system, it would break up the whole fabric of society. For a handful of unscrupulous rogues would plunder the neighbors at pleasure.

Scripture does, indeed, reveal to us the divine Will as a guide of conduct : but we are bound to use our Reason in rightly interpreting it, so as to avoid such absurd conclusions as those just mentioned.

LESSON XXV.

§ 1.

GENEROUS forgiveness of injuries, again, is a point of Christian duty, respecting which some people *False Generosity.* fall into confusion of thought. They confound together personal *resentment*, and disapprobation of what is morally *wrong*. One who has cheated you, or slandered, or persecuted you, or your friend, is neither *more* nor *less*, a cheat, a slanderer, or a persecutor than if he had done the same to a stranger. And in that light he ought to be viewed. Such a person is one on whom you should not indeed wish to inflict any suffering beyond what may be necessary to reform him, and to deter other wrong-doers; and you should seek to benefit him in the highest degree by bringing him to a sense of his sin. But you ought not to choose such a man as an associate, or to trust him, and in all respects treat him as if he had done nothing wrong. You should therefore take care, on the one hand, that the personal injury you may have suffered does not lead you to think worse of a man than he deserves, or to treat him worse; and, on the other hand, you should not allow a false generosity to destroy in your mind the distinctions of right and wrong. Nor, again, should the desire of gaining credit for great magnanimity, lead you to pretend to think favorably of wrong conduct merely because it is you that

have suffered from it. None but thoughtless or misjudging people will applaud you for this. The duty of Christian forgiveness does not require you, nor are you allowed, to look on injustice, or any other fault, with indifference, as if it were nothing wrong at all, merely because it is you that have been wronged.

And, universally, you should take care not to confound together tenderness and kindness towards the *persons* who are in error or in fault, and indifference about the *faults themselves*. A charitable disposition is chiefly shown in making due allowances for those whom we do think in the wrong; not, in persuading ourselves that they are right, or that it is of little consequence whether a man thinks and acts rightly or wrongly. *Faults* and *errors*, you should be careful neither to overrate, nor to underrate; and the persons who may have fallen into them, you should be careful not to judge too harshly, yet without destroying in your own mind the distinctions of true and false, or of good and evil.

§ 2.

The same kind of false generosity leads some persons to do injustice to a friend, through an excessive dread of being unduly biassed in his favor. They decide against him, when perhaps he is in the right from a fear of over-partiality; and show too *little* deference for the judgment of one they think highly of, for fear of showing *too much*. In short, in their over-anxiety

to straighten the beam, they bend it too far the contrary way.

Now it may be said that such faults as those above described, are much less common than the opposite ones. And this is true: but then, they are faults of a much better kind of persons: — of those who are seeking to know and to do what is right. And to warn such persons of the mistakes they are liable to, is more likely to be profitable (as I have already said) than to admonish those who think and care little about doing right. Gross partiality to friends, and injustice towards opponents, and bitter resentment of injuries and carelessness about all religion, and worldliness, and self-indulgence, and hard-hearted indifference about the welfare or the sufferings of one's neighbors, — all these are indeed but too common; but they are not at all likely to be *mistaken for virtues*. It is when some error creeps in, in the *disguise of a duty*, that a warning against it is the most needed, and the most likely to be useful.

Again, it is commonly regarded as a reproach to any one to be *inexorable*; and some persons think it an amiable trait in themselves, to be open to entreaty. Now certainly if a man of no very high moral principle, and of but moderate benevolence, has been led by anger to make an over-severe decision, or to refuse his neighbor some benefit which he had better have granted, his being *inexorable* in adhering to this, against all entreaties, is so much the worse. The evil will be less, if he is prevailed on to reconsider the case and relent. But a man of very strict moral-principle, will always be *inexorable in proportion as he is benevolent*. For he

*An in-
exorable
character.*

will never form any severe decision except when he is convinced on careful deliberation that he is absolutely *bound* to it in duty. And he will grant nothing to importunate entreaties, because he will be ready to grant everything that is proper, without *waiting* to be entreated.

The "unjust Judge," and the unkind neighbor, in the Parables, would, if they had been just and kind, not have yielded to "importunity," but have done what was asked without it.*

§ 3.

What is sometimes called the Sentiment of *Self-Esteem*, sometimes Self-confidence, and of which the *Self-Esteem*. faulty excess is called Pride, *Arrogance*, or Self-conceit, is not in itself an evil, though it is very apt to lead to evil.

It is hardly necessary to say that we ought not to think too highly of our own claims, or our own virtues, or our achievements, nor to treat others with haughty contempt, &c.† For however apt many persons may be to *commit* such faults, no one can fall into them from *not knowing* that

* Christians are admonished in these Parables, to be persevering in prayer, not, of course, from any real *resemblance* between our Heavenly Father, and an unjust Judge, or an unkind neighbor, but because the earnestness of our prayers makes us the less unfit to receive his benefits, by impressing the more strongly on the mind, our own wants, and our dependence on Him for the relief of them.

† See the extract from a little volume of *Sacred Poetry*, at the end of this Lesson.

they *are* faults, and that Modesty and Christian Humility are right.

No one however is to be blamed for claiming just as much respect as is his proper due; or for thinking himself fit, when he is really so, for some enterprise, or for some Office. A modest man indeed will rather keep somewhat *within* his just claims, than run the least risk of going at all beyond them. And there are occasions in which a wise and good man will think it right to forego something of what is fairly his due, and to "sit down in the lowest room" [place]. But generally speaking, we are not to censure any one who claims nothing beyond his just right. And a man is rather to be commended, who disdains to be very forward in asking favors, and laying himself under obligations,* and for maintaining and asserting his independence.

And it is worth remarking, that those persons are rather the most apt to be *touchy*, and ready to suspect others of slighting or affronting them, who are rather deficient in the sentiment of Self-Esteem. They are the most disposed to feel suspicious and sore on the point whereon they are the most doubtful of themselves. A man who feels convinced that he is not a contemptible character, is the less likely to think that others (at least, those whose opinion is entitled to any regard) will be likely to treat him as contemptible.

But if any one feels himself capable of acting a noble and generous part, and, therefore, called on so to act, and if he feels that it would be a *degradation* to him to do

* The word "obligation," according to its etymology, signifies *bondage*.

anything cowardly, mean, or shabby, this feeling is not only allowable, but is even a great help towards virtuous conduct.

Of course without a perception of the distinction between Right and Wrong, we could not even form a notion of any such thing as virtuous conduct. But when that moral perception does exist, there is, and ought to be, a feeling that Virtue *elevates*, and Vice *lowers* the character. And this feeling, though it cannot be the sole foundation of virtue, and ought not be the chief motive to good conduct, yet is — as I have said — a great *help* towards the improvement of the character.

§ 4.

A person may be very deficient in real Christian Humility* while talking much (and that with perfect sincerity) of the weakness, and sinfulness, and ignorance, of the *Human-Race generally*. For he may be proud of his own supposed personal superiority as an individual; and may treat his equals or superiors with arrogant disdain: and while confessing in *general* terms, that he is a “miserable Sinner,” may, in every *particular* instance, stoutly justify himself, and refuse ever to acknowledge even the smallest error.

On the other hand, it is a mistake to think that any one who does happen to be superior to the generality, intellectually or morally, is bound, as a point of modesty, to be

* See *Lessons on Morals*, L. xviii. § 4.

ignorant of this, or to pretend to be so, and to think, or profess to think, himself inferior to what he really is. For, on the one hand, it cannot be a part of Duty to be under any kind of *mistake*; and, on the other hand, there cannot be any virtue in feigning or affectation of any kind.

Properly speaking, self-conceit and modesty have reference to a man's estimate of himself as *compared with the reality*. A conceited man *over-rates* himself; and a modest man does not. But many people do not at all take this into account. They are apt to reckon a man conceited who has a *high* opinion (whether rightly or wrongly) of his own powers; and him modest who forms a *low* one. And yet it may so happen that this latter may be in reality over-rating himself in thinking himself not below the average, or only a little below: and the other may possibly be even under-rating himself in thinking himself only a little above it.

If you could imagine a mouse imagining itself just equal to such a *small* animal as a rabbit, and an elephant believing itself only equal to such a *large* animal as an ox, they would be making opposite mistakes.

Your general practical rule should be, to expect *more of yourself than of others*. I do not, of course, mean, that you should ever call wrong conduct right. But you should consider that that which would be a very great fault in *you*, may be much less inexcusable in some others who have not had the same advantages. You should be ready to make allowances for want of clearness of understanding, or for defective education, or for a want of the highest and best examples. Those may be really trying to do their duty according to the best lights they have, whose moral views

are, on some points, as yet, but dim and imperfect, and whose conduct on the whole falls far short of what may fairly be expected, — and *will* be expected, — of one whose moral judgment is more enlightened, and his standard of duty more elevated.

NOTE.

THE WAY TO FIND OUT PRIDE.

Pride, ugly pride, sometimes is seen
By haughty looks and lofty mien :
But oft'ner it is found that pride
Loves deep within the heart to hide ;
And while the looks are mild and fair,
It sits, and does its mischief there.

Now if you really wish to find
If pride be lurking in your mind,
Inquire if you can bear a slight, —
Or patiently give up your right.
Can you submissively consent
To take reproof and punishment,
And feel no angry temper start
In any corner of your heart ?
Can you at once confess a crime,
And promise for another time ?
Or say you've been in a mistake ;
Nor try some poor excuse to make,
But freely own that it was wrong
To argue for your side so long ? —
Flat contradiction can you bear,
When you are right and know you are ?

Nor flatly contradict again,
But wait, or modestly explain,
And tell your reasons one by one;
Nor think of triumph, when you've done?
Can you, in business or in play,
Give up your wishes or your way?
Or do a thing, against your will,
For somebody that's younger still?
And never try to overbear,
Nor say a word that is not fair? —
Does laughing at you in a joke,
No anger or revenge provoke;
But can you laugh yourself, and be
As merry as the company?
Or when you find that you could do
The harm to them they did to you,
Can you keep down the wicked thought,
And do exactly as you ought?

Put all these questions to your heart,
And make it act an honest part;
And, when they've each been fairly tried,
I think you'll own that you have pride:
Some one will suit you, as you go,
And force your heart to tell you so;
But, if they all should be denied,
Then you're too proud to own your pride.

THE WAY TO CURE PRIDE.

Now I suppose, that having tried,
And found the secret or your pride,
You wish to drive it from your heart,
And learn to act an humbler part.

Well, are you sorry and sincere?
I'll try to help you then, my dear.

And first, the best, the surest way,
Is to kneel down at once, and pray :
The lowly Saviour will attend,
And strengthen you, and stand your friend.
Tell Him the mischief that you find
For ever working in your mind;
And beg his pardon for the past,
And strength to overcome at last. —
But then you must not go your way,
And think it quite enough to pray :
That is but doing half your task;
For you must *watch* as well as *ask*.
You pray for strength, and that is right,
But, then, it must be strength to fight.
For where's the use of being strong,
Unless you conquer what is wrong?
Then look within . — ask every thought,
If it be humble as it ought :
Put out the smallest spark of pride
The very moment 'tis descried :
And do not stay to think it o'er;
For while you wait it blazes more.
If it should take you by surprise,
And beg you just to let it rise,
And promise not to keep you long,
Say " No! the smallest pride is wrong."
And when there's something so amiss,
That pride says, " Take offence *at this*,"
Then if you feel at all inclined
To brood upon it in your mind,
And think revengeful thoughts within,
And wish it were not wrong to sin,

O stop at once ! — for if you dare
To wish for sin — that sin is there !
'Twill then be best to go and pray
That God would take your pride away ;
Or, if just then you cannot go,
Pray in your thoughts, and God will know ;
And beg his mercy to impart
That best of gifts — an humble heart.
Remember too that you must pray,
And watch and labor *every* day;
Nor think it wearisome or hard
To be forever on your guard.
No; every morning must begin
With resolutions not to sin;
And every evening recollect
How much you've failed in this respect.
Ask, whether such a guilty heart
Should act a proud, or humble part;
Or, as the Saviour was so mild,
Inquire if pride becomes a child;
And when all other means are tried,
Be humble that you've so much pride.

ENCOURAGEMENT IN STRIVING AGAINST PRIDE.

But if the Christian still remains
Imperfect after all his pains,
Why labor still to conquer pride ?
Since victory is still denied;
Since what he seeks can ne'er take place,
Why should he strive to " grow in grace ? "
Not so, my child ! be sure you may
Obtain the good for which you pray.
But still you must not feel secure
Of having made a perfect cure.

The Christian, till his course is ended,
Must never *say* "I've apprehended."
Although you strive to do God's will,
You must be self-distrustful still :
In knowledge you must seek to grow ;
Yet never boldly say, "I know :"
Nor ever think you've conquered pride,
And lay your watchful care aside.
If you are good, this can be known
To the all-seeing God alone :
You still must watch with constant fear
From all transgression to keep clear.
Still trusting while you strive to mend
That God your efforts will befriend.
And may you find, in HIS great day,
That all your sins are wiped away !

LESSON XXVI.

§ 1.

A REGARD for the opinion of our fellow-men concerning us, is found in every one, though in very different degrees, and also, in different forms. It is *Desire of Approbation*, variously called "Desire of Approbation," "Love of Glory," "Love of Popularity," "Love of Honor," &c., and, in its faulty excess, *Vanity*, and Ostentation.

Some people speak of *Pride* and *Vanity*, as if they were nearly the same, or at least always went together: as if the person who is the most anxious for approbation must be one who has much Self-Esteem. But the fact is oftener the reverse. One who has originally a strong desire of approbation, will feel this the more if he distrusts himself, and is doubtful as to his own qualifications. And it is often observed that a man will be particularly anxious for applause on those particular points about which he feels the most self-distrust. A man, for instance, of acknowledged eminence as a Lawyer, will be chiefly anxious about his reputation as a Poet; one of undoubted eminence in Science, will be anxious to be thought a great Painter, or Musician, &c.

Besides that some have more, and some less, of a regard for the opinion of others, there are also many different *kinds* of this regard. One man will be chiefly desirous of being

beloved, and sometimes perhaps even pitied ; another will *Praise, ad-* care little for love ; — will not endure to be pitimiration, &c. ed ; — and would rather be envied, or hated, provided he can excite *respect*, and awe, and even dread. You may sometimes meet with a man who prides himself on possessing some curious plant or breed of dogs, &c., which he is anxious that *no one else* should have. He will be careful to destroy every offset, or puppy, that he does not want for himself. And he will prefer the glory — such as it is — of being the *only* possessor of some such curiosity, to the credit of being friendly and good natured ; thus exposing himself to the dislike and contempt of most of his neighbors.

Some again are chiefly anxious to be *admired*, others, to be *commended* and others again to be what may be called *felicitated* ; though this word does not exactly express what is meant ; and hence some have introduced into our Language the Greek word “*macarize*,” which signifies to think a person *well off*, on account of something he *possesses*. The words “*felicitate*” and “*congratulate*” relate, properly, to *events* only. For instance, we congratulate a friend on the *birth of a son*, or on his *acquiring* a fine estate ; but we “*macarize*” him [think him happy] in *having* a promising son, or a fine estate.

A person is *admired*, again, for what he is considered to *be* ; — for qualities which we regard in the light not of *possessions*, but of parts of *himself* ; as Wisdom, Genius, Valor, personal Beauty. And any one is *commended* [praised] for what he *does* — for what is looked upon not as something *possessed* by him, nor yet as a *part* of himself, but as an *act* of his ; such as Industry, Temperance, Liberality, &c.

§ 2.

Again, there are great differences as to the *Differences*
kinds of things *for* which different persons *in kind.*
 desire either admiration, or praise, or macarism. One, for
 instance, delights to be admired for Beauty, another for
 Wit, and another for Learning, &c.

There are also great differences as to the persons *from* whom
 approbation of any kind is most sought, or enjoyed. Some,
 though they greatly prize the applause of those they esteem
 and look up to, care but little about the opinion formed of
 them by the ignorant and unthinking; while others, on the
 contrary, are anxious to be the idols of the Rabble, and will
 even sacrifice the approbation of the wise and good, for the
 sake of wide-spread popularity. Many of the Jewish
 Rulers of old "loved the praise of men more than the
 praise of God." And such characters are but too common
 in every Age and Country.

And lastly, in some, the *desire of Applause* is much
 stronger than the *dread of censure*; while others are quite
 the reverse. One man, though he would like very well to
 obtain credit, yet would not purchase it at the expense of
 being, by some persons, abused or ridiculed; and through
 dread of this, will prefer spending his life in obscurity:
 while another, for the sake of celebrity, will not mind
 encountering a storm of censure and obloquy.

What is called the "Law of Honor" depends on the
 regard felt for the opinions of others. It
Law of *Honor.* enjoins, and forbids, certain things, under the

penalty of being *scorned* and shunned, by those of our own Class in Society. It is a Law which does not extend to everything that is *wrong*, nor to everything that is *considered* as wrong; but only to some particular points. A Gentleman, for instance, may do something that almost every one would allow to be wrong, without being *excluded from the Society* of Gentlemen; which he *would* be, if exposed as a *cheat*, or a *liar*, or a *coward*.

The Law of Honor differs much in different nations. A Chinese for instance, is very little ashamed of being detected as a *cheat*; but he would be disgraced by not treating his *parents* with due respect, or not keeping the *Tombs* of his Ancestors in good repair. And he is not disgraced by being *flogged*; but he would be ready to die of mortification at having his *hair* cut off.

And in the same nation, different Classes of persons have different points of Honor. The Honor of the Male Sex for instance, and of the Female, are not the same.

A man of Honor, in the highest and noblest sense of the word, is one who disdains to do anything — known or unknown — which *would* expose him, — *if* known — to the contempt of respectable people.

§ 3.

No Desire needs more to be carefully watched, than that for the respect and approbation of our fellow-men. To root out this Desire would be neither possible nor right. But it should be most carefully watched and checked. And we should not allow

*Dangers of
the desire of
approbation.*

it to be the *motive* of our actions. If you do obtain applause, and especially, that of the wise and good, for doing what is right, it is quite allowable, and it is unavoidable, to feel gratification; but we ought never (in the important concerns of life) to act *for the sake of* human applause, as an ultimate end. It is only in trifling matters that such a motive is allowable. To display, for instance, your skill at Cricket or at Chess, or to seek applause for a feat of Ventriloquism, or a clever sleight-of-hand trick, or the like, is not blameable. But in the serious and important portions of your conduct, human applause must never be your ultimate end sought for its own sake.

When however you would persuade others to do something that is good, either by precept, or by example, you must, for this purpose, seek for their favorable opinion of you. And this is the meaning of "Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father who is in Heaven."

And if you come forward as a candidate for some Situation, you must make known, in some way, your qualifications for it. But in these cases, it is not for its *own* sake, and as an ultimate end, that human approbation is sought.

Where no such reasons exist, the Rule given us is, "Take heed that you do not your alms before men, to be seen of them."—"Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth."—"Thy Father, who seeth in secret, shall reward thee openly."

We should be always taking pains therefore to give the *best direction* to our desire of approbation; that is, to seek the approbation of Him who "seeth in secret." And this

is doubtless one purpose for which that Desire was implanted in Man by his Maker. For, — over and above all thought of *reward* and *punishment*, and also, all sense of *Duty*, and all feelings of *gratitude* for what God has bestowed, — besides all this, there is (as both Reason and Scripture point out) the additional motive, of a desire to do whatever is “*well-pleasing* in his sight,” and to avoid whatever would be disapproved by Him: looking to the day when “every man shall receive [his] praise of God.” *

And indeed this is what it would be natural to feel towards *any* Being — suppose, one of our fellow-men — whom we believed to be eminently wise and good. We should be glad of the *approbation* of such a person, though he had not conferred on us any favor which called for gratitude, and though we had no expectation of receiving any benefit from him. beyond the mere approbation.

§ 4.

Vanity self-defeating. It is worth remarking, that there is no passion which has so direct a tendency to defeat its own object, as Vanity. It is true, indeed, that excessive Avarice does sometimes lead to poverty and ruin, by tempting men into rash speculations. And injudicious benevolence may (as was remarked above) do more harm than good. But on the whole, a man is not less likely to gain wealth, or to do good, from having a strong desire for those objects. The passion for applause, on the contrary, in

* 1 Cor. iv.

proportion as it is perceived (which it almost always will be,) tends to *lower* you in men's estimation. They admire most, those who least court admiration.

It is also to be observed that no passion produces so much of a *wavering* unsteadiness of character, as Vanity. One who is devoted to the pursuit of Wealth, or of Power, or even of sensual-pleasure, may pursue a *steady* course (though a very degrading one,) through life. And one who acts on the higher motive, of a sense of Duty, will be eminently unwavering. But he who is continually thinking of human approbation, will usually be like a ship left to drift about at the mercy of varying winds and currents. He will now take one course, and now, another, to please this and that set of men; and will, on the whole, resemble the old man with his boy and his ass, in the Fable; seeking to please everybody, and ending by pleasing nobody.

§ 5.

Those who have the training of a young person who is disposed to be over-anxious for praise or admiration, sometimes think to cure him of this, by withholding all commendation, even when deserved, and bestowing nothing but censures and checks. But this, besides that it is likely to dishearten him too much (especially if he is rather deficient in self-esteem), may have the effect of driving him to seek, and perhaps obtain, applause from *others*, who perhaps are less competent judges, and less safe guides. It would be a wiser plan to give him

*Error in
Education.*

moderate praise, accompanied with earnest cautions against making that an ultimate end.

Those persons act somewhat as a laborer's wife sometimes does ; who being anxious that he should be very temperate, never provides him a comfortable meal at home, and supplies him with no drink but cold water. Thus, he is often driven to resort to the Alehouse ; from which she might have kept him, if she had indulged him with a moderate cup of home-brewed ale in his own house.

LESSON XXVII.

§ 1.

THE Desire of Society—of having some of our fellow-men to communicate with—though much connected with the desire of their approbation and sympathy, is yet distinct from it. And it is also distinct from an *affectionate* disposition, and a tendency to form friendships, and to *attach* oneself to *particular individuals*. For, total solitude is so intolerable to Man's nature, that, after a time, the company of one we neither love nor esteem, would be preferred to it.

A gentleman of education and refinement, and of high moral character, who was repeatedly imprisoned by tyrannical Governments, for political offences, was at first confined—to his great mortification—with the vilest malefactors. Afterwards he was put into solitary confinement; which at first he felt as a relief; but, after a time, he longed for the society even of the rogues. And complete solitude, when long continued, generally produces Insanity or Idiocy.

The desire of Companionship,—simply as such—seems to be nearly the same with the instinct of those brute-animals which are what is called *gregarious*. To many of these, the presence of some of their own species seems

essential to their thriving and feeling comfortable. And it is well-known that it is a most difficult thing to drive a *single sheep* the way you would have it go; though to drive a *flock* is very easy. A shepherd who had to leave one of his sheep at a neighbor's house, has found it his easiest way to drive two others thither along with it, that when he had left the one, he might have two to drive back.

But there are many kinds of Brutes, and some that are not gregarious, which have, as well as Man, *Attachment*. what some have called *Adhesiveness*; — the disposition to form an *attachment* to particular individuals, either of the human Species, or of some other. It is found particularly strong in the Dog, and in the Elephant: but many others display much of it. And it is remarkable that it does not seem to depend on an association with the idea of *food*; for a dog will be strongly attached to his master, though usually or constantly supplied with his food by others.

Attachment to an individual and a disposition to form friendships must not (as was formerly remarked) be confounded with the Sentiment of Benevolence. There are indeed some persons who possess both great Benevolence, and also a tendency to form strong Attachments; but some, again, have the one of these dispositions very strong, and the other, but in a very moderate degree. For there are great differences in men as to both points.

§ 2.

Love of children, again, seems to be something quite distinct both from general *Benevolence*, and from *Love of* desire of *Society*, and from tendency to *Friend-ship*. *Children*. For, it is sometimes found very strong, both in those who have much, and in those who have but little, of those other feelings; and sometimes, again, it is almost wanting in persons in whom those feelings are very strong. A person overflowing with benevolence towards every sentient Being, will perhaps be found to have little or no *liking* for children, though he would be glad to promote their welfare: and another perhaps will be like those surly mastiffs which are savage to *men*, but quite gentle with children.

It is wonderful what a faculty children have of finding out those who like them. No *caresses* or gifts lavished on them from regard to their parents, or from general benevolence, will ever bring a child to attach itself to those who do not really like children for their own sakes. In this point it is far more difficult to deceive children than grown people.

Many Brutes manifest a great degree of love for their offspring: namely, all Beasts, all Birds, some Insects (as Bees) and some few Reptiles and Fishes.

§ 3.

Emulation,—the desire to surpass, or at least equal, those around us, in something that is honorable, is not *Emulation* at all in itself evil, but needs to be carefully *and Envy*. watched, lest it degenerate into *Envy*.

Emulation seeks to advance *oneself*; Envy, seeks to lower another; and it is accompanied with a feeling of dislike and hostility towards those who have outstripped us or equalled us.

By *Jealousy* we commonly mean what may be called *prospective Envy*, that is, a *dread* of some one's equality or superiority. A man *envies* those who have *actually attained* some advancement, and is *jealous* of those who he fears *will* attain it.

The approaches of the odious passion of Envy are the more insidious on account of its very odiousness; since hardly any one will ever acknowledge to himself that he feels Envy. Men endeavor therefore to justify their aversion to the person envied, on the ground of his being *unworthy* of the honour or other advantage he has acquired. When any one acquires something of which he is really undeserving, we are said to feel *indignant*: and hence men are apt to cloak their Envy under the disguise of just Indignation.

It is remarked by Aristotle, and also by Paley, that Emulation and Envy are felt chiefly towards those nearly on the same level with us; and that all desire of superiority, and all enjoyment in the obtaining of it, are in reference to persons somewhat in our position, and not those very much above us, or very much below us. A Shepherd feels no gratification in his superiority to the sheep or the dog: nor the Farmer from his superiority to his shepherd and other farm servants; nor the Landlord, from his superiority to the tenant-farmer; nor again, the King from his superiority to the landlord. But

*Who are the
objects of
these feel-
ings*

if the Shepherd excels the neighboring shepherds in the management of a flock, or is a better cricket-player, or wrestler, than the other rustics, or if the farmer has better crops and cattle than his neighbors,—or if the Squire has more influence in the County than the other country-gentlemen — and if the King has a finer territory, or more loyal subjects, than his neighbors, — this is the kind of superiority which men enjoy, and which they aim at.

And accordingly, the laborers are not so likely to envy the farmer, or the farmers, the squire, or the squires, the king, as each of these are to envy one another.

§ 4.

It is well for Society that this is so, considering how prone men are to the vice of Envy. For if the lower classes envied the higher as much as they *Advantage to Society.* are apt to envy one another, we should have perpetual Revolutions. It is only when the mass of the People are very much distressed, and have long been misgoverned, and grievously oppressed by their superiors (as in France under the old Monarchy), that the full tide of the popular envy is turned against the possessors of rank and wealth. And the consequences are dreadful.

As for Emulation, that, from its very nature, can only be felt towards those but a few steps above us. For, it is only those, that we can hope to overtake or to surpass. A Village school-master, or a Farmer, cannot feel any towards a Minister of State or a Prince ; but the sight of a school, or a farm, better managed than their own, may fire them with emulation.

Emulation is very apt (as I have said), to degenerate, in base minds, into Envy. But with those of a *Generous Emulation*, higher character, and when directed towards good objects, it may prove a powerful aid in a virtuous and honorable course. One may see two or three noble-minded youths united in the bonds of friendship, though they may have been competing with each other for school-prizes, and perhaps are afterwards running a like race at College; and perhaps will all their lives be emulating each other in the career of some liberal Profession; and all, without the least tincture of ill-will, or interruption of friendship.

LESSON XXVIII.

§ 1.

THE Desire of Power seems to be a part of the human constitution; though in very different degrees *Desire of Power.* in different persons.

One form of it is commonly called *Ambition*.

Some Philosophers speak of a supposed tendency to *destroy*. But it is probable that what they describe as Destructiveness, is merely one form, and a very common one, of the desire to *produce an effect*; — in short, to exercise *power*. One may see a baby delighting to exercise its infant strength on anything within reach. It prefers to handle those objects which it can *alter the shape of*, — to roll a ball, — to throw down a chair, — or to break its toys. The reason why the pleasure of exercising power shows itself (in children, and the ignorant and coarse-minded) principally in *destroying*, or in some kind of *mischief*, is, partly (1) because this is much the *easiest* and most obvious exertion of power; and partly (2) because it the most impresses the mind with a full consciousness of Power.

(1) It is far easier to inflict a wound than to heal one; — to set fire to a hay stack than to extinguish it; — to break any article, than to make it; — to break any article, than to make it; and universally, to do hurt, than to do good. But moreover (2), when you do any *hurt* to any one you feel that

this is *wholly your own* exercise of power, and that he does not aid you in it, but, if possible, would oppose you ; and that you *prevail* over him. But when you do him any service, he, if possible, aids your efforts. If, for instance, you throw a man *down*, this is in spite of his resistance, or at least without his help : but if you *raise up* one who is down, he joins his efforts with yours.

Hence it is that the most base-minded and brutal display their love of Power, chiefly in the way of mischief, tyranny, and cruelty. And a further confirmation of this, is, that the most savage Tyrants often delight to load with *honors and favors* some one whom they have taken a fancy to ; and that this favorite is usually some worthless person whom they have raised from the dregs of the people. The elevation of such a person, the Tyrant feels is completely his *own* doing, and an exercise of supreme power. A man of merit and ability, on the contrary, would have been considered as having himself *contributed* to his own elevation.

§ 2.

Hence it is that the most wanton and brutish barbarian tyrants think that they best “ set forth their glory,” and “ assert their sovereignty ” by doing hurt to one man and good to another, *without any reason for* it, except that such is their *will and pleasure*, and, in short, from mere caprice.

And some persons, whom one may suspect to be themselves of a somewhat similar disposition, presume to attribute this kind of procedure to Almighty God ; insisting on it

that in such and such a case He had no reason at all, but acted as He did, to "declare his sovereignty," and "for his own glory:" as if He could literally desire glory! Whenever He has merely revealed to us His Will, we must not dare to pronounce that He *had* no reasons for it except His Will, because He has not thought fit to make those reasons known to us. To say (as some have presumed to say)* that He does so and so for *no cause whatever except that He chuses* it, seems little, if at all, short of blasphemy. Even a just earthly king, being not responsible to his subjects for the reasons of his commands, may sometimes think fit to issue commands without explaining his reasons. But it would be insolent rashness for any one thence to conclude that He *had* no reasons, but acted from mere caprice.

So, also, a dutiful child will often have to say, "I do so and so, because my kind and wise parents have commanded me: *that* is reason enough for *me*." But though this is — to the *child* — a very good reason for *obeying* the command, it would be a very bad reason, with the *parents*, for *giving* that command. And he would show his filial veneration and trust, not by taking for granted that his parents *had* no reason for their commands, but on the contrary, by taking for granted that there *was* a good reason both for their acting as they did, and for their withholding from him any explanation.

* See *Lessons on Morals*, L. xviii. § 4.

§ 3.

It is almost superfluous even to mention the vast amount of evils — the oppression, the wanton cruelty, *Dangers of love of Power.* and injustice of every kind — that spring from an excessive, or misdirected, and uncontrolled love of Power. Though not an evil in itself, when carefully kept within bounds, and regulated by virtuous principle, and sound judgment, there is no part of our nature that needs to be more carefully watched, and steadily restrained.

Those who have a good deal of the love of Power, — in short, who have a *taste for governing*, — are sometimes apt, when entrusted with it, to show, even when far from being tyrannical, so much *delight* in bearing rule, as to offend many of those placed under them. For, most men, or at least very many, feel indignant at seeing a man take pleasure in commanding and forbidding; and would like better to see him *enduring the task* of governing, from a sense of duty.

On the other hand, a man of the opposite disposition — one who rather dislikes the task of governing — will be apt, unless he is a man of very high principle, to be too remiss; partly from indolence, and partly from an over-strong sympathy with the love of liberty, and a dislike to all coercion, restrictions, and punishments: all of which are in truth evils of themselves, though often necessary evils.

There are good, and bad, and indifferent, Rulers, of each of these opposite dispositions; and each man should guard

against the fault he is most prone to. Perhaps, on the whole, and as a general rule, those make the best governors who have little or no delight in governing, but exercise power merely on principle, for the public good.

§ 4.

It must not be inferred from what has been above said, that all persons are *cruel*, who are strongly attracted by narratives, or even spectacles of suffering. *Craving for excitement.* Even of the coarse-minded vulgar, who crowd to see an Execution, there are probably many who would be glad to *rescue* the sufferer if they could. But there is in the human mind a certain craving for *excitement*; for the sake of which men are willing to endure an admixture of pain. For, pain is far more *stimulating* than pure unmixed pleasure; and thence, a certain degree of it is endured for the sake of that stimulus.

Hence, no doubt, arises the chief part of the gratification derived from *Tragedy*. Representations of sufferings which even call forth tears, and give a certain amount of pain to the spectator or reader, yet prove attractive, from the excitement they thus produce.

The craving for a stimulus of this kind may be compared to the appetite for such condiments as mustard, salt, pepper, and vinegar, in our food. An excess of these is very disagreeable; but a moderate admixture serves to correct insipidity, or the over-lusciousness of unmixed sweets.

On the other hand, some persons have something in their

Nervous sensitiveness. bodily constitution which gives them an excessive horror at inflicting or witnessing death or wounds: and some even faint at the description of them. And these are not necessarily kind-hearted, or even exempt from cruelty. A person who shudders at the sight of bloodshed, and could hardly bring himself to kill a wasp that was teasing him, may, conceivably, be harsh and tyrannical, hard-hearted, and bitterly resentful.

§ 5.

The Desire, again, of *acquiring*, and of *possessing* some kind of property, seems to be a part of the *Desire of gain.* human constitution; though this also is found very various in degree.

Though the mere calculations of Self-love would lead men to provide for their subsistence, and for the various gratifications which wealth can purchase, there seems to be, over and above this, a wish, in most men, and probably, in some degree, in all, to possess something that they can call their *own*. And the degree in which this exists in each man, is not found to be at all in proportion to the degree in which each desires or enjoys the things that are to be procured by wealth. On the contrary, one may see it particularly strong in persons who, for the mere pleasure of gaining and keeping wealth, are content to forego, all their lives, most of the luxuries and even comforts of life.

It is likely, however, that in many instances the love of *power* (above noticed) is much mixed up with the love of

gain, and takes that form. For, wealth confers a kind of power.

The excess of this tendency is called *Avarice*, or *Covetousness*; and sometimes *Love of Money*. This last expression leads some into the error of sup-
Avarice.
 posing that those rude nations which have not learned the use of Money, must be exempt from any such passion. But in fact, they are often excessively covetous of such things as are to them wealth; and not seldom, thievish.

§ 6.

It is almost superfluous to observe that Avarice is a vice, and one which needs to be guarded against with the utmost care: more especially, be-
Temptations to avarice.
 cause, to the greater part of mankind, the pursuit of gain — the earning of money — is a matter of necessity and of duty, that they may be able to support themselves and their families. The more care, therefore, is to be taken lest Avarice should creep in and gain possession of the heart, under the disguise of what is allowable and right.

And though the danger of this is one which *all* men should be on their guard against, it is evident that this danger is the *greatest* (though some people speak as if it were just the reverse) to those who are *not* rich, but are *obliged* to labor, and to be very careful about money, in order to secure a decent maintenance, and who are forced to go without many things that are desirable, and which they could procure if they were richer. The wealthy *may* think much about money: the poor *must*.

Avarice assumes various forms, according to the other dispositions with which it is combined in different men. One who is very cautious, timid, and not hopeful, will be what is called “stingy” and “penurious:” not so eager for gain, as fearful of loss; and thus perhaps incurring loss, by letting, for instance, his house and his farm go to ruin, from grudging the cost of timely repairs, and of proper tillage and manure. Another man, of a daring and sanguine temper, will perhaps not grudge expenditure, but will be *covetous* and grasping. And such a one will often, through greediness of gain, ruin himself by rash speculations.

LESSON XXIX.

§ 1.

HITHERTO we have been speaking of the Mind in its *natural* [normal] state. By this is meant not necessarily absolute *perfection* in all points, but *Idiocy and Insanity.* a state not crippled or impaired by disease. And so also, when we speak of the “natural” or “normal” condition of the body, we mean, not that the limbs and all the bodily organs are necessarily in the highest perfection, but merely the absence of *deformity*, or of the *loss* of any of the limbs or organs: which we reckon an *unnatural* condition.

When the mental powers, or some portion of them, remain, from childhood, undeveloped, and without their natural growth, we call this *Idiocy*. But this state is also sometimes brought on in after-life by some disease, or some great shock given to the mind.

When the mental powers are in a state of decay in old age, this is usually called *Dotage*; and sometimes *Childishness*.

When the mind is impaired, not by a *want*, or a *weakness*, of some of its Powers, but by an *irregular* *Madness.* *action*, this is called “Madness,” or “Insanity;” though the latter of these words originally signified merely being “not in sound health.” The word “*Derangement*,”

— that is, *mental* derangement, — is also often used in the same sense.

The state of mind of a patient in a certain stage of Fever, when he is under *delusions*, and imagines things that have no existence, is called *Delirium*. When this takes place only during the access of Fever, we never call it *madness*; nor should we speak of the person as having ever been *insane*. But the *continuance* of Delirium is called *Madness*. And as Idiocy is (as has been just said) a kind of prolonged *Infancy*, so, *Madness*, of the delirious kind, is (as was observed in a former Lesson) a kind of prolonged *Dream*. The dreamer, and the madman, having, each, lost, for the time, the control of the Will over the mental-conceptions, these are consequently mistaken for realities.

And here it is worth remarking, that both in dreaming, and in madness, there is often a sort of *intermediate* state of mind between belief and disbelief; a *half-consciousness* of being under a delusion, which yet one cannot quite throw off. When you are asleep, but not soundly (especially when unwell), you are sometimes haunted by some unpleasant dream, which you vainly strive to get rid of, though half-suspecting that it is only a dream. And the like often takes place in *Insanity*. Read, for instance, the poet Cowper's description of his own condition, in his touching poem of "The Castaway;" and you will feel sure that he was partly believing, and partly not, in its truth. No one can think either that he would have written it if fully conscious that it was *untrue*, or again, that any one fully and firmly convinced that he was irrevocably doomed to eternal per-

dition, could have sat down to write this conviction in *metre and rhyme*.

§ 2.

Besides this kind of Madness, there is another which is often joined with it, but sometimes exists without it, called, in technical language, "*Mania*." *Mania and Delirium*. This consists in the excessive violence of some Passion, so that it breaks loose altogether from the control of Reason. Such, for instance, was the case of a man who, on being reproved by his mother for having dirtied his clothes, snatched up a poker and killed her on the spot. If he had merely given her an angry and insolent answer, he would have been called rude, ill-behaved, and undutiful. It was only the *excessive degree* of violence of temper, that constituted him a madman.

This was a case of *Mania without Delirium*.

If, again, he had killed his mother under a *delusion*, fully believing that it was *not* his mother, but a house-breaker coming to rob and murder him, this would have been a case of *Delirium without Mania*. And if he had been only in sport, and had had no notion that the poker could do any hurt at all, we should have called him an *Idiot*. Indeed there is a case recorded of an idiot who cut off the head of a man who was asleep, and went and hid it, amusing himself with the thought of how much the man would be at a loss, *when he awoke*, to know what was become of his head!

That kind of temporary insanity caused by *intoxication*

from drink, is chiefly of the character of *Mania*.
Intoxication. Opium, again, and some other drugs, produce a derangement more consisting of Delirium.

• Mania often occurs in the delirious stage of Fever.

There is a curious case recorded of a fever-patient, who,
Fever. at the stage of the disease which *would*, in ordinary cases, have been attended with delirium, was restored, for the time, from a state of Idiocy to sound sense. She had been a servant in a gentleman's family, and had afterwards become idiotic. During the fever, she recognized the physician, who was the son of her former master; inquired after all the family, and talked quite rationally. But as the fever abated, she sank back into idiocy.

Somewhat similar was the case of a clergyman, a man of rather superior intelligence, but on some points, insane, who, during a violent fever, became sane, and spoke rationally of the delusions he had been under. But they returned when the fever was cured.

§ 3.

Besides these kinds of mental disorder, there is another, which may be called *partial Oblivion*: not a
Oblivion. *general* decay of Memory, such as often occurs in old people, but a total forgetting of some one *class of things*, or of all that has occurred during a certain *definite period*; the Memory remaining unimpaired in all other points.

A case is recorded of a Frenchman who had settled in

England when a boy, and resided there many years. He spoke English like a native. But in the delirious stage of a fever, he could speak and understand nothing but French ; and insisted on it that he was but sixteen years old. All that had passed, and all that he had learnt, since then, was to him a perfect blank.

A similar case is recorded of a bricklayer in London, who fell from a scaffold, and suffered a concussion of the brain. When in the hospital, he could not understand what was said by the attendants, and talked what seemed to them an unmeaning jargon. One of the Nurses, who was a Welsh-woman, found that he was talking Welsh. This was his mother-tongue ; and he had suddenly forgotten his English, through the shock to his brain.

Again, a case is recorded of a gentleman who suffered an apoplectic stroke, from which he recovered, with the full use of all his faculties, only, *Apoplexy.* that he had wholly forgotten all that had passed for about ten years before the attack. He remembered all that was previous to that period, and all that was taking place after his recovery. But his friends had to tell him, as a matter of History, of all the occurrences of those ten years.

A similar case was that of a lady who became insane, and, under proper treatment, completely recovered, and had all her mental powers unimpaired, except that she had wholly forgotten all the events of a period of several years previous to her attack. During that period, she had become acquainted with a gentleman whom she married. But he, and the child that she had borne, were total strangers to her, after her recovery : and she had much difficulty in be-

lieving, on the assurances of her friends, that she was a wife and a mother.

In these cases, the mind resembles a book from which some leaves have been torn out, but which remains perfect in all the parts before and after the gap thus made.

Another case is that of a well-educated lady, who, on her recovery from a paralytic stroke, had forgotten how to *spell*. Her letters were in good firm hand-writing, and good sense as formerly; but the spelling was like that of the illiterate Vulgar.

§ 4.

The most curious perhaps of all such cases, is that of a *Restored memory.* man of learning who used to correspond with some of his foreign acquaintances, in Latin, which he read and wrote as easily as his mother-tongue. On recovering from a paralytic attack he found his faculties unimpaired, except that he had totally *forgotten Latin*. Being in the prime of life, and a man of energetic character, he set himself to learn the language afresh. He studied hard, for a considerable time, and was making just such progress as an intelligent man might be expected to make in learning a language. But one day, as he was laboring to make out a passage in some Latin book, suddenly the meaning of it flashed across his mind: and at the same moment, *all* his knowledge of Latin came back to him at once, and he was as good a scholar as ever. It seemed as if a kind of veil had been torn off.

Such cases as these are among those mysteries of the Mind which probably no one will ever be able to explain.

LESSON XXX.

§ 1.

INSTITUTIONS for reclaiming and educating Idiots, have been established by benevolent persons, in Switzerland, and in England. And the success has been wonderful. Almost all the Patients, though remaining more or less weak in intellect, have been brought from the condition of Brutes, to be rational Beings, behaving decently, and learning some handicraft trades, by which they can earn their living. And some of them, though as unfit to take care of themselves as a child, yet display much ability in some particular point. An idiot in Switzerland is said to have become a good Painter. For, Idiocy is often *partial*. There is a case recorded of a poor Welsh peasant who taught himself Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and French; yet was so complete an idiot that he was unfit to take care of himself, and could not learn any manual art by which he might earn a subsistence.

Again, there was a very eminent physician, who became idiotic, and so continued for the rest of his life, taken care of like a child; but when he could be prevailed on to prescribe for a Patient, he was found to retain all his medical skill.

§ 2.

Insanity also is often partial; and when it is confined to some one delusion, it is called *Monomania*. A *Partial Insanity*. madman will often be not only rational, but very intelligent, except on some one point; and even in the point wherein he is insane will display great ingenuity. A man who was a good scholar, was confined in a madhouse where he was harshly treated; and he wrote to a friend—also a scholar—to entreat him to procure his release. But he knew that his Keeper opened and read all his letters; and accordingly he described himself in his letter as very comfortable, and kindly used; and then he added what professed to be a quotation from a classical author, but which was a description, in *Greek* (which he knew the Keeper did not understand) of his ill-treatment.

Another gentleman having complained of being unjustly confined as a madman, he and his Keeper were examined together before a jury. He answered all their questions quite rationally, and displayed such perfect good sense that the jury were filled with indignation against the physician who was his Keeper. The Doctor when called on for his defence, said, "Well, sir, you have made out a grievous case of ill-usage; but you have not told these gentlemen of your *driving round the moon* every night in a coach and four." "And if I do," said the madman, "it is no thanks to you; for you would prevent me if you could!"

§ 3.

It is wonderful to what a degree the delusions of the Insane will sometimes prevail over the evidence of their senses. A patient whom it was not thought safe to leave by himself, had an attendant placed in the same room. He complained bitterly of this intrusion on his privacy, and insisted on the man's being lodged in a separate room. To pacify him the keepers pretended to comply; and they stretched a *line of tape* across the chamber, leaving the attendant on one side, and him on the other. With this arrangement he was satisfied; and he boasted to the friends who came to visit him how comfortable he was, now that a *partition* (as he called it) had been put up and he had a private room to himself. *Delusions of the Senses.*

Another Patient fancied himself a prince, living in splendid luxury, and took the madhouse for his Palace, and the attendants for his servants; and used to boast to every visitor, of the grand style in which he lived. But one thing, he said, perplexed him; that though his table was every day covered with the choicest dainties, dressed by skilful cooks, all the dishes had an unaccountable flavor of *porridge*. This was his actual diet; and it seems his taste and smell were exempt from the delusions which affected his other senses.

§ 4.

Mad patients are apt to take an especial *aversion* to those whom (when sane) they were the most attached to. And hence it is generally found expedient *to friends.* *Aversion*

to remove them from their families, and place them with strangers.

One of the most curious cases of Monomania, was that of a man who had displayed wonderful ability as a practical chemist, and had thus acquired a large fortune. He was perfectly sane except on one point; an unaccountable antipathy to his only child, a daughter, whom he believed, without any foundation, to be one of the most depraved of human beings. He made a Will, leaving all his property to some public Institution. And if he had simply done this the Will would probably have stood valid; since he might have been supposed to have some good reasons—though not stated—for what he did. But luckily for his daughter, he gave his reasons for disinheriting her; charging her with atrocious crimes, which she was able easily to prove she could not possibly have committed. And thereupon the Will was set aside on the ground of insanity, and she inherited as heir-at-law.

§ 5.

The treatment of the Insane was formerly much more violent and harsh than what is generally applied. *Treatment of the Insane.* proved and practiced now. A comparatively mild treatment is found, in most cases, sufficient for restraining them, and also conducive to their recovery.

The disorder is a much more *curable* one except in those advanced years, than is generally supposed. If it be taken in time, the patients, if young, much oftener recover than not. But since,—when they do recover,—

care is generally taken to keep the whole matter a secret, hence the disorder is generally supposed to be of less frequent occurrence and less curable, than it really is.

The varieties of Insanity are very numerous. Some patients are gloomy and sullen; some gay and talkative; others, fierce and malicious. One will fancy himself an emperor, possessing boundless wealth; others will fancy themselves ruined and reduced to beggary. This latter is a very common form of the disease. Some, again, fancy themselves angels, or inspired prophets; others think themselves irrecoverably doomed to perdition. And a very large proportion of mad patients imagine that a conspiracy is formed against them, or that they are ill-used by their kindest friends. Some differences accordingly, in the mode of treating different patients, is necessary.

§ 6.

When any criminal act is committed by a person who is suspected to be of unsound mind, the Jury which has to try him are often perplexed with long metaphysical discussions about moral agency, which they cannot be expected to understand, and which, if they *could* understand them, would be nothing to the purpose.

It is no excuse for any one — mad or not mad — to say that he “did not *intend to do anything wrong*.” For, those who “killed the disciples of Jesus thought they were doing God service.” It must be proved (when a man has done something that is in itself criminal), that he did not *intend to do the thing he did*. The only question, there-

fore, that a Jury ought to inquire about is, whether a man designed to do the very thing which he actually did. For, if any one is so complete an idiot (like the one mentioned in the last Lesson) as not to know that cutting off a man's head will kill him, or if he is so mad as not to know that fire will burn, no such person could be influenced by penalties against murder, or against arson [fire-raising]. But if he *intended* to kill a man, or to set fire to a house, then, however absurd and irrational may be his *motive* for that design, he might conceivably have been deterred from the act by the fear of punishment. If he is so mad as to think it allowable or virtuous to commit a murder, or other crime, he may still be withheld from it by the expectation of suffering the penalty of the crime. Indeed some religious or political fanatics have been fully persuaded that the assassination of some great man was a laudable act. And though some of these have braved death in such attempts, one cannot doubt that many others of them would have attempted the same, if they could have done so with impunity.

Now the proper end of all human punishment, is (as was *Prevention* pointed out in the *Lessons on the British Con-*
of Crime. *stitution*) the *prevention* of crime. *Vengeance*, — the inflicting of any evil with no such end in view, — is not allowable to Man.

And if a person *designs* to do the thing he does, he may be presumed — whether sane or insane — to be a Being capable of being deterred by the fear of punishment. And that madmen *are* capable of being so influenced, is well known. The threat of a strait-waistcoat, or of a solitary cell, will often keep them in order.

§ 7.

All discussions, therefore, about a man's having or not having "power to distinguish moral right and wrong," and being "morally responsible," are foreign from the purpose. For supposing a man to be wholly destitute of such power, he is then, so far, on a level with the Brute-creatures. Now we all know that many Brutes are capable of being deterred from something, by the apprehension of punishment. A dog may be kept from worrying sheep or poultry, by the fear of a beating. And though the sheep, mentioned in a former Lesson, could not be made to understand that it is morally wrong to trespass on a corn-field, they are kept from it by the fear of a bite from the shepherd's dog.

*Discussions
about moral
responsi-
bility.*

For want of having this simple principle kept before the mind of a Jury, they are bewildered, and left to decide at random, and often decide wrongly.

And it may be added, that a madman will often be so far conscious of his own state, — or, at least, aware that he is *thought* by others to be mad, — that he will thereupon *calculate on impunity*, and act accordingly.

*Expected
impunity.*

There was, for instance, in Dublin, a few years ago, a madman, who threatened and attempted the lives of several persons, on account of some imaginary offence: and, in threatening one of them, he said, "Remember the case of M. who shot Mr. S." He alluded to the case of another madman, who had, a few years before, waylaid and mur-

dered a gentleman, and had been *acquitted*, on the plea of *insanity*.

Again, when, some years ago, a madman set fire to York Minster, it is said that the matter became known to the inmates of a Lunatic-Asylum there, who talked it over among themselves. And one of them having observed that he supposed the incendiary would be hanged, another is said to have replied, "Oh no: he is one of us, and will be acquitted."


And so he was!

§ 8.

There are several very curious mental phenomena which have been purposely left unmentioned in these *Omissions in these Lessons*. Lessons; because, being unknown, or very little known, to most persons, they are also so strange and unaccountable, that no one could be expected to believe them without strong proofs. And to give such proofs, — to bring forward such ample evidence of them as *could* be adduced, and as would be needed, together with a refutation of the objections that have been raised, and also an exposure of the delusions and falsehoods that have been mixed up with well-established facts, — would require a long treatise, quite unsuitable to an elementary Work.

And with respect to the points that *have* been noticed, these Lessons do not at all pretend to have exhausted the subject. A full description of everything relating to the Human Mind, as far as known, and an examination of all the theories concerning it that various writers have framed, would occupy a very large volume.

But it is hoped that the brief outline which has been given, and the remarks made on some important points, may have the effect of turning the Reader's attention to the subject, and exciting him to pursue the study of it: and, especially, that he may have been guarded against being either unduly alarmed and disheartened, or, again, captivated and misled, by bold, but unsound theories, and grand-sounding language that conveys no distinct meaning.



QUESTIONS ON THE FOREGOING LESSONS.

N. B. — It is strongly recommended that the student should go through the *Questions* on each Lesson *before* reading the Lesson itself, and give the best answers he can frame : and when he then reads the Lesson, he will find it more interesting, and will retain it much better. See the Introduction to the *Lessons on Reasoning*.

LESSON I.

KNOWLEDGE of the possession of a Soul general : but the nature of that Soul imperfectly understood. Why? § 1.

Does Scripture give any definite answer to inquiries into that nature? § 1.

“Life” and “Soul,” used indifferently in Scripture? § 1.

“Soul” as signifying “mind” must be distinguished from “Life?” § 1.

Why has the Mind been compared to the Eye? § 2.

Origin of the terms used to express the operations of the Mind? § 2.

These terms led to unconscious Materialism. Why? § 2.

Does the impossibility of a perfect comprehension of the subject render the study of it useless? § 3.

Best method of securing the correctness of such knowledge as can be obtained? § 3.

LESSON II.

How many bodily senses are generally reckoned? § 1.

Occasionally subdivided, how? § 1.

Means by which external organs act on the Brain and Mind?
 § 1.

Sense of touch different from other senses, in what? § 1.

Sensation and Perception distinct? § 2.

Various significations of the word "Sense?" § 2.

"Common Sense," how applied correctly? § 2.

"Good Sense?" § 2.

An instance of the want of? § 2.

No mistake likely to arise from these uses of the word? § 2.

Do the strongest *Sensations* and the most vivid *perceptions* necessarily go together? § 3.

Give an instance? § 3.

Pleasures and pains of Perception not properly *sensual*? § 3.

Are the Senses generally more acute in Man or in the Brute creation? § 4.

Instances? § 4.

Are these *sensations*, properly so called, or *perceptions*? § 4.

Full use of a sense not always born with the possessor? § 5.

In what "sense" is this most clearly observed? § 5.

Opinion that the senses may be educated? § 6.

What is most probably the fact? § 6.

LESSON III.

What is usually understood by "Instinct?" § 1.

Man or Brute most amply provided with? § 1.

Instinct more wonderful than usually supposed? § 1.

Instances? §§ 1, 2.

Instinct a *blind* tendency? § 3.

Meaning of the term? § 3.

Instances? § 3.

Are instincts always original? § 4.

Reasons for the supposition of "Implanted Instinct?" § 4.

Do Brutes possess instincts superior in number as well as in degree? § 5.

Chiefly directed to the supply of two great wants of nature?
 § 5.

Preservative and preventive? § 5.

From Man's want of those instincts what inference is to be drawn? § 6.

Proof of this from an ancient tradition? § 6.

From the experience of all ages? § 6.

This experience a confirmation of Scripture? § 6.

The inferiority of instinct in Man more than compensated for.

How? § 7.

Common opinion with regard to Reason and Language? § 7.

How disproved? § 7.

Instances of "Intelligence?" § 7.

Of the knowledge of "Language?" § 7.

Differences in kind as well as degree? § 8.

Man not in everything superior? § 8.

Some faculties nearly or altogether wanting in Brutes. Which (among others) totally? § 8.

What difference does the absence create? § 8.

LESSON IV.

Many mental and bodily acts under control of the Will. Give examples? § 1.

Do we understand how the Will operates to produce voluntary bodily action? § 1.

Are we conscious of the operation? § 1.

Active Principles of the mind. Mention? § 2.

Definition of "Self-love?" § 2.

Of Conscience? § 2.

Usual application of the word "Passion?" § 2.

Signification of "Feeling," applied indifferently to Action and Suffering? § 2.

Give an example of the instinctiveness of Appetite? § 3.

Appetites lost? § 3.

Or acquired? § 3.

Examples? § 3.

LESSON V.

Differences between "Appetites" and "Desires." Mention two? § 1.

Have Brutes desires? § 1.

What is generally understood by "Affections?" § 2.

What do we understand by "love" as applied to things—circumstances? § 2.

What by "Self-love?" § 2.

How is the word applied? § 2.

True meaning of "loving one's neighbor as oneself?" § 2.

Proper description of those who do so? § 2.

Why is Philanthropy to be considered a Desire (sentiment) rather than an affection? § 2.

Give the true meaning of "Self-love?" § 3.

Impossible for a rational Being to be destitute of it. Why? § 3.

Or for an irrational to possess it? § 3.

Tends frequently in the same direction as "desire" or "taste?" § 2.

Give examples of similar action, or a similar course of conduct from dissimilar motives? § 3.

Self-gratification, not excessive, or ill-directed, or improperly indulged Self-love. How are we warranted in drawing the conclusion? § 3.

Distinction between "Self-love" and "Selfishness?" § 3.

Is "Selfishness" positive or negative? § 3.

Caused by the absence of what qualities? § 3.

Mention another faculty totally wanting in Brutes? § 4.

State the cause of a Brute's apparent sense of having done a wrong action? § 4.

A popular notion with regard to Man's consciousness of "right" and "wrong?" § 4.

How to be proved erroneous? § 4.

By the correct meaning of the expression used? § 4.

By our application of the terms "just" and "good" to God? § 4.

By our not imputing "Sin" to irrational Beings? § 4.

LESSON VI.

Are the *Intellectual-processes* directly connected with the Will? § 1.

- Or indirectly, and how? § 1.
 Common mistake with regard to the Feelings? § 2.
 In what manner produced? § 2.
 In how far can we make the Will influence Feeling? § 2.
 To what physical process is this analogous? § 2.
 To what does generalization in speaking of the mental powers lead? § 3.
 Why? § 3.
 Give examples of Memory? § 3.
 Of Judgment? § 3.
 Of Inventive-genius? § 3.
 What does our experience of developed genius and ability prove? § 4.
 Refutes an assertion occasionally made, how? § 4.
 What is the best method to treat of "Invention" "Judgment," and "Memory?" § 4.
 Give an instance? § 4.
 How does this answer to our mode of speaking with regard to Active-principles? § 5.
 Does it create any confusion of ideas with regard to general temperament? § 5.

LESSON VII.

- Ordinary language correct in defining the seat of the Intellectual Powers? § 1.
 Incorrect as regards the Feelings? § 1.
 In the phraseology of a former period, the Intellectual Powers also improperly referred; state some instances in Scripture? § 1.
 One remnant of this language retained. Mention it? § 1.
 What is the probable cause of the error with regard to the seat of the Feelings? § 1.
 Ancient opinions with regard to the seats of the Passions. Mention them? § 2.
 Probable causes for such. State them? § 2.
 Are the Inspired Writers free from those inaccuracies of language? § 2.
 Is it possible to understand fully the connection between the Mind and its Organ? § 2.

Although no philosophical system can give assurance of a Future State, can any be of use in preparing the mind to receive evidence of such? § 2. (Note.)

And which, in this case, seems best calculated to do so? § 2. (Note.)

Difficulty of reconciling "singleness of mental power" with the "Immortality of the soul." State it? § 2. (Note.)

Contrary opinion rather leads to such conclusion. How? § 2. (Note.)

Connection between the Body and Mind not more removed from our comprehension, than other mysteries of Nature? § 3.

Why is this point frequently forgotten? § 3.

Force of Gravitation, has it been explained? § 3.

What Theory has been set up to explain the operations of the mind? § 4.

How do persons in general use and understand the word "Idea?" § 4.

And in what sense do some Philosophers employ it? § 4.

Difficulty of reconciling this Theory with the belief in "the immateriality" of the Mind? § 4.

Does such a Theory really explain the operations of the Mind? § 5.

What is the actual fact concerning "Idea" or "Mental Imagery?" § 5.

The ready reception of Theories unestablished by sufficient proof, a strange fact of human nature. How to be explained? § 5.

Contrary opinions among Locke's disciples? § 5.

What conclusion must we necessarily draw from them? § 5.

LESSON VIII.

Differences between different persons not confined to the Mental Faculties? § 1.

Illustration of this fact? § 1.

Power of "bodily Sense" sometimes confused with power of "Mental Faculty?" § 1.

Refuted by a fact connected with the "Sense of Hearing?" § 1.

What Mental Faculty is it, the existence of which is proved by this fact? § 1.

Give another illustration? § 2.

And a further proof of the existence of distinct Mental Faculties drawn from a remarkable case of physical malformation? § 3.

State a fact connected with "Memory?" § 4.

Is it observed most frequently in civilized or savage life? § 4.

Or possessed in any degree by the Brute creation? § 4.

Or does it in them take in any degree the form of an instinct? § 4.

LESSON IX.

Mention a Faculty which seems wholly wanting in Brutes and very deficient in Savages? § 1.

Give an instance in each case? § 1.

What cause does this deficiency in the brute-mind seem to depend on? § 1.

What produces incapacity for *reasoning*? § 1.

What is *Abstraction*? § 2.

Definition of "generalize?" § 2.

Give the meaning of "common-term?" § 2.

Give a common application of the words "same," "one-and-the same," "identical?" § 2.

And an example of the application? § 2.

And the cause why so applied? § 2.

Importance of distinguishing this from literal *identity*? § 2.

Of what does the latter not consist? § 2.

Difficulty of avoiding confusion of ideas on this subject. Give an instance? § 2.

Secondary (figurative) sense of the word "same." How sometimes used? § 2.

Why? § 2.

"Sameness" in the original sense does not admit of degrees. Give an example? § 2.

Generalizing process required for the distinguishing of Number (counting)? § 2.

Explain the mode in which carried on? § 3.

Without the specification of objects? § 3.

What is always understood, when speaking of number? § 3.

Is this process generally familiar to the human mind? § 4.

Give an instance by its effect on language? § 4.

LESSON X.

Language as an *instrument* of thought. Brutes incapable of employing it? § 1.

How far do they understand language? § 1.

In what does "Reasoning" consist? § 1.

Give an example? § 1.

Can there be any reasoning-process without a *common-term*? § 1.

Mistake on this subject. State it? § 1. (Note.)

How produced? § 1. (Note.)

Easily shown to be an error? § 1. (Note.)

What are the general-signs commonly employed? § 2.

Give an exception? § 2.

Difficulties of untaught Deaf-Mutes? § 2.

How surmounted in one instance? § 2.

Individuals sometimes employed as signs of a class? § 3.

In what science is this done? § 3.

Comparison evident in all cases of generalization? § 4.

Are Brutes capable of perceiving resemblance? § 4.

What error may be founded on this capacity, by a previous reception of the theory of "Ideas?" § 4.

What is the actual fact? § 4.

Difference between the Brute and Human perception of resemblance. State? § 4.

Give a few illustrations? § 5.

Refer a garment, building, &c., to the various classes, of color, of size, material, value, &c.? §§ 5, 6.

Is education necessary to develop and improve the power of Abstraction? § 6.

How does the Deaf-Mute differ in respect to this power from the most intelligent of the Brute creation? § 6.

LESSON XI.

Probability of there being in every instance of Reasoning, an act of the Will? § 1.

Why not always noticed? § 1.

When are we conscious of it? § 1.

Power of exercising the Will on the operations of the Mind? § 1.

Is it possessed by Man? § 1.

Universally? § 1.

Always equally exercised? § 1.

Is it common to the Brute creation? § 1.

What then is their condition? § 1.

And on what occasions does our condition resemble theirs? § 2.

Are we always conscious of dreaming? § 2.

Do we always recollect having done so? § 2.

How is the absence of the power of Will in sleep to be reconciled with Somnambulism? § 2.

How is the succession of imagery in dreams produced without the power of the will? § 3.

And what is the effect of this? § 3.

Difference of the waking state? § 3.

Resemblance between sleep and Madness? § 4.

Passion? § 4.

Intoxication? § 4.

Interrogation as to present sleep or waking: consciousness not a sufficient answer. Why? § 5.

Correct argument stated in sleep no proof of "process of Reasoning?" § 5.

What is produced by the absence of the "process?" § 5.

"Process of reasoning" always carried on when we are awake? § 5.

Shortness and simplicity of this process in general. An instance? § 5.

Absence of perceptible effort? § 5.

Observation worth making concerning dreams? § 5.

Another? § 5.

Exercise of the Reasoning-faculty *voluntary*. Cause of what? § 6.

Intellectual powers. Why bestowed? § 6.

Our Duty? § 6.

Our Condemnation? § 6

LESSON XII.

Probable seat of the Intellectual-Powers that are peculiar to Man? § 1.

Generally received opinion with regard to the Brain? § 1.

Result of the comparison of the foreheads of Men and various animals? § 1.

Of the more civilized races of Man with the ruder savage tribes? § 1.

What may the facts be taken as a proof of? § 1.

What has been remarked in contradiction of this? § 2.

In what manner may it be explained? § 2.

Corresponds with what is known of all the bodily organs. Give an instance? § 2.

State that which, if existing, might be an effectual refutation? § 2.

"Organ of Comparison," use of? § 3.

Not simple perception of resemblance? § 3.

LESSON XIII.

"Organ of Causality," Office of. § 1.

Is the belief in "cause" general? § 1.

What consciousness is produced thereby? § 1.

Distinct from the Reasoning-faculty? § 1.

Use of the word "because" in reasoning. § 1.

Does it refer to our knowledge, or to that which produced the effect? § 1.

Danger of a confusion of thought on this point, from what proceeding? § 2.

What other danger is to be avoided? § 2.

A common error with regard to "uncertainty" or "contingency." § 2.

From what cause proceeding? § 2.

Different uses of the word "must." § 2.

Is the faculty of Causality the same in all men? § 3.

Are the other Mental Powers? § 3.

This inequality implies in our modern use of a word. What?
§ 3.

From what is the expression borrowed? § 3.

And what should it remind us of? § 3.

Can we give a reason why such should be the case? § 2.

What, therefore, is our duty? § 3.

Mention a former error still maintained by some, though but
a few, persons? § 4.

To what may we compare this notion of Mental-Power? § 4.

Opposed to Experience and Reason? § 4.

And to our knowledge of physical as well as Mental Nature?
§ 4.

The difference not only in *degree* but in *kind*. Instance! § 5.

What is therefore an unreasonable expectation? § 5.

And what practical mistake is frequently made in consequence
of this expectation? § 5.

Improvement of the Mental powers possible? § 6.

Improperly attempted? § 6.

Instance in the case of one of the powers? § 6.

What opposite error is to be avoided? § 6.

What does this produce? § 6.

Does this mental condition bear a resemblance to any physical
one? § 5.

Produced by a similar system of physical training? § 6.

With what object should the Mental Faculties be cultivated? § 6.

And what is the best mode of attaining it? § 6.

LESSON XIV.

Mention a Faculty supposed to be connected with a distinct
portion of the Brain? § 1.

What dependent on? § 1.

Can "Numeration" proceed without Abstraction? § 1.

Or Abstraction without Numeration? § 1.

Explain this? § 1.

Another distinct Faculty? § 2.

Does a supposition of "distinctness" in this case interfere
with what has been already said concerning the use of *Language*? § 2.

Does the power of *Abstraction* confer facility of expression?
§ 2

Is the power of acquiring foreign Languages connected with general superiority of Mental endowment? § 2.

What sense necessary for acquiring a foreign Language by means of sound? § 3.

A distinct Mental Faculty? § 3

Is or is not peculiar to Man? § 3.

More strongly developed in Childhood or Maturity? § 3.

Mention another supposition concerning the acquisition of Languages? § 3.

"Talent for *Languages*." "Talent for *Language*." Difference. Mention? § 4.

Is the former necessary for "accuracy?" § 4.

What is necessary to produce the latter? § 4.

Command of Language. Is it connected with the ready acquisition of? § 4.

LESSON XV.

Individuality. Supposed to be a distinct Faculty. On what grounds? § 1.

How is this power generally designated? § 1.

Is it necessarily connected with other exercises of Memory?
§ 1.

Or with intelligence? § 1.

Attention and Observation, distinct? § 1.

Which connected with "Individuality?" § 1.

Give a comparison between, drawn from a familiar process?
§ 1.

What do the foregoing remarks indicate? § 2.

Which is the more common, Faculty, "Observation," or the power of combining the subjects of Observation, so as to draw an inference from? § 2.

An Illustration? § 2.

Morbid activity of the Faculty, how designated? § 3.

Operating in a more extended manner, produces, What?
§ 6.

Distinction of Inquisitiveness, describe? § 3.

Motive a test? § 3.

LESSON XVI.

- Derivation of *Wit*? § 1.
- Sense in which it was formerly used? § 1.
- Is this "sense" still in occasional usage? § 1.
- What is now understood as "*Wit*?" § 1.
- What is reasonably to be supposed concerning the "*Organ of Wit*?" § 1.
- Distinction between *Humor and Wit*? § 1.
- Effects of each? § 1.
- Laughter. Peculiarity of? § 2.
- Animals unprovided with physical organs necessary? § 2.
- Inference? § 2.
- What faculty does it seem connected with? § 2.
- Excited by? § 2.
- Mention an opinion held by some persons? § 2. (Note.)
- Incongruity, when perceived? § 2.
- Why does Mimicry excite laughter? § 2.
- Parody, the same? § 2.
- Wit* properly so called. Distinction? § 3.
- In what does it consist? § 3.
- Does it necessarily excite laughter? § 3.
- Is *comparison* required? § 3.
- Instance? § 3.
- Cause of the pleasure derived from *Wit*? § 3.
- Another cause? § 3.
- The same acting in a case not connected with *Wit*? § 3.
- The reason why (apart from moral grounds of objection) profane or indecent allusions afford so little pleasure to those who appreciate *Wit*? § 3.
- Another cause of the amusement afforded by *Wit*? § 4.
- An example of this? § 4.
- What has been remarked as existing in most instances of *Wit*? § 5.
- Exhibit this as existing in a Pun or Conundrum? § 5.
- Exposure of a fallacious argument. Effect of? § 5.
- Wit* introduced into valid argument, or connected with profound reflection. Subservient to? § 5.

Has the same effect, though not receiving the same designation?
 § 5.
 Instances (*see Note*)? § 5.

LESSON XVII.

Faculty of Construction, in what consisting? § 1.
 What effect has this power when combined with the knowing faculties? § 1.
 Or with the *reflecting* faculties (*intellectual* power)? § 1.
 Do men differ much as to the degree in which they possess this faculty? § 2.
 What are the effects of a small degree, or a dormant state? § 2.
 Is it supposed peculiar to Man? § 2.
 Its effect in Brutes? § 2.
 What directs the *propensity* in Man, and what in the Brute creation? § 2.
Imaginative Faculty. General use of the word Imagination? § 3.
 Strict and proper use? § 3.
 What is necessary in anything imagined? § 3.
 Impossibility of its being otherwise. Illustrate? § 3.
 How did the ancients prove this by their fables? § 3.
 What may we liken the work of Imagination to? § 3.
 Is the faculty found in Brutes? § 4.
 Illustration? § 4.
 How does this correspond with human actions? § 4.
 Is *Imagination* necessary to Invention? § 4.
 Why do we not speak of "Inventors" as having a "fine Imagination?" § 4.
 What other distinct Faculty is supposed necessary to produce this? § 4.
 What must we believe concerning Invention? § 4.

LESSON XVIII.

Different *natural turns of mind*. Two errors to be guarded against? § 1.

Is the possession of a *variety* of endowments very uncommon?

§ 1.

Or the attainment of some degree of proficiency even in those pursuits for which a man has no remarkable talents, impossible?

§ 1.

Mistakes leading to errors of practice above-mentioned, Name?

§ 2.

Number of different independent Mental Faculties, disproves what ideas? § 2.

Probable cause of mistakes on this point. State? § 3.

Wrong inference? § 3.

How must we calculate the chances against meeting *united*, any two things *opposed*, or *not at all connected*? § 3.

Illustrate? § 3.

Calculation? § 3.

On what supposition does this proceed? § 3.

LESSON XIX.

Exercise of the Faculties, errors in "Comparison?" § 1.

What is meant by an "important point" in this case? § 1.

The real use of the Comparison mistaken? § 1.

The Argument overlooked? § 1.

Or too readily admitted? § 1.

Instances of the character of these errors? § 2.

Comparison of *useful* with *valuable* articles? § 2.

Show the point in which the analogy fails? § 2.

Mandeville's argument against educating the laboring classes?

§ 2.

In what instances would it hold good? § 2.

And in what fail? § 2.

Why? § 2.

Importance of noticing differences. How recognized? § 3.

Words in the English Language derived from "Separation"?

§ 3.

The case in which it is of most importance to notice the points of difference? § 3.

Why? § 3.

Instances? § 3.

- Resemblances easily perceived? § 3.
 Effects of a closer examination? § 3.
 What admission must follow? § 3.
 What do we mean by *Analogy*? § 4.
 Names of things derived from? § 4.
 Two Mistakes concerning Analogies. Name the first? § 4.
 Leads to a false conclusion. Instances given before? § 4.
 Second Mistake? § 4.
 To what leading. Give an Illustration? § 4.
 Various comparisons of the same thing correct errors. Example? § 4.
 Serves as a rule in the use of figurative language. Give a remarkable instance? § 5.
 Kingdom of Heaven compared? § 5.
 Comparisons impossible to be taken literally? § 5.
 Parable of *dishonest* steward. Show where the analogy fails? § 5.
Unkind Neighbor and *unjust* Judge? § 5.
 The word "*is*," instances of its being employed? § 5.
 Meaning? § 5.
 Mistake of Nicodemus? § 6.
 Of the Disciples? § 6.
 Reason why Nicodemus should have become a disciple (as given by himself)? § 6.
 Expressions of Christ, and of the Apostles, still mistaken? § 6.
 Lead to what? § 6.
 Exercise of the faculty of Comparison for the purpose of Illustration. In what manner is it done? § 7.
 Give an illustration? § 7.
 And of the Analogy too literally understood? § 7.
 Consequence of inattention to the above cautions? § 7.
 Subjects in speaking of which we are *obliged* to use analogical language? § 7.
 What has been introduced? § 7

LESSON XX.

Faculty of Construction liable to abuses. Mention one of these? § 1.

- To what error does this correspond? § 1.
 Persons in whom the tendency is strong. Describe character?
 § 1.
 Temptation? § 1.
 In what branches of Philosophy has this abuse been most productive of error? § 2.
 Difference between *religious* and other knowledge? § 2.
 Full and complete system must be erroneous? § 2.
 Natural Science — Process of acquiring knowledge? § 2.
 Possibility of framing systems? § 2.
 The only thing really necessary for avoiding error? § 2.
 Revelation. Partial or impartial? § 3.
 Instance? § 3.
 Probability concerning the Gospel scheme? § 3.
 Ignorance of the *whole* history of the world? § 3.
 Hope held out by the Gospel. What knowledge derived from?
 § 3.
 What was to be expected from partial revelation? § 3.
 Conduct of the truly wise? § 3.
 What may our partial view of a system be compared to?
 § 4.
 Produces no difficulty to those who understand what a "partial view" means? § 4.
 Consequence of an attempt to render it entire? § 4.
 A great danger consequent on an eagerness for forming
 "Theories"? § 5.
 Mode of using words in scientific discourse or writing? § 5.
 Necessity of this mode? § 5.
 Not used in popular writing or discourse? § 5.
 Impossibility instanced by the word "*line*"? § 5.
 Are the Scriptural writings scientific or popular? § 6.
 How then are we to arrive at the Meanings of the words?
 § 6.
 Consequence of affixing technical meanings? § 6.

LESSON XXI.

- Refer to the Faculty described in Lesson 13? § 1.
 What is required in the exercise of it? § 1.

Impatience of some persons at being unable to discover causes.
What does this lead to? § 1.

Frequently combined with abuse of "Construction"? § 1.

Consequence? § 1.

Illustration? § 1.

• "Ideality" (Poetical Imagination). Give an exact definition of? § 2.

What is requisite in the use of? § 2.

To what does the contrary tend? § 2.

And what effect has it in matters concerning Religion? § 2.

Are these abuses of the faculty confined to inferior Minds?

§ 2.

Example? § 2.

Statement of a Roman-catholic writer? § 2.

Have other writers made the same avowal? § 2.

Frequent consequences of having acted on it? § 2.

What may such conduct be likened to? § 2.

Erroneous idea of Humility? § 3.

Argument used in favor of? § 3.

How far is this correct? § 3.

Reason not a substitute for Revelation? § 3.

The real use of Reason? § 3.

Presumption of an opposite course? § 3.

Illustration? § 3.

In what light are we to consider *taste* and *fancy*? § 3.

By what rule should we guide? § 3.

Another danger arising from Over-indulgence of Imagination?

§ 4.

The exercise (with exception) not evil in itself? § 4.

What does the "excess" lead to? § 4.

What effect may it have on the heart? § 4.

On the judgment? § 4.

Erroneous pictures of Human nature in Moral tales? § 4.

Comparison of the Imaginative and Reasoning powers to natural objects? § 4.

Caution necessary in reading Works of Fiction. § 5.

Differences between fancy and reality concerning the powers of doing and suffering? § 5.

What will a want of taking these into account lead to? § 5.

What should we then do? § 5.

Illustrate by mode of proceeding in practical matters? § 5.

Of what advantage is a well-regulated exercise of the Imagination? § 6.

In what branch of study is the exercise essentially necessary? § 6.

How is it to be exercised? § 6.

What effect will it have? § 6.

And what effect will the absence, or non-exercise produce? § 6.

Give an instance? § 6.

What erroneous notion has arisen from a defective Imagination? § 7.

How are many led to believe self-civilization an easy thing? § 7.

What sort of cultivation produces this false reasoning? § 7.

Blindness, difference between *becoming* and having been *born* blind? § 7.

Easiness of picturing the former state? § 7.

Difficulty of the latter? § 7.

Conceptions of Slavery, difference between those *born and brought up*, and those deprived of freedom after having arrived at maturity? § 7.

Analogy holds good concerning our difficulty in imagining savage nature? § 7.

The incorrect notion sometimes appears more natural. Give an instance? § 7.

Another case in which the exercise of the Imagination is necessary? § 7.

What is to be considered when conceiving oneself in the place of another? § 7.

Does this require a strong effort? § 7.

Why? § 7.

Application to Instruction. Explain? § 7.

LESSON XXII.

Necessity of attention to the words used in denoting some qualities or operations of the Intellect? § 1.

What should we then inquire in order to be understood in what we say, or to understand what is said? § 1.

Opinion of some persons on this point? § 1.

What must be the "true sense" of a word in an existing language? § 1.

What do we usually understand by the word Memory? § 2.

By Recollection? § 2.

Explain this? § 2.

Suggest a useful practical rule? § 2.

Imagination and Fancy often used in the same sense. Give an instance? § 3.

A distinction sometimes made. Illustrate by an extract from *English Synonyms*? § 3.

The difference between Imagination and Fancy? § 3.

What does Imagination therefore require? § 3.

And what imply? § 3.

Example? § 3.

What may we include in "works of Fancy" which we could not in "efforts of Imagination?" § 3.

Give a definition of "Conception?" § 3.

Illustrate this, by a general usage of the term? § 3.

Which is "Conception" or "Imagination" more a voluntary act of the mind? § 3.

Derivation of the word "clever?" § 4.

Agrees with the word "skill," "discretion" in what? § 4.

In what manner is the word improperly used? § 4.

What bad practice should young persons in their use of language avoid? § 4.

Correct application of the word? § 4.

Is "Cleverness" a distinct mental Faculty? § 5.

How is the word "Skill" commonly applied? § 5.

And to what classes of persons? § 5.

Is it a distinct Faculty? § 5.

Is "Genius" of the same class? § 5.

Mention some of the powers to which we apply the term? § 5.

Distinction of "a learned" or "intelligent person" from "a person of Genius"? § 5.

Common opinion respecting "Genius"? § 5.

Danger of the abuse of this? § 5.

Proper method of proceeding. Illustrate by a familiar example? § 5.

LESSON XXIII.

- Wisdom, Wit, Science and Cunning.* Derivation of? § 1.
 How distinct? § 1.
 What does this serve to show? § 1.
 What do we now understand by *Wisdom*? § 1.
 Illustration of this? § 1.
 Derivation of the word *Prudence*? § 1.
 How applied now in distinction to *Wisdom*? § 1.
 Relates also to what? § 1.
 Distinction between a *wise* and a *prudent* Statesman? § 1.
Prudence a partial, *Wisdom* a general quality? § 1.
 Meaning of *Cunning*? § 1.
 What does *Wisdom* chiefly consist in? § 2.
 Experience useless without this? § 2.
 Why? § 2.
 A common saying with regard to experience? § 2.
 Prove the fallacy by a simple illustration? § 2.
 Experience. Not creative. What does it supply? § 3.
 What do persons ignorantly speak of? § 3.
 What is actually known *by* Experience? § 3.
 Give an example? § 3.
 How has the knowledge in this case been acquired? § 3.
 Hasty conclusions without sufficient grounds. Give one or two examples? § 3.
 What is commonly called arguing from Experience? § 4.
 And what, from Analogy? § 4.
 Give an example of each? § 4.
 And an illustration? § 4.
 Explain the meaning of "Association" or the term "Association of Ideas"? § 5.
 How is it sometimes misapplied? § 5.
 General familiarity with *Association*. Give an instance? § 5.
 A fact of Common observation. State it? § 5.
 How have some persons made use of this? § 5.
 Is the power of Association perceived in Brutes? § 5.

- What process is chiefly carried on by means of *Association*?
 § 5.
 For what good purpose may we avail ourselves of this? § 5.
 And how is it sometimes injudiciously used? § 5.
 What hasty conclusion do some persons form? § 5.
 Prove the error by an illustration? § 5.

LESSON XXIV.

- Can the word *Sentiment* be used in more "senses" than one?
 § 1.
 What does it most commonly denote? § 1.
 Contrast *Benevolence* as a *Sentiment* with *Good-will* (or love)
 as an *Affection*? § 1.
 Why do we not apply the word to the *Desire* of Gain? § 1.
 What is *Benevolence* designated when applied to small matters?
 § 2.
 Does it require the guidance of the Reason? § 2.
 Instance? § 2.
 What other influence is particularly useful combined with
Benevolence? § 2.
 What *Faculty* combined with *Benevolence* produces "*Public-
 Spirit*"? § 2.
 What error of practice are those deficient in it liable to fall
 into? § 2.
Benevolence of disposition produces happiness to the possessor.
 Can this fact be explained? § 3.
 Seemingly paradoxical? § 3.
 What distinction should we be careful to make? § 3.
 In what are those qualities alike? § 3.
 Motive of the Benevolent Man's conduct? § 3.
 Want of this in the merely good-humored, how exhibited?
 § 3.
 Care in the guidance of *Benevolence*. Necessary also for
Veneration"? § 4.
 Piety misdirected, what does it become? § 4.
 The Lord. The *jealous* God? § 4.
 Direct evil of forgetting this? § 4.
 Indirect effects? § 4.

- An erroneous opinion with regard to Religion? § 4.
 What does Scripture say on this subject? § 4.
 What may be remarked of even the Christian Religion? § 4.
Conscientiousness. (Sense of Justice, Sense of Duty, Moral Faculty, or Conscience). Liable or not to misdirection? § 5.
 How guided? § 5.
 Description of *Conscience*? § 5.
 What mistake may be made concerning its authority? § 5.
 Persecution sometimes conscientious? § 5.
 How should conscience act (Analogy)? § 5.
 Other mistakes beside *conscientious persecution*. Mention one? § 6.
 No authority for this conduct to be found in Scripture? § 6.
 Objection likely to be raised? § 6.
 How is this to be met? § 6.
 Another mistake? § 6.
 Want of the right understanding of Duty, chief cause of? § 6.
 Another error? § 7.
 From what proceeding? § 7.
 To what would a consistent persistence in this lead? § 7.
 Why? § 7.
 And what would be the consequence of such conduct if generally adopted? § 7.

LESSON XXV.

- Confusion of ideas concerning Forgiveness of Injuries. State? § 1.
 Should our "sense of wrong" be influenced by considerations of "self," either in mitigation or aggravation? § 1.
 Why not? § 1.
 What should be our course of conduct? § 1.
 What does the Christian law of forgiveness neither require nor permit? § 1.
 And what distinction should we endeavor to preserve? § 1.
 How is a charitable disposition chiefly shown? § 1.
 What should we be careful not to destroy? § 1.
 Another phase of "False Generosity"? § 2.

- What may be said concerning this and similar faults? § 2.
 True. With a distinction? § 2.
 Answer to the objection? § 2.
 The contrary faults are not likely to be mistaken for virtues?
 § 2.
 When is a warning against error most needful? § 2.
 An Inexorable character. Common opinion concerning the
 contrary? § 2.
 In what case correct? § 2.
 How inapplicable to persons of strict moral principles? § 2.
 Illustrate this by two of our Lord's parables? § 2.
 Sentiment of *Self-esteem*, excess. How named? § 3.
 Difficult to make a mistake concerning the abuse of this Senti-
 ment? § 3.
 Case in which blame cannot justly be attached? § 3.
 What will be the general behavior of a modest person? § 3.
 Independence, commendable? § 3.
 What remark may be made concerning a deficiency in this sen-
 timent? § 3.
 Character of a self-respecting person? § 3.
 Self-respect an assistance towards leading a moral life. On what
 principle? § 3.
 A general acknowledgment of the sinfulness, weakness, and
 ignorance of mankind, no sign of individual Humility? § 4.
 Is it necessary that we should consider ourselves inferior to
 what we really are, in morals or intellect? § 4.
 Why would such conduct be contrary to Duty? § 4.
 To what do Self-conceit and Modesty properly apply? § 4.
 The real distinction between a conceited and a modest man?
 § 4.
 An erroneous opinion concerning? § 4.
 An Illustration? § 4.
 What should be our practical rule on this point? § 4.

LESSON XXVI.

- Desire of Approbation.* Faculty generally possessed? § 1.
 Excess of the desire. How named? § 1.
 Different Forms? § 1.

Pride and Vanity. State the distinction? § 1.

Regard for the opinion of others. Mention some differences in the kind desired? § 1.

What is compatible with a desire for *love*? § 1.

And incompatible with a desire for *respect*? § 1.

Distinction between *felicitate* and *congratulate*, and the Greek word "Macarize." Give the proper application? § 1.

Explain the difference between *admiration* and *commendation*? § 1.

Differences in the *things* for which desired? Name some? § 2.

Differences in the *persons* from which desired. State? § 2.

Desire of Applause. Dread of Censura. Not necessarily combined. Instance? § 2.

What law recognized by society depends on a regard for the *opinion* of others? § 2.

Is it necessarily connected with "Morals"? § 2.

Differs in different nations? § 2.

And classes? § 2.

Dangers of the desire for approbation. Rule for avoiding? § 3.

Distinction between trifling and important matters? § 3.

When is it our duty to seek for the favorable opinion of others? § 3.

And when a necessity? § 3.

Distinction between these cases and those in which it is not to be sought for? § 3.

Scriptural Rule for general conduct? § 3.

Best direction of the desire? § 3.

Purpose for which it was given? § 3.

A circumstance worthy of remark concerning *Vanity*? § 4.

Rule cannot be applied in two other cases (mention), though the result is frequently the same? § 4.

What is also to be remarked concerning *Vanity*? § 4.

Not of necessity belonging to the indulgence of other wrong desires? § 4.

And incompatible with a higher motive? § 4.

Error on this point in the training of the young? §

Two evils likely to arise? § 4.

The wiser plan? § 4.

Give a familiar example? § 4.

LESSON XXVII.

Desire of Society. What distinct from? § 1.

Give an example? § 1.

What instinct does it correspond with? § 1.

Instance of the effects of the latter? § 1.

Is Attachment [Adhesiveness] peculiar to Man? § 1.

What may be remarked concerning this quality in Brutes?
§ 1.

Attachment not to be confounded with *Benevolence* (mentioned before)? § 1.

Mention a quality distinct from *Benevolence*, *desire for Society*, and a tendency to *Friendship*? § 2.

Are the objects of this generally aware of its existence? § 2.

Is it manifested in Brutes? § 2.

Emulation. Description of? § 3.

Give the distinction between it and Envy? § 3.

A definition of *Jealousy*? § 3.

Why are the approaches of Envy difficult to be perceived?
§ 3.

Upon what grounds do we justify, and under what name do we frequently admit Envy? § 3.

A remark of Aristotle and Paley concerning Envy and Emulation? § 3.

This fact conducive to the peace of Society. How? § 4.

Must belong to Emulation? § 4.

Generous Emulation. Use of? § 4.

LESSON XXVIII.

Desire of Power. Generally possessed? § 1.

Give the common name of one form? § 1.

Mention a supposed natural tendency? § 1.

What may be considered the probability? § 1.

And what may be assigned as a reason for its taking this form?
§ 1.

Give examples? § 1.

And a fact in further confirmation? § 1.

What presumption do some persons form on this subject?
§ 2.

God's irresponsibility no ground for such a conclusion? § 2.

An example by which our conduct is to be regulated? § 2.

Evil springing from the love of Power. Mention some of the worst? § 3.

Not in itself an Evil? § 3.

Usual effect of possessing it? § 3.

And of not possessing? § 3.

Both requiring to be guarded against? § 3.

An inference not to be drawn from what has been said concerning the love of power? § 4.

Craving for excitement. To what does it lead? § 4.

Give a proof of this? § 4.

To what may this desire be likened? § 4.

A constitutional peculiarity of some persons. Mention? § 4.

Does not necessarily create kindness of disposition? § 4.

Desire of Gain. Admits of great variety in degree? § 5.

Distinction from Self-love? § 5.

What desire may be sometimes combined? § 5.

What is the excess of this tendency called? § 5.

And to what mistake does this lead? § 5.

Difficulty of guarding against Avarice. In what does it chiefly consist? § 6.

To whom is this danger therefore the greatest? § 6.

Why? § 6.

Different forms of avarice. Mention? § 6.

LESSON XXIX.

What is meant by the *natural* or normal state of the mind?
§ 1.

Analogous to our Physical Nature? § 1.

What is meant by *Idiocy*? § 1.

Is this state ever brought on after Maturity? § 1.

How do we designate this state of decayed powers met with in old age? § 1.

Mind impaired by *irregular action of its powers*. State how designated? § 1.

- How was this word originally used? § 1.
 Existence of *delusions*. How named? § 1.
 Distinction between *Madness* and Delirium? § 1.
 In what does the similitude between Delirium and Dreaming consist? § 1.
 Intermediate state of mind not uncommon in dreaming? § 1.
 Is it experienced in Insanity? § 1.
 Give an instance in proof? § 1.
 Mania. Describe? § 2.
 Is it always combined with Delirium? § 2.
 Give an instance of its separate existence? § 2.
 And an example of Delirium without Mania? § 2.
 The distinction between both and Idiocy? § 2.
 An Illustration of the latter? § 2.
 Of which character does intoxication partake? § 2.
 In what disease does Mania frequently occur? § 2.
 Mention one or two cases in which a contrary condition was developed from apparently the same cause? § 2.
 Mention another description of Mental disorder? § 3.
 In what does it consist? § 3.
 Give one or two cases in example? § 3.
 What does the mind in this condition resemble? § 3.
 Mention a singular instance in which something previously acquired was forgotten? § 3.
 And another in which the acquisition was suddenly recovered? § 3.
 Are these Mental phenomena to be explained? § 3.

LESSON XXX.

- Has it been found possible to educate Idiots? § 1.
 Is this education effectual generally or partially? § 1.
 Give an example of a curious case? § 1.
Monomania. Describe? § 2.
 Give an instance of great caution and ingenuity combined with insanity? § 2.
 Delusions of Insanity prevailing over the evidence of the senses. Give one or two instances? § 3.
 Mention exemption in the latter case? § 3.

Alteration of Feelings in the insane. What is the most common? § 4.

Mention a curious instance of this? § 4.

What course of treatment has experience proved to be the best suited for the recovery of the insane? § 5.

Is the disorder easily removed? § 5.

What circumstance leads to an opposite opinion? § 5.

Mention some of the varieties of insanity? § 5.

Criminal lunatics. Difficulties attending the trial of such? § 6.

Plea of *no wrong intention*. Is this sufficient? § 6.

What else must be proved? § 6.

Actual question for the Jury? § 6.

Ignorance of consequences. A valid plea. § 6.

Distinctions between *intention* and *motive*. Inference to be drawn? § 6.

Crimes excused by the perpetrators. Upon what grounds? § 6.

What may reasonably be concluded? § 6.

The proper end of all human punishment? § 6.

How does this apply to the insane? § 6.

Moral responsibility. How are persons supposed to be totally incapable of, to be regarded? § 7.

And by what motive may they therefore be deterred from crime? § 7.

What consequence has followed a neglect of this principle? § 7.

Capacity for calculating chances in the insane. How has this been exercised? § 7.

Give one or two instances? § 7.

Purposed omissions in these Lessons. Cause of? § 8.

Points that have been mentioned. Do they include all that might be said on each subject? § 8.

Have there been many theories framed on the Human Mind? § 8.

Chief object of this work? § 8.

47

■

11

12

INDEX.

- Abstraction, 52, 54, 81.
 Abstraction combined with Benevolence, 147; employed at pleasure, 61.
 Abstract common-term, 73.
 Abstract Idea (Happiness), 28 ; (Duty), 30.
 Acquisitiveness, 186.
 Active Principles, 24.
 Activity of the Soul, 2.
 Adhesiveness, 176.
 Admiration, love of, 169.
 Affections, 27, 28; seat of, 39.
 Ambition, 181.
 Analogy, words formed by, 4.
 Analogies, 111; comparisons founded on, 111; Mistakes concerning, 111; Memory described by, 112; varied, 112; perception of by Wisdom, 140.
 Animal life, 1.
 Appetites, 25; acquired, 25.
 Applause, desire of, 169.
 Approbation, desire of, 167; dangers of, 170; best direction of, 171.
 Argument, unconsciousness of, 64; dream of, 67; Mandeville's, 100; Mock, 97; comparison introduced, 107.
 Argus, saying concerning (N.), 97.
 Aristotle, remark of, 178.
 Arrrogance, 158.
 Association, 30, 143; accidental, 143; of places with thought, 144; employed in education, 144; as developed in Brutes, 144.
 Attachment, 176.
 Avarice, 187; different forms of, 188.
 Aversion to friends (in the mad), 181.
 Being (Supreme), character of, 149.
 Being (Supreme), civilization derived from, 20.
 Bees, instinct of, 14.
 Benevolence, 146; combined with Abstraction, 147; distinct from Good temper, 148.
 Bodily senses, 7.
 Brain, organs connected with, 7; Mind connected with, 39; possible imperfections of, 71; comparison between Man's and Brutes, 70; probable plurality organs in, 41.
 Brazilian savages, ideas concerning, 130.
 Brutes, reason in, 21; superior acuteness of sense, 10; difference of Man's intelligence, 22; perception of resemblance, 60; power of association, 144; imagination of, 100; Mistakes of, 69; Mental operations uncontrolled, 64; Appetites, common to, 25; instinct superior, 18; incapacity for abstraction, 52, 62; incapable of sin, 32.
 Calculation, aptitude for, 81.
 Castle building, 125.

- Cause and Proof, 75.
 Causes, inquiry into, 74 ; erroneous search into, 122.
 Chance, matter of, 75.
 Chances against union, 105.
 Children, love of, 177.
 Christian Religion, 110, 118.
 Civilization, 129.
 Classification, 62.
 Cleverness, 136 ; not a distinct Faculty, 137.
 Colors, perception of, 7, 48.
 Common sense, 8.
 Common term, 73 ; concrete, 73 ; abstract, 73.
 Commendation, desire of, 168.
 Combination, tendency to, 98.
 Companionship, desire for, 175.
 Compassion, Greek word for, 40.
 Comparison, 60 ; Faculty of, 72 ; exercise of, 115 ; errors in, 108 ; laughter connected with, 90.
 Conceited Man, character of, 161.
 Conception, 99.
 Conceptions, nature of, 136.
 Congruity, 92.
 Conclusion, cause of, 74.
 Conscience, 30 ; errors of, 151.
 Conscientiousness, abuse of, 150.
 Construction, Faculty of, 98.
 Contingency, 75.
 Contrast, 93.
 Crime, prevention of, 200.
 Criminal Lunatics, 199.
 Cunning, meaning of, 140.
 Curiosity, 87.
 Deaf Mutes, 57 ; difference from Brutes, 63.
 Degrees of similarity, 53 ; of Ability, 78.
 Delirium, 190 ; with Mania, 191 ; without Mania, 191.
 Delusions, 197.
 Desires, 26.
 Desire of Welfare, 28.
 Desire of Approbation, 167 ; danger of, 170 ; differences of, 169.
 Desire of Society, 191.
 Desire of Power, 181 ; danger of, 184.
 Desire of gain, 186.
 Destructiveness, 181.
 Discussions on Moral responsibility, 201.
 Discernment, derivation of, 109.
 Disciples, Christ's, 114.
 Discretion, derivation of, 109.
 Dotage, state of, 189.
 Dreams, 65 ; absurdity of, 68.
 Dread of Man, Instinct of, 117.
 Duty, sense of, 30 ; motive of action, 173 ; error in disguise of, 157.
 Earth's Motion (Note), 96.
 Ear for Language, 82.
 Ear for Music, 47.
 Education, association connected with, 144 ; erroneous ideas of, 77.
 Electricity, nature of, 2.
 Eloquence, 84.
 Emulation, 77 ; generous, 180.
 English Synonyms, 185.
 Enigmas, 93.
 Envy, 177 ; remark of Aristotle concerning, 178.
 Errors in education, 173 ; in the exercise of the Faculties, 107 ; from love of system, 116 ; of Conscience, 151.
 Erroneous search for Causes, 122.
 Essay, Locke's (Note), 45.
 Etymologies, study of, 133, 139.
 Evangelists, writings of, 125.
 Evidences of Christianity, 110.
 Excitement, craving for, 185.
 Exercise, appetite for, 25.
 Experience, 141 ; use of, 141 ; and analogy, 142.
 Expected impunity, 185.
 Exultation, laugh of (Note), 90.
 Eye compared with the Mind, 3.
 "Eyes and no eyes," 85.
 Fable of Prometheus, 20.
 Faculty, Moral, 30 ; abuse of 150.
 Faculty of Construction, 98 ; of Places, 50 ; of Number, 51, 81 ; of Comparison, 72 ; of Causes, 74 ; of Language, 81 ; of observing Individuals, 85 ; Imaginative 99.

- Faculties connected with bodily actions, 49.
 Faculties, modes of action, 37; errors in the exercise of, 42.
 Fallacies mock, 95.
 False Humility, 124.
 False generosity, 155.
 Fancy, 133.
 Faults, conduct towards, 156.
 Feeling, signification of, 24.
 Feelings, seat of, 40; influence of the Will on, 84.
 "Felicitated," meaning of, 163.
 Fever, 190; Delirious, stage of, 192.
 Fiction, Work of, 100; dangers of, 125; care to be taken, 126.
 Figures, to be varied, 112.
 Fire, use of, 19.
 Forehead, 70.
 Forgetfulness, cases of, 194, 195.
 Form, eye for, 49.
 Fortune, gifts of, 77.
 Friends, injustice to, 156.
 Friendship, desire for, 177.
 Gain, desire for, 186.
 Games, 101.
 General-terms, formation of, 22.
 General-signs, 57.
 Generalizing process, 54.
 Generous Emulation, 189.
 Generosity, false, 155.
 Genesis, reference to, 21.
 Genius, 138.
 Glory, desire for, 167.
 God, Will of, 31.
 Good sense, 9.
 Good temper, 148.
 Good nature, 147.
 Good and Evil, notion of, 31.
 Governing, taste for, 184.
 Government, 109.
 Gravitation, force of, 42.
 Gratitude, feeling of, 172.
 "Head" and "Heart," 89.
 Hearing, sense of, 47.
 History, study of, 127.
 Human Mind, tastes of, 125.
 Human race, conclusion respecting, 87.
 Humility, 160.
 Humor, 92.
 Hunger, Instinct of, 14.
 Ideas, Theory of, 42, 122.
 Ideality, 123.
 Idiocy, 189, 195.
 Ill-balanced Minds, 80.
 Images, 115.
 Imagination, poetical, 123; dangers of, 126; advantage of exercise, 127; defect of, 129.
 Imaginative Faculty, 99; of Brutes, 100.
 Imitation, 82.
 Impossible, 76.
 Incongruity, 90.
 Individual sign, 59.
 Inexorable character, 157.
 Insanity, 67, 189, 197, 198, 199.
 Insane, treatment of, 198; expected impunity of, 201.
 Instinct, 14; of Brutes, 15; blind, 16; original, 16; implanted, 17; inferior in Man, 18.
 Instruction, 131.
 Intellectual powers, 33; seat of, 39, 70; Responsibility for, 69.
 Intellectual Faculties, errors of, 107.
 Intelligence, 89.
 Intoxication, 191.
 Invention, 102.
 Jealousy, 178.
 Justice, sentiment of, 150.
 Kind, differences in, 78.
 Kingdom of Heaven, Comparisons, 113.
 Knowledge, 75; desire for, 87.
 Knowing Faculties, 98.
 Language, 56; as an instrument of thought, 22; Faculty of, 82; Talent for, 83; questions concerning, 133.
 Laughter, 90.
 Laura Bridgeman, 57.
 Law and Honor, 169.
 Laws, study of, 104.
 Lessons, omissions in, 202.
 Life, 1.

- Love, 27.
 Lunatics, criminal, 199.

 Madness, 189.
 Man, bodily senses of, 7; Instincts, 18; dread of, 17; difference to Brute, 28; originally untaught, 20.
 Mania with delirium, 191; without delirium, 191.
 Materialists (Note), 3.
 Memory, 35; and Recollection, 134; good, 85; described by Analogy, 112.
 Men differ in Mental powers, 47.
 Men not alike, 77.
 Mental powers, seat of, 39; Connected with sight, 48; Original differences in, 36.
 Metaphors connected with Mind, 4.
 Mimicry, 91.
 Mind, proper to Man, 1; Compared to the eye, 3; Language applied to, 4; Comprehension of, 5; Natural turns of, 103; Natural state of, 189; Powers of, 33; Ill balanced, 80; Connection with Brain, 41.
 Mistakes, Practical, 79.
 Mistakes as to Analogies, 111.
 Money, love of, 187.
 Monomania, 196, 198.
 Moral Faculty, 30; abuse of, 150.
 Moral Responsibility, 201.
 Musical Faculty, 37.
 Mysteries of Nature, 42.

 Nature, Gifts of, 77.
 Natural turns, 36, 103.
 Natural Science, 117.
 Nature, Mysteries of, 42.
 Necessary and Impossible, 76.
 Needful Warnings, 152.
 Nerves, 7, 23.
 Nervous sensitiveness, 186.
 Non-resistance, 153.
 Number, Faculty of, 51, 81.
 Numbering, process of, 54.

 Observation, 86.
 Odd and Singular, 55.
 Omissions, 202.
 Organ of Mind, 70; of Sight, 71; of Comparison, 72; of Causality, 74; of Wit, 89.
 Organs, external, 7.
 Original Instinct, 18; Appetites, 25; differences, 36.
 Ostentation, 167.

 Paley, remark of, 178.
 Parables, 112; explained, 114; like Images, 115.
 Parody, 91.
 Partial Insanity, 196.
 Partial Idiocy, 195.
 Partiality, fear of, 156.
 Passion, 24, 67.
 Passions, 40.
 Perception, 8; distinct from Sensation, 9.
 Philosophy, errors in, 117.
 Philosophy, false, 122.
 Phrenologists, opinions of, 70, 72, 85.
 Piety, 149.
 Places, Faculty of, 50.
 Play, 100.
 Pleasures of Imitations, 92.
 Poetical Imagination, 123.
 Popularity, love of, 167.
 Powers, Intellectual, 33; differences in, 36, 47; different subjects of, 37.
 Power, desire of, 181; dangers of, 184.
 Practical Mistakes, 79.
 Praise, desire of, 167.
 Prevention of Crime, 200.
 Pride, 158; Way to find out (Note), 162; Way to cure (Note), 163; Encouragement in striving against (Note), 165.
 Pride and Vanity, contrast, 167.
 Proof, confusion of, 75.
 Prudence, 139.
 Public-Spirit, 147.
 Punishment, fear of, 30.

 Qualities, chances against union, 105.

- Quickness, 137.
- Reason, employed on Religion; 124; employed on Fiction, 127; unaided, 20; of Brutes, 21; questions beyond, 2.
- Reasoning, process of, 22; exercise of Will in, 64; suspended in Sleep, 67.
- Ready reception of Theories, 44.
- Recollection, 134.
- Renouncing the World, 152.
- Resentment, 155.
- Responsibility, 69; Moral, 201.
- Restored Memory, 194.
- Revelations, partial, 118; necessary for Civilization, 20.
- Rokeby, quotation from (Note), 130.
- Rulers, Good and bad, 184.
- Sacred Poetry (Note), 162.
- Sameness, 52.
- Savages, state of, 20.
- Savages, supposed improvement, 129.
- "Science," derivation of, 139.
- Scripture language, 120.
- Scripture terms, 121.
- Self Esteem, sentiment of, 158.
- Self Love, sentiment of, 28.
- Sentiments, 146.
- Sentiment of Benevolence, 147.
- Sensation, 8.
- Senses, bodily, 7; delusions of, 197; indications of, 12; use of acquired, 11; belonging to Brutes, 10.
- Sense, signification of, 8; of Touch, 8; of Hearing, 47; of Sight, 9; of Smell, 9.
- Separation, 109.
- Signs, 57, 59; arbitrary, 143.
- Sin, 32.
- Singular, 55.
- Skill, 137, 109.
- Slavery, state of, 109; ideas of, 130.
- Sleep, 65; sound, 66; walking, 66; supposed argument in, 68; Smile, 90.
- Society, desire for, 175.
- Spleen, 40; opinion concerning, 89.
- Statute (Note), 92.
- Style, 107.
- Superstition, 149.
- Syllogism, contained in Pun, 95.
- Systems, love of, 98.
- Tales, general character of, 125.
- Moral, 126.
- Talents, 76.
- Talents, use of the word, 7, supposed incompatible, 104.
- Talent for Language, 88.
- Talent for Observation, 86.
- Taste, sense of, 7.
- Taste for governing, 184.
- Technical sense of Scripture, 120.
- Temptations to Avarice, 187.
- Tenderness to Sinners, 156.
- Terms, Scripture, 121; general, 22, 60; Common, 52, 56.
- Theories, ready reception of, 44; unintelligible, 44; eagerness for, 120, 116, 122.
- Theory of Ideas, 42.
- Theological Systems, 117.
- Thought, instrument of, 22, 56.
- Thought, object of, 48.
- Thoughts, association of, 143.
- Touch, sense of, 12, 58.
- Tragedy, pleasure of, 185.
- Treatment of Lunatics, 198.
- Turns, natural, 103.
- Turning to account, power of, 86.
- Tyranny, 182.
- Uncertainty, 75.
- Understand, meaning of, 5.
- Union of qualities, 105.
- Unsteadiness of character, 173.
- Use of the Senses, 11.
- Use of experience, 141; of Fire, 19; of Language, 21, 82.
- Vanity, 167; self-defeating, 172.
- Varieties of Insanity, 199.
- Variation of Figures, 112.
- Vegetable Life, 1.
- Veneration, organ of, 149.
- Virtue, feeling of, 160.
- Virtue, mistake concerning, 151.

- Volition, exercise of, 64.
- Will, 23; influence on Feeling, 34; exercise, of, in reasoning, 64; suspended in sleep, 66; Mind of Brutes uncontrolled by, 64.
- Will of God, 188.
- Wisdom, derivation of, 139; definition, 139; distinction from prudence, 139; perceives Analogies, 140.
- Wit, derivation of the word, 89; description of, 89; and Humor, 92; pleasure derived from, 92, 93; argument contained in, 95; connection with Fancy, 135.
- Works of Fiction, 125; care to be taken in study of, 126.
- Words, right meaning of, 133, 139.



1







